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A B S T R A C T
This thesis presents a new paradigm for the modeling of cooperative
human–computer interaction in order to evaluate the antecedents, for-
mation, and regulation of human–computer trust. Human–computer
trust is the degree to which human users trust computers to help
them achieve their goals, and functions as powerful psychological
variable that governs user behavior. The modeling framework pre-
sented in this thesis aims to extend predominant methods for the
study of trust and cooperation by building on competent problem-
solving and equal goal contributions by users and computers. Specif-
ically, the framework permits users to participate in interactive and
interdependent decision-making games with autonomous computer
agents. The main task is to solve a two-dimensional puzzle, similar
to the popular game Tetris. The games derived from this framework
include cooperative interaction factors known from interpersonal co-
operation: the duality of competence and selfishness, anthropomor-
phism, task advice, and social blame.
One validation study (68 participants) and four experiments (318
participants) investigate how these cooperative interaction factors in-
fluence human–computer trust. In particular, the results show how
trust in computers is mediated by warmth as universal dimension
of social cognition, how anthropomorphism of computers influences
trust formation over time, and how expressive anthropomorphic cues
can be used to regulate trust. We explain how these findings can be
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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
1.1 motivation
Of all our social relationships, we prefer individuals we can trust.
Trust, “the attitude that an agent will help achieve an individual’s
goals in a situation characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability”
(Lee & See, 2004, p. 54), is one of the most powerful psychologi-
cal tools at our disposal. The possibility to separate friend from foe
makes trust inseparable from social interactions. Likewise, trust has
grown to become a key psychological variable in human–computer
interaction (HCI) that is just as important as computer reliability for
successful human–computer teams (Dzindolet et al., 2003).
Today, people’s activities often rely on intelligent computer agents,
from smart devices and digital assistants to early social robots. Those
technologies are increasingly endowed with the requirements neces-
sary for complex cooperative interactions, such as problem-solving
performance and autonomy. Performance-based capabilities are a cru-
cial source of information based on which users trust agents (Han-
cock et al., 2011; Lee & See, 2004). Other essential capabilities relate to
an agent’s interface that was engineered for the users to interact with.
Social robots and 3D virtual agents have expressive anthropomorphic
interfaces, enabling them to mimic human appearance and/or behav-
ior in order to make the interaction feel natural to users and influence
them in profound social ways.
Can the mechanisms behind trust be utilized to develop technol-
ogy that people can work together with, similar to how they cooper-
ate with other humans? Computers are no longer used as mere tools.
Rather, humans and computers increasingly cooperate toward com-
plex interaction goals through a series of competent goal-directed ac-
tions (see Fig. 1). In the future, both users and agents could be equally
equipped to contribute to the goal, decreasing functional differences
between the actors, yet increasing the need to understand how users
trust such agents.
Designing for trust is an ambitious task. This thesis focuses on the
psychological problem of appropriate trust, that is, a match between
perceived and actual technology capabilities (Lee & See, 2004). This
perspective needs to encompass human-centered experiential and be-
havioral factors of trust as well as significant developments of intel-
ligent computer agents. Computer agents are ubiquitous, occupy a
wide range of roles, efficiently align to user needs, provide recom-
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Figure 1: Schematic view of human–computer cooperation.
mendations, and permit natural communication. This has major im-
plications for appropriate trust:
1. Technology is increasingly endowed with anthropomorphic char-
acteristics: Speech-based interfaces enable interactions based on
natural dialog and embodied agents such as social robots and
virtual agents have deliberate human-like appearance. This en-
ables designers to implement seemingly social behaviors which
influence user responses in meaningful ways. It is, however, still
mostly unclear if users trust anthropomorphic technologies like
they trust other humans.
2. Cooperative computer agents allow for more open interactions
toward complex goals, exceeding classic interaction metaphors
such as the desktop paradigm. Future systems can engage in
collaborative interactions that involve shared problem-solving
and users being no longer fully in charge of the task. As users
pass responsibility to agents, they need to be able to assess the
agent’s competencies and intentions to contribute to the goal,
leading to a higher need for trust.
These two developments suggest users now can (or must) resort to
previously unavailable cues to develop trust as HCI gradually evolves
toward cooperative interaction. The following characteristics describe
novel challenges users are faced with in cooperative interaction:
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• Complexity: The interaction involves a myriad of degrees of
freedom. Single actions or events not necessarily follow a script
or pattern.
• Interdependency: The actions of the involved agents depend on
each other. In order for them to be mutually supportive, task-
related coordination and communication is required.
• Goal-directedness: The actions are geared toward a specific and
observable or measurable outcome.
• Continued interaction: In order to achieve goals, repeated ac-
tions over an extended period of time are necessary. The trust-
ing relationship is dynamic, it develops and changes.
• Decision-making: Complex decisions require the coping with
uncertainty and risk, and trust is one of the most powerful
mechanisms users have at their disposal to handle this issue.
Additionally, social decision-making involves decisions made
by users and other seemingly social agents.
On the one hand, the above considerations make appropriate trust
all the more important. Untrustworthy agents pose various obsta-
cles and risks. Much like untrustworthy web services, they can have
malevolent intentions and try to exploit users. They can also be too
incompetent to engage with or too incompetent to separate credi-
ble from incredible information, which poses a threat to the interac-
tion goal. Both intention- and competence-related issues imply non-
cooperativeness, yet their relative importance depends on whether
the cooperative framing involves strategic elements and may thus of-
fer exploitation. Extreme examples of the need for appropriate trust
(and pitfalls of modern-day HCI) often contain reports of unfortu-
nate and fatal transportation catastrophes caused by inappropriate
reliance.1
On the other hand, it becomes more and more difficult to estab-
lish appropriate trust in the first place. State-of-the-art algorithms for
learning and user modeling make it seem as if computers really know
their users, although in the social sense, they certainly do not. Cog-
nitive biases distort expectations and authority attributions toward
computers (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). Interface designers use
simple but effective techniques to persuade and motivate users in or-
der to evoke specific behavioral reactions and influence their attitudes
and emotions (Fogg, 2003). Research on nonverbal and multimodal
behavior takes another step forward by demonstrating how robust
trustworthiness cues can be identified and mapped onto anthropo-
morphic agents (DeSteno et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2013; Lucas et al.,
2016).
1 Those reports are not part of the present thesis.
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The implications of intelligent agents that approach cooperative
problems in a human-like manner are still largely unknown, in partic-
ular, how people perceive, trust, and interact with them. Although the
literature suggests that users form trust in computers (i.e., human–
computer trust) differently than in other humans (e.g., Lee & See,
2004; Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007), little is known about how an-
thropomorphic characteristics and cooperative interactions affect trust.
Recent studies maintain that anthropomorphic agents could provide
cues that help users to develop trust in them, but they viewed agents
as rather passive decision support and enabled users to remain fully
in charge of the cooperative task (Visser et al., 2016; Visser et al., 2017).
In order to achieve trusting human–computer cooperation, the HCI
community is in need for cooperative frameworks addressing such
limitations.
1.2 contributions
This thesis adds to our understanding of human–computer trust and
aims to show how cooperation with computers can be achieved. The
approach behind this work is to design trustworthy computer agents
that facilitate appropriate trust for cooperation. If an agent’s inten-
tions are dubious or its competencies are inadequate, user overtrust
should be avoided. Likewise, if the agent’s competencies are ade-
quate, user distrust may cause an overall suboptimal output.
The underlying working hypothesis is that in order to establish
perceived trustworthiness, agents must be perceived and understood
by the user to be willing to cooperate and to have the competencies
necessary to achieve cooperation. An extensive body of work at the in-
tersection of HCI and decision-making research addresses this issue
by adopting behavioral game theory as theoretical foundation and
cooperation framework. This work demonstrated that the human ten-
dency to trust and cooperate with computers is modulated by contex-
tual cues such as anthropomorphism, but it is grounded in simplistic
assumptions about cooperation that ignore task competence.
The methodological goal of this thesis is to extend decision-making
scenarios known from behavioral game theory toward more interac-
tive problem-solving, which requires competent action on both sides.
The central element is a newly developed interaction framework that
has humans and agents contribute equally to the goal. Based on this,
the empirical goal is to analyze how contextual and trustworthiness
factors such as anthropomorphism and competence relate to human–
computer trust. Three research questions will be investigated in the
empirical part:
1. Trust antecedents: How are fundamental dimensions of social
cognition related to trust in computer agents?
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2. Trust formation: What is the effect of anthropomorphism on the
formation of trust in computer agents?
3. Trust regulation: Are anthropomorphic cues suitable for the reg-
ulation of trust?
The underlying interaction paradigm of the present work is cooper-
ation. Cooperative relations are based on effective communication, co-
ordinated efforts, division of tasks, mutual agreements regarding con-
flicting interests, and positive (cooperative) attitudes (Deutsch, 2011).
In HCI, these factors are often largely approximated. Endowing com-
puters with an understanding of naturalistic cooperation is a major
ongoing challenge. Cooperation is often conceptualized using coop-
erative games such as the one-shot or repeated prisoner’s dilemma,
which give access to low complexity and standardized interaction
frameworks. The contribution of the present approach is an interac-
tion paradigm to investigate trust in more naturalistic cooperation.
Several experiments were carried out to analyze trust within the co-
operative paradigm. The first experiment focuses on trust antecedents
in strategic cooperation. It attempts to evoke universal perceptions of
social cognition by modeling two dimensions of strategic decision-
making. These perceptions are then used to predict trust in the agent.
The second and third experiment investigate trust formation in an-
thropomorphic versus non-anthropomorphic collaborators using an
advice adoption scenario. Advice adoption is an important issue in
HCI because people are increasingly challenged with establishing
trust in computer-generated recommendations.
Since trust is a desirable albeit dynamic state of mind, people have
developed mechanisms for its regulation in interpersonal relations.
The fourth and final experiment aims at implementing social regu-
lative behavior into an anthropomorphic agent in order to influence
trust after a critical incident. Incidents such as joint goal failure are
a threat to both trust and continued cooperation. Exploring mecha-
nisms to regulate trust permits feasible cooperative solutions as op-
posed to discontinued interaction.
1.3 thesis outline
A short overview of the structure of this thesis is given below.
Chapter 2: Trust: Theoretical background. This chapter explains the
trust phenomenon, key factors of trust such as social risk and uncer-
tainty, antecedents and specific implications for behavior.
Chapter 3: Trust in human–computer interaction. This chapter turns
to the concept of human–computer trust. It explains the progress
behind anthropomorphic technology and current methodological ad-
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vances regarding the study of trust and cooperation in HCI. To put
human–computer trust into perspective, models and frameworks that
explain how technology socially influences users are explained.
Chapter 4: An interactive cooperation game paradigm for the inves-
tigation of trust in human–agent interaction. This chapter describes
the present thesis’ understanding of cooperation and explains how it
extends predominant methodology. These considerations provide the
motivation to develop a novel paradigm for the investigation of trust.
The paradigm consists of a task as well as key interaction elements
that are based on cooperative principles.
Chapter 5: Experiment 1. The first empirical chapter investigates the
question if fundamental dimensions of social cognition are also re-
lated to trust in computer agents.
Chapter 6 and 7: Experiment 2 and 3. The following empirical chap-
ters approach the potential effect of anthropomorphism on trust for-
mation over time.
Chapter 8: Experiment 4. The last empirical chapter investigates the
ability of an anthropomorphic agent to regulate trust.
Chapter 9: General discussion. The final chapter summarizes the
main findings and discusses their implications for the relation be-
tween social cognition and trust, human–computer trust, requirements
for human–computer cooperation, and design of trustworthy com-
puter agents. The chapter discusses future research directions and
limitations regarding the paradigm and experiments.
2
T R U S T: T H E O R E T I C A L B A C K G R O U N D
Trust has captured deep interest of various scientific disciplines, in-
cluding sociology, social and applied psychology, HCI, economics,
and game theory (Camerer, 2003; Corritore et al., 2003; Fukuyama,
1995; Gambetta, 1990; Lee & See, 2004; Mayer et al., 1995). One rea-
son why trust is such a well-studied phenomenon is that trust is an
indicator of how well interpersonal relationships work. We desire re-
lationships to be of trusting nature because mutual trust makes social
exchanges significantly easier. Students need trust in their teachers,
patients in doctors, buyers in sellers, clients in lawyers, passengers in
drivers, children in their parents.
This chapter outlines the nature (Section 2.1), antecedents (Section
2.2), behavioral consequences (Section 2.3), and regulating factors of
trust (Section 2.4). The role of fundamental dimensions of social cog-
nition – warmth and competence – for trust is introduced in Section
2.5. By focusing on the psychological perspective of trust, one goal
of this chapter is to describe how close the relationship between stan-
dard trust models and recent theorizing on social cognition is.
2.1 the general concept
Trust, “the attitude that an agent will help achieve an individual’s
goals in a situation characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability”
(Lee & See, 2004, p. 54), has broad and significant implications for
the human social life. Trust is a defining characteristic of interper-
sonal behaviors such as assistance, care, cooperation, avoidance, as
well as different types of relationships, including personal, profes-
sional, romantic, and human–computer relationships. Trust is rele-
vant in nearly every, if not all types of social interaction along dif-
ferent degrees of immediacy, intimacy, and individual importance
(Couch & Jones, 1997). It is based on cognitive and affective processes
(McAllister, 1995), evolves over the course of a relationship (Rempel et
al., 1985), and relies on specific interpersonal trait evaluations (Jones
& George, 1998). The social sciences have brought forth several per-
spectives of trust, each with its own conceptualizations. The original
branches focus on trust as general expectation or belief that is rooted
deeply in personality, as institutional phenomenon, or as character-
istic of economic and social exchange relationships (for an overview
see Lewicki, 2006). Adding to this, more recent developments treat
trust as a quantifiable variable in strategic decision-making (Berg et
al., 1995; Camerer, 2003) or as factor that governs user behavior in
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human–computer interaction (Hoffman et al., 2013; Lee & See, 2004;
Muir, 1987).
The question why exactly people trust each other in the first place is
explained in one of the most popular trust models by introducing an-
other relevant concept: trustworthiness (see Fig. 2). According to this
model, trust results from the assessment of the target agent’s (i.e., the
trustee) trustworthiness and the evaluating agent’s (i.e., the trustor)
general propensity to trust others (Mayer et al., 1995). Trustworthi-
ness is an interpersonal quality which signals that the trustee can in
fact be trusted. It is the combination of the perceived abilities and
character (i.e., benevolence, integrity) of the trustee. Ability refers to
a “can-do” and character to a “will-do” dimension of trustworthiness
(Colquitt et al., 2007). In other words, in order to be trustworthy, the
trustee must be able to act in an appropriate and competent manner,
and she or he must be willing to do so.
Figure 2: The Mayer et al. (1995) trust model. Trust is the outcome of an in-
terplay of the trustee’s perceived trustworthiness and the trustor’s
general propensity to trust others.
Current approaches view trustworthiness as the trustee’s likelihood
of influencing the trustor’s goals, given an underlying conflict of in-
terests (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Lewicki, 2006). Similarly, Hardin
describes trust as encapsulated interest: “[...] I trust you because your
interest encapsulates mine, which is to say that you have an inter-
est in fulfilling my trust” (Hardin, 2002, p. 4). Since one can never
be fully certain about the actual outcome of trusting relationships,
the trustor voluntarily enters a state of risk and vulnerability by de-
pending on the trustee (Lee & See, 2004; Mayer et al., 1995). Without
uncertainty and the corresponding risk, trust is irrelevant and not
necessary (Gambetta, 1990; McAllister, 1995).
Before turning to other characteristics, it is helpful to review the
constructs that have been used interchangeably with trust (see Cor-
2.1 the general concept 9
ritore et al., 2003; Hardin, 2002; Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Mayer et al.,
1995).
• Trustworthiness: Trustworthiness is an aggregate of personal
characteristics. The characteristics describe the commitment of
fulfilling another’s trust and thus, trustworthiness begets trust
(Hardin, 2002). This commitment is determined by the trustee’s
ability, benevolence, and integrity with respect to the trustor’s
goals (Mayer et al., 1995). Moreover, the commitment can be
reinforced by internal (e.g., moral obligations, benevolence) and
external forces (e.g., norms, contracts) (Hardin, 2002).
• Predictability: Predictability is different from trust because be-
ing able to predict another agent’s behavior does not imply one
would accept being vulnerable and trust that agent (Mayer et
al., 1995). Trust goes beyond predictability because trust entails
positive assumptions that the agent is likely to act in one’s favor.
This is not the case for predictability.
• Cooperation: Trust and cooperation share a rather close connec-
tion which led to some conceptual confusion in the past. Co-
operation does not necessarily require trust. People can read-
ily cooperate without trust since cooperation does not always
involve risk (Mayer et al., 1995). Today, there is little dispute
over the fact that trust and cooperation are two different con-
cepts: Cooperation involves the behaviors necessary to achieve
a specific goal, whereas trust is an attitude toward social agents.
Section 2.3 gives more details on trust and cooperation.
• Credibility: Credibility and trust also often appear together in
the literature. However, credibility is synonymous with believ-
ability, according to Fogg and Tseng (1999). They side with the
seminal Yale studies and view credibility as the resulting out-
come of trustworthiness and expertise (Hovland et al., 1953).
Thus, credibility is an individual characteristic.
In organizational settings, trust is a cognitive response elicited by
an appraisal of reliable and dependable behavior shown by the tar-
get, or an affective response elicited by benevolence attributions of
the target (McAllister, 1995). McAllister showed that cognition-based
trust promotes affective trust, and he demonstrated behavioral conse-
quences of affective trust. Specifically, affective trust led to the moni-
toring of others’ needs and prosocial behavior.
The model by Lewicki addresses the multifaceted nature of profes-
sional and personal social relationships (Lewicki, 2006). Professional
relationships, he argues, are mainly task-oriented. In contrast, the
main focus in personal relationships is the social and emotional rela-
tionship itself as well as the individuals in the relationship. The model
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distinguishes between calculus-based (CBT) and identification-based
trust (IBT). First, CBT reflects the need to ensure consistent behavior
and is enforced by basic economic calculations of rewards related to
fulfilled expectations, and fears stemming from the possible punish-
ment of trust violations. To gain CBT, people perform actions to prove
their trustworthiness and systematically test each others’ trust. This
type of trust constitutes an early stage toward personal relationships.
Second, as people begin to mutually identify with each others’ de-
sires and intentions, IBT is built. Lewicki describes this higher level
of trust as a harmonious and synchronized state of profound inter-
personal identification.
In another model on the qualities of close interpersonal relation-
ships, trust evolves along with the maturing of the relationship (Rem-
pel et al., 1985). In early stages, predictability, the extent to which
behavior can be anticipated, is most relevant for trust. Predictability
judgments are somewhat similar to ability/competence attributions
(Lee & See, 2004) because perceived predictability is based on con-
sistency evaluations over repeated observations and hardly requires
intention inferences (Rempel et al., 1985). Instead, the accuracy of pre-
dictability judgments is proportional to the amount of past observa-
tions. Predictability is followed by dependability (reliability, honesty,
integrity) attributions that focus on the target as an individual with
certain qualities and characteristics. Here, evidence of predictability
provides a foundation of dependability attributions. In the final stage,
faith in the other facilitates trust in that it transcends the necessity
of any past experience and permits the enduring of uncertainty and
risk. This model is compatible with the view that trust is no static, sta-
ble, or single-point phenomenon. Rather, trust can be seen as phase-
specific variable that changes over time and traverses several stages
such as building, stability, and dissolution (Rousseau et al., 1998).
According to Jones and George (1998), the interpersonal interac-
tion of values, attitudes, and moods/emotions is important for trust.
These traits differentially influence the trust experience. Values deter-
mine the dimensions other social agents are evaluated on (e.g., pre-
dictability, reliability, competence, integrity) and individually affect
trust by emphasizing certain qualities over others. Attitudes, the eval-
uative knowledge regarding specific objects that govern behavioral
responses to the objects (Olson & Zanna, 1993), influence trust as
they contain trustworthiness judgments. Moods and emotions are an
integral part of the trust experience itself (see also Lee & See, 2004).
As people sometimes engage in introspection to observe their own
affective response to others, leading to initial trust or distrust, moods
and emotions are also antecedents of trust. In contrast to values and
attitudes, moods and emotions are less stable as they accompany
changes in the trust experience.
Based on this review, the trust models share a couple of similarities:
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• Trust is a way of handling imperfect knowledge in the context
of interpersonal behavior and relations
• Trust can have cognitive and affective sources
• From a psychological point of view, trust can only be put in
social agents capable of benevolent and malevolent intentions
• Trust is conceptualized along a single dimension ranging from
high trust to high distrust (but see Lewicki, 2006)
• A crucial perceived quality that makes people accept the uncer-
tainty and vulnerability associated with the trust put in others
is trustworthiness
2.2 antecedents of trust
In order to trust a social agent to perform a specific action, one must
assume the agent has the competence and intention to perform it
(Deutsch, 1962). People are naturally motivated to categorize others
as friend or foe based on their intentions (Fiske et al., 2007). In doing
so, they generate an information base for deciding whom to approach
or avoid, and in which cases cooperation may be a smart choice. This
is important for understanding the meaning of trustworthiness for
trust. Trustworthiness is essentially a decision aid: “[...] we cogni-
tively choose whom we will trust in which respects and under which
circumstances, and we base the choice on what we take to be ’good
reasons,’ constituting evidence of trustworthiness” (Lewis & Weigert,
1985, p. 970). Trustworthiness, the “willingness to be conditionally co-
operative” (Boone & Buck, 2003, p. 165), is a quality one is ascribed by
others and explains why agents are trusted (Mayer et al., 1995). Some
argue that trust and trustworthiness are inseparable. Trust encapsu-
lates trustworthiness evaluations, and trusting someone who is not
trustworthy is maladaptive in the context of social relations (Hardin,
2002). Perceiving social agents as trustworthy leads to trust and emo-
tional attachment (Colquitt et al., 2007).
Trustworthiness is promoted by behavioral factors and anthropo-
morphic cues. Goal-oriented behavioral factors that contribute to trust-
worthiness are perceived ability, benevolence, and integrity (Mayer et
al., 1995). Ability refers to the skills, competencies, and characteris-
tics allowing an agent to exert influence in a specific domain. Benev-
olence describes the degree to which the trustee wants to do good
to the trustor and suggests some sort of attachment between the two
agents. Integrity is the extent to which both agents’ principles and
moral attitudes are aligned. Ability is argued to be a cognitive cue
of trust, benevolence and integrity are emotional cues (Dunn, 2000).
Overall, an agent worth trusting shows reliable and predictable task
performance, has a positive orientation to others’ problems as well
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as goals by complying with the goal-oriented purpose its competen-
cies are attributed with, and adheres to integrity expectations arising
throughout the problem-solving process (Lee & See, 2004). These re-
quirements underline that in contrast to trust in mere actions, trust
in agents grows if the trustor attributes trustworthy qualities to the
trustee.
Anthropomorphic cues play an important role for trustworthiness.
In particular, facial appearance (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Todorov,
2008; Winston et al., 2002), nonverbal behavior (DeSteno et al., 2012),
male facial width (Stirrat & Perrett, 2010), and facial emotion displays
(Boone & Buck, 2003) were shown to be involved in the formation of
trustworthiness. Judging the trustworthiness of neutral faces is a va-
lence evaluation, that is, facial trustworthiness describes how positive
or negative target faces are perceived. This is important for inferring
the target’s intentions because it enables the efficient identification
of approach/avoidance signals in the form of happiness and anger
features (Todorov, 2008). Researchers uncovered the relation between
facial features and trustworthiness using a facial computer model that
permits the exaggeration of facial dominance and trustworthiness
(Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). In the first step, open descriptions of hu-
man faces were collected and condensed into specific traits, including
attractiveness, unhappiness, and sociability. Another group of partic-
ipants then rated the faces on those traits. Principal component anal-
yses revealed two underlying dimensions of face evaluation: valence,
describing attractive and non-aggressive faces, and dominance, de-
scribing dominant, aggressive, and confident faces. Trustworthiness
judgments correlated highly and reliably with the valence dimension.
Finally, the authors constructed a computational model of how faces
vary on dominance and trustworthiness, and randomly generated 300
emotionally neutral faces. It was found that linearly extrapolating the
facial shapes along the previously uncovered trustworthiness dimen-
sion induced a shift from perceived anger (low trustworthiness) to
happiness (high trustworthiness) among participant ratings (Ooster-
hof & Todorov, 2008).
Expressing one’s desires and intentions through emotion in an ac-
curate fashion is a trait known as emotional expressivity. With this
ability, social agents communicate their trustworthiness and willing-
ness to cooperate (Boone & Buck, 2003). Accordingly, people rely
heavily on the judgment of facial expressions to judge honesty in
face-to-face negotiation (Lucas et al., 2016). This suggests that the en-
coding and decoding of trustworthiness is an emotional process go-
ing beyond the mere signaling of approach and avoidance (Boone &
Buck, 2003) as, indeed, the decoding involves brain regions dedicated
to processing emotions (Winston et al., 2002). Moreover, the ability to
decode even subtle facial cues is advantageous in situations that re-
quire trust decisions (Krumhuber et al., 2007). In a similar way, the
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combination of certain nonverbal behaviors related to approach and
avoidance intentions (e.g., leaning away from the counterpart, cross-
ing arms) were found to predict trustworthiness judgments (DeSteno
et al., 2012). It is necessary to recognize the context-free environ-
ment of some of these studies (for exceptions see DeSteno et al., 2012;
Krumhuber et al., 2007; Lucas et al., 2016), implying that behavioral
responses underlie the context-dependent activation of evaluative di-
mensions (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008).
In a survey study, researchers analyzed the role of liking for trust
in the relationship between buyers and sales reps (Nicholson et al.,
2001). Liking is seen as affective trust antecedent that creates personal
attachments. The attachment or bond is driven by common interests,
a shared outlook, and frequency of interactions. However, over time
these factors become less important for trust as the attachment itself,
once established, is now the primary antecedent. The results show
that liking mediates the effect of cognitive antecedents on trust, that
is, value similarity and frequency of interactions. Moreover, they in-
dicate that trust can indeed become more affect-based over time.
To summarize, liking and trustworthiness are key elements to un-
derstand how trust is formed. From an evolutionary point of view,
individuals adapting to identify benevolent (trustworthy) and mali-
cious (untrustworthy) intentions in others over the course of a social
categorization process hold a crucial advantage and can adjust their
behavior accordingly, including the decision to trust or not (Fiske
et al., 2007). Going beyond this, emotion expressions which are hy-
pothesized to signal trustworthiness increase trust and cooperation
in social dilemmas (Krumhuber et al., 2007; Melo et al., 2014). Impor-
tantly, both the behavioral and anthropomorphic dimension highlight
trustworthiness as an interpersonal quality.
2.3 behavioral implications of trust : risk taking , coop-
eration, reliance
Like other psychological constructs, trust is a bridge between beliefs
and behavior (Lee & See, 2004). The influence of trust on social be-
havior is explained by the notion of risk, the perceived probability of
loss (Chiles & McMackin, 1996). Trust permits people to cope with
the risk of being uncertain regarding the intentions and actions of
others (Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). Risk taking, then,
is making oneself vulnerable by the willingness to depend on others
(Mayer et al., 1995), or by the willingness to accept non-reciprocated
social investments in social exchanges (Shore et al., 2006). There is a
reciprocal relationship between trust and risk taking: risk may lead to
trust, which creates risk taking (Rousseau et al., 1998). Taken together,
risk taking is a central consequence of trust. The behavioral manifes-
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tation of risk taking takes many forms, and the amount of risk one is
willing to take depends on the amount of trust (Mayer et al., 1995).
As explained earlier (see Section 2.1), the close connection between
trust and cooperation has led to some conceptual confusion in the
past. Today, researchers have established the important difference be-
tween both constructs: while trust is a psychological state, coopera-
tion is some form of interpersonal interaction that may rely on trust
but can also have more elementary foundations. Among those, ini-
tial cooperation between individuals followed by strict reciprocity
has been shown to be fairly robust (Axelrod, 1984). Moreover, on
this account, it is possible to explain cooperation as an evolutionary
key mechanism between biological organisms (Brosnan et al., 2010;
Trivers, 1971). These considerations aside, broad evidence suggests
that cooperation is facilitated by trust, a finding that is well-studied
in the context of social dilemmas (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Dawes,
1980). Social dilemmas are defined as a conflict between immedi-
ate self-interest and long-term collective interest (Van Lange et al.,
2013). The underlying idea of social dilemmas is that one is better
of with defecting, irrespective of the other individuals’ choice, but
taken together, all individuals would benefit from collective cooper-
ation (Dawes, 1980). Under these conditions, the importance of trust
for cooperation is amplified by the magnitude of conflicting interests
between the individuals (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013). The link between
trust and cooperation is also well-established in the context of organi-
zations (Jones & George, 1998; Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995). In
the organizational context, cooperation is usually understood as help,
assistance, or teamwork. Jones and George suggest the form of co-
operation depends on whether trust is conditional or unconditional
(Jones & George, 1998). Conditional trust represents the minimum
level of trust to facilitate social and economic exchanges toward a
common goal, based on the prospect of future beneficial interactions.
Unconditional trust, on the other hand, follows from shared values
and confidence in the involved co-workers’ trustworthiness. The lat-
ter fosters a type of cooperation characterized by high personal costs
and self-sacrifice.
The relation between trust and cooperation is more complex than
it may seem at first glance. For instance, it was found that people en-
gage in unconditional cooperation to signal trustworthiness (Jordan
et al., 2016). In economic decision-making, the degree to which par-
ticipants cooperate unconditionally with a hypothetical target is in-
creased if participants knew they would be observed. Unconditional
cooperation occurred either if participants refused to take the chance
to learn about the associated costs of cooperation, or quickly decided
to cooperate after the cost was revealed. In the next phase, partici-
pants played the trust game with those who observed their earlier
decision. If the previous decision was known to observers and if
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participants cooperated unconditionally before, the observers trusted
participants more by sending them more money. Finally, participants
that cooperated unconditionally actually were more trustworthy than
those who did not as they also returned more money to the observers
in the same trust game. This suggests that reputation building is a
central underlying motivation behind the relation between trust and
cooperation. The researchers could also demonstrate that uncondi-
tional decisions serve the purpose of signaling trustworthiness for
future cooperation and are not caused by the desirability of uncondi-
tional decisions in general. Furthermore, it was shown that coopera-
tion is both consequence and antecedent of trust.
Trust is not only important in interpersonal interactions, it has im-
plications for HCI as well. A well-established notion is that trust gov-
erns, but not completely determines reliance in computers. Lee and
See developed a conceptual model to describe why people often rely
on computers they trust and reject those they do not trust (2004).
According to their model, the intention to rely on computers is influ-
enced by human workload, self-confidence, perceived risk, and effort
to engage. If the intention is formed, time constraints and configura-
tion errors affect actual reliance. Lee and See identified a bidirectional
relation between trust and reliance to the extent that reliance often
determines trust. If a computer is not used, that is, relied on, trust is
harder to grow because information regarding its capabilities remain
limited.
2.4 trust regulation
Establishing trustworthiness and building trust do not occur in iso-
lation but in the context of dynamic and complex social interactions.
Trust processes can be regulated actively with the goal in mind to
continue the interpersonal relationship. Lewicki explains how people
typically regulate the different forms of trust he and his colleagues
proposed (Lewicki, 2006). To manage calculus-based trust (CBT), the
type of trust based on punishment, reward, and the associated fears
and hopes, a mutual agreement among the involved parties regulates
the functioning of the social exchange by negotiating shared expec-
tations and monitoring each other’s actions. In contrast, high-level
forms such as identification-based trust (IBT) are managed by pro-
moting a shared identity based on similar group memberships, in-
terests, goals, values, and reactions to familiar situations. People are
motivated to balance self-protection in the face of vulnerability on
the one hand and the attainment of mutual goals on the other. A key
for achieving this is to build sufficient CBT such that the handling of
clear behavioral expectations is facilitated, and to acknowledge mat-
ters of distrust in order to define solutions prior to the emergence
of conflict. Differentiating between basic exchange-based and higher
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levels of trust hence suggests that disagreements pertaining to beliefs
or personal values which stand in the way of IBT be separated from
the foundation of calculus-based interactions (Lewicki, 2006).
A critical component of the dynamics of trust are trust violations.
Trust violations impede the maintaining of trust in human–human
(Lewicki & Bunker, 1996) and human–computer interactions (Muir &
Moray, 1996). Both expectations, trusting (e.g., high competence) and
distrusting (e.g., low competence) behavior, can be violated, although
the former kind usually is more significant (Lewicki, 2006). Trust in
computers typically diminishes when the system produces obvious,
detectable errors. Errors contradict assumptions of trustworthiness,
reliability, and accuracy and since they are better remembered, vio-
late trust (Dzindolet et al., 2003). This process is seen as an affective
response to violations or confirmations of implicit expectations (Lee
& See, 2004). Muir and Moray found that trust is affected by both
the magnitude and variability of a computer’s competence (Muir &
Moray, 1996). Their results also indicate that trust does not necessar-
ily decline gradually with increased errors. They observed a steep
decline at the beginning and a moderate decline later on. Moreover,
a loss of trust is not always tied to degraded system performance
but, being a fragile construct, may occur even if an error only mo-
mentarily affects performance, without an effect on overall system
performance. However, evidence suggests the loss of trust after trust
violations by computers can be regulated. For instance, rather than
displaying erroneous output, providing users with continuous feed-
back regarding computer performance, or giving them a reason why
it may produce an error increases the willingness to trust (Dzindolet
et al., 2003). The ongoing development of trust may depend on initial
assessments (Muir & Moray, 1996). Furthermore, distrust appears to
be more resilient than trust (Muir & Moray, 1996; Muir, 1994).
There are explicit repair techniques to overcome trust impairments
following from trust violations. In interpersonal relationships, apolo-
gies can help rebuilding trust, especially when they are carried out
sincerely and the nature of the past relationship provides reasons
to overcome strong violations with reconciliation (Tomlinson et al.,
2004). The effectiveness of an apology versus denial is affected by the
violation. Fine-tuned apologies are effective if mistrusted individu-
als apologize for competence-based violations but deny responsibil-
ity for integrity-based violations, and apologize before evidence of
actual guilt is revealed but deny responsibility before they are found
innocent (Kim et al., 2004). Aside from apologies, trust repair may
require an extended period of time in order to permit the reassur-
ance of reliability, hence explicitly addressing matters of distrust may
provide short-term solutions, for instance by temporarily minimizing
vulnerability (Lewicki, 2006). There are few studies that investigated
the effect of computer apologies on the interaction. It was found that
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people accept the notion of computer apologies and that they may
be beneficial regarding users’ moods and the interaction experience
(Akgun et al., 2010; Tzeng, 2004). Robots that blame themselves for er-
rors or the human–robot team are more likable than those that blame
the user (Groom et al., 2010; Kaniarasu & Steinfeld, 2014). However,
with respect to trust as outcome variable, the only study being avail-
able found no differences between a self-blaming, user-blaming, and
team-blaming robot (Kaniarasu & Steinfeld, 2014).
2.5 the role of fundamental dimensions of social cog-
nition : warmth and competence
People often lack the time and cognitive resources to make thorough
judgments in complex and dynamic social decision situations. Con-
verging evidence shows that a large fraction of interpersonal judg-
ments is located on two universally prevalent dimensions of social
perception: warmth and competence (Fiske et al., 2007; Judd et al.,
2005; Wojciszke, 2005). Warmth is associated with perceived trustwor-
thiness, friendliness, empathy, and kindness, and competence is re-
lated to perceived intelligence, power, efficacy, and skill (Cuddy et al.,
2011). In the past, the understanding of warmth conceptually approx-
imated to trustworthiness (Campbell et al., 2001; Fletcher et al., 1999)
or morality (Wojciszke, 1994), yet the underlying meaning remained
the same. Specifically, warmth attributions reflect perceptions of the
behavioral intentions of a social agent, while competence attributions
pertain to perceived behavioral effectiveness (Fiske et al., 2007). More-
over, warmth judgments are based on perceived motives (Reeder et
al., 2002) and they affect trust and doubt in others’ motives (Cuddy
et al., 2011). Unveiling the role of the warmth and competence frame-
work for social cognition was particularly fruitful for research on be-
havior construal (Wojciszke, 1994), impression formation (Wojciszke
et al., 1998), and stereotypes (Cuddy et al., 2008; Cuddy et al., 2007;
Judd et al., 2005).
In a series of experiments involving impression formation based
on vignettes and other textual materials, Wojciszke and colleagues
demonstrated how warmth judgments shape social perception (Wo-
jciszke et al., 1998). Warmth traits were more accessible than com-
petence traits, more relevant for impressions in terms of prediction
accuracy and weight, and the dominance of warmth traits was more
pronounced for females. Competence attributions are easier to estab-
lish and maintain, but warmth attributions carry a potentially higher
risk because the consequence of misinterpreting bad intentions can be
severe (Cuddy et al., 2011). Warmth and competence are central un-
derlying factors of stereotypes across cultures (Cuddy et al., 2008).
Moreover, the combinations of high versus low warmth and com-
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petence judgments determines emotional responses towards targets,
such as admiration, contempt, envy, and pity (Cuddy et al., 2007).
What is the relation between those omnipresent judgments and
trust? The psychological function of warmth and competence judg-
ments is to explore one’s own behavioral options. There is no dispute
over the impact of warmth and competence on approach–avoidance
behaviors, yet empirical findings as to how these judgments influ-
ence interpersonal behavior across different situations are mostly re-
stricted to survey- and vignette-based studies (Asch, 1946; Cuddy et
al., 2007; Wojciszke et al., 1998). For instance, warmth-based stereo-
types are associated with active behaviors such as facilitation (high
warmth) and harm (low warmth) (Cuddy et al., 2007). One of the
common approximations of warmth in the literature is centered on
trustworthiness and feelings of trust (Campbell et al., 2001; Fiske et
al., 2007; Fletcher et al., 1999; Williams & Bargh, 2008). Recall that
trustworthiness provides an information base to decide if one can
trust another agent (see Section 2.2). Indeed, trustworthiness traits
such as benevolence and integrity are congruent with traits occupy-
ing the warmth label, including fair, generous, helpful, honest, under-
standing (Wojciszke et al., 1998). In their review, Fiske and colleagues
do not explicitly discuss the empirical evidence of the relation be-
tween perceived warmth, trustworthiness, and trust, but noted: “al-
though one could quibble over separating or combining trust and
warmth, there is a core linkage between the two features, with trust
and warmth consistently appearing together in the social domain”
(Fiske et al., 2007, p. 77). Trustworthiness is essentially seen as warmth
trait, and perceived intent is the underlying psychological meaning
of the combined traits, that is, “friendliness, helpfulness, sincerity,
trustworthiness, and morality” (Fiske et al., 2007, p. 77). Conceptually,
both warmth and competence as well as trustworthiness attributions
are means for people to categorize perceived intentions and abilities.
Importantly, trustworthiness captures both perceived intentions and
abilities, not just perceived intentions. Based on this, reducing trust-
worthiness to warmth falls short of capturing performance-related
abilities needed to actually achieve tasks toward cooperative goals.
Consistent with the view that warmth and competence together in-
volve perceived intentions and abilities, one possible solution toward
theoretical integration is to understand trustworthiness as one of the
outcomes of warmth and competence attributions. Given a lack of em-
pirical evidence, this remains a proposition.
In sum, a better understanding of the relation between warmth
and competence on the one hand and trust variables on the other
hand could help explaining how people distinguish trustworthy from
untrustworthy social agents and how this affects behavior. Specifi-
cally, this open question could show links between the implications
of warmth and competence and the antecedents of trust and trust-
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worthiness, and achieving this is practically relevant for understand-
ing interpersonal interactions. For instance, people are more willing
to cooperate with trustworthy agents in social dilemmas (Boone &
Buck, 2003; DeSteno et al., 2012; Krumhuber et al., 2007) which is es-
pecially relevant in one-shot interactions that do not offer punishment
(Janssen, 2008). Moreover, the capability to detect untrustworthy indi-
viduals is supported by perceptual and cognitive processes, but this
mechanism appeared to be mitigated by how competence (i.e., status)
affects warmth (i.e., attractiveness) (Mealey et al., 1996).
2.6 summary
Trust works like a social compass in a complex world filled with
risky choices. Trust allows people to take risks and engage in co-
operation with others. The issue of whom to trust is essentially a
decision-making problem that is governed by cognitive and affective
processes. In this process, trustworthiness is a trust antecedent. Peo-
ple evaluate the perceived abilities and intentions of others to infer
their trustworthiness based on which trust develops. From a social
cognition perspective, trustworthiness formation is similar to the eval-
uation of warmth and competence, although there is little empirical
evidence of the precise relationship between warmth, competence,
and trustworthiness. Anthropomorphic cues such as facial features
play an important role for social cognition because the underlying di-
mensions of face evaluation, valence/trustworthiness and dominance,
enable intention inferences. Since trust evolves over time and some-
times rapidly changes, there are mechanisms for its regulation in or-
der to prevent the decline of trust and relationships altogether.

3
T R U S T I N H U M A N – C O M P U T E R I N T E R A C T I O N
People’s lives are pervaded by technology. Automated machines, com-
puter agents, and service robots help us achieve our goals in a myriad
of ways. Digital assistants that are always within our reach recom-
mend directions, travel targets, movies, new friends, and shopping
products. Computers incrementally interpret, correct, and complete
human input. Conversational agents chat with us in virtual environ-
ments and solve complex issues such as self-service and customer
support. Industrial robots and assistance systems for manufacturing
enable the supervision, maintenance, and control of large-scale in-
dustrial facilities, even from a distance. On top of that, autonomous
vehicles could soon revolutionize public and private transportation.
Technology closely adapts to our needs, occupies entirely new roles,
and performs complex cognitive tasks related to perception, planning,
and problem-solving. Although the statement may not be true in the
rational sense, computers are clearly perceived to be more than mere
tools.
Human–computer trust is a special form of trust. Early on, trust
has been recognized as a central human factor in HCI, but the advent
of technological devices with intelligent problem-solving capabilities
and human-like characteristics such as facial animation and natural
language communication raises important questions as to how people
develop trust in computer agents.
This second chapter on trust gives an overview of key aspects of
human–computer trust research and pursues a central underlying
question: What are the characteristics of human–computer trust?
Section 3.1 describes the relevant factors of human–computer trust.
Section 3.2 describes how anthropomorphism fundamentally changes
or understanding of HCI. Section 3.3 is devoted to current advances
of human–computer interaction studies on trust and cooperation. Tech-
nology influences people’s affective, cognitive, and behavioral pro-
cesses in many ways. Section 3.4 shows how different theories, mod-
els, and frameworks explain the social influence of technology on
human users.
3.1 factors of human–computer trust
The history of HCI is also a story of who is in charge, the computer or
the human user. For instance, the progress behind decision support
systems between the 1960s and 80s was appraised as a move away
from the control of expert systems over users, toward users taking
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over decision authority and responsibility (Muir, 1987). In retrospect
it became obvious that computers had been viewed predominantly
as mere tools because gradually, remarkable contrasts to this earlier
view emerged. Computers took on a host of important roles across
different domains at the workplace, became increasingly indispens-
able, and communicated with humans in novel ways. This fundamen-
tally changed the way people interacted with them (Hoc, 2000; Nass
et al., 1996). As a consequence, researchers began to systematically in-
vestigate if people treat computers in unanticipated ways. Indeed, it
was revealed that users applied social norms to computers and show
social responses such as gender-stereotyping (Nass et al., 1994).
Today, with the heterogeneous range of human–computer applica-
tions such as negotiation (Lin & Kraus, 2010), supervisory machine
control (Sheridan & Parasuraman, 2005), long-term relationships (Bick-
more & Picard, 2005), and cooperative teamwork (Bradshaw et al.,
2012; Wissen et al., 2012), trust remains as a consistently important
factor in HCI. Appropriate forms of trust prevent maladaptive human
behaviors caused by distrust and overtrust (Lee & See, 2004). Trust
regulation techniques are helpful in overcoming trust violations such
as errors (Visser et al., 2016), allowing for feasible adjustments like
trust calibration in contrast to more costly solutions like technology
disregard. The idea of calibrated trust is a key element of automation
research, a scientific branch concerned with how people use auto-
mated agents to achieve their goals. According to this view, calibrated
trust is a match between user trust and actual technology capabilities
and involves evaluations of trustworthiness and competence (Muir,
1987). Notably, automation research predicts that human–computer
trust deviates from interpersonal trust and highlights the unique hu-
man responses to technology (Lee & See, 2004).
What are the key factors of human–computer trust? The literature
suggests that the specific characteristics revolve around a number of
concepts:
1. Trust antecedents
2. Focus and modes of trust
3. Trust dynamics and the processual character of trust
4. The relation between human–computer and interpersonal trust
5. Idiosyncrasies of the technology and nature of interaction
This list could be extended to include factors such as the organiza-
tional and cultural context of trust, or how information is processed
in the context of trust formation, but for the sake of brevity we focus
on the essential elements above.
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i) trust antecedents . A trust antecedent is information that in-
forms a trustor about a trustee’s competence to achieve the trustor’s
goals (Lee & See, 2004). In an effort to unify dimensions of trust, Lee
and Moray proposed three general antecedents of trust: performance,
process, and purpose (Lee & Moray, 1992). The performance dimen-
sion refers to expectations regarding the automation’s reliability, pre-
dictability, and ability. Process denotes if the automation’s character-
istics are beneficial to the intent’s and goals of the operator, and is
similar to character traits or integrity. Purpose describes underlying
motives or intents of the automation, making it similar to benevo-
lence. These three types of goal-oriented information determine ap-
propriate trust, that is, a level of trust that matches the degree to
which the trustee (an automation device or a social agent) will help
achieve the trustor’s goals.
ii) focus and modes of trust. The focus of trust refers to
what exactly is to be trusted (Lee & See, 2004). The focus is defined
by the level of detail, ranging from more general trust in an overall
system to trust in particular functions and states of computer agents.
Trust in computers also has different modes (Hoffman et al., 2013).
Based on the limited experience with a technology and the difficulty
to predict its behavior in novel situations, people resort to the spe-
cific modes of trust. For instance, default trust occurs in the absence
of deliberative thought as to whether a computer can or cannot be
trusted. Instead, default trust is used as a shortcut and potential con-
cerns are ignored. Negative trust occurs as the general attitude that
at some point, most technology will be faulty and complicate one’s
work. In contrast, absolute trust is a completely unconditional, yet
context-dependent mode of trust. Absolute trust, as Hoffman and
colleagues note, is more common between people. In HCI, the only
example of absolute trust is negative trust. Usually, trust in technol-
ogy is conditional upon tasks and contexts. It appears that people’s
tendency to resort to such different modes of trust is another mani-
festation of the need to handle complexity (Lee & See, 2004). Further-
more, over- and undertrust can be traced back to some of the modes
of trust.
iii) trust dynamics and its processual character . Trust
is no static or monotonically developing variable. To trust and at-
tribute trustworthiness are dynamic processes, depending on context
and goals, with unclear start and end points (Hoffman et al., 2013).
Like interpersonal trust, trust in computers can be described along de-
velopmental dimensions such as formation and violation. Muir (1987)
argued that trust in computers can be formed in a manner similar to
the stages of interpersonal trust development identified by Rempel
et al. (1985). However, the opposite pattern was also observed experi-
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mentally: faith predicted trust in the beginning, followed by depend-
ability, and then by predictability in the final stage (Muir & Moray,
1996). Thus the dynamics of trust also depend on information regard-
ing the purpose of a system that is provided before the interaction,
as well as documentation and training (Lee & See, 2004). Comparing
how people form trust in computers versus other people, specifically,
how trust in people builds on experiences gained over time, leads to
an important caveat: trust in computers is developed in a rather un-
natural fashion if people are forced into the interaction (Lee & See,
2004).
iv) the relation to interpersonal (human–human) trust.
Interpersonal trust is determined by combined attributions of com-
petence, benevolence, and integrity (Mayer et al., 1995). Research has
shown that these factors are also relevant for trust in computer agents
(Lee & Moray, 1992). Furthermore, trust-related HCI studies often
build on trust definitions and models established in psychology and
sociology (e.g., Barber, 1983; Mayer et al., 1995; Rempel et al., 1985;
Rousseau et al., 1998). Going beyond this, research by Reeves and
Nass suggests that human–computer interaction is similar to inter-
personal communication as people respond to computer agents as if
they were humans and apply social norms, self-/other-distinctions,
and gender stereotypes to computers, even though people are aware
of the fact that those reactions are inappropriate: “These social re-
sponses are not a function of deficiency, or of sociological or psycho-
logical dysfunction, but rather are natural responses to social situa-
tions” (Nass et al., 1994, p. 77). Because this rule applies to the social
influence of computers in general, it can be deduced that interper-
sonal and human–computer trust are, in theory, similar.
In contrast, other HCI research provides evidence that people’s be-
havior in human–computer interactions cannot be explained using in-
terpersonal trust mechanisms (Hoffman et al., 2013; Lee & See, 2004;
Visser et al., 2016). This applies to general expectations of expertise as
well as behavioral responses: computer advice is assumed to be more
objective and rational than human advice (Dijkstra et al., 1998), and
people tend to have difficulties with bringing reliance on computer
output into accordance with the output’s actual reliability (Dzindolet
et al., 2003). The mismatch between perceived and actual reliability
is a key issue in HCI. If the human user finds a level of trust that
is in line with system capabilities, his trust is well calibrated, but this
is often not the case (Lee & See, 2004). One reason is that human–
computer interactions are characterized by specific heuristics such as
automation bias that people apply exclusively to computers. Accord-
ing to this phenomenon, people ascribe greater power and authority
to computer-generated decision aids than other advice sources in or-
der to reduce monitoring efforts (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010).
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v) idiosyncrasies of the technology and interaction.
The relevant factors of human–computer trust are often determined
by defining properties of the technology itself such as the degree of
automation and perceived autonomy (Lee & See, 2004; Parasuraman
& Riley, 1997), anthropomorphism (Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007;
Visser et al., 2016; Waytz et al., 2014), and interface type (e.g., virtual
agents, robots; Bickmore & Cassell, 2001; Hancock et al., 2011). Such
idiosyncrasies contribute to the shift from tool-like interaction toward
novel forms of human–computer interaction. They also impact how
people form trust in computers.
Although computers are not truly autonomous because they lack
self-determination, independence, and consciousness, people may at-
tribute a certain intentionality to them (Lee & See, 2004). Perceived in-
tentionality, in turn, could trigger attributions of loyalty, benevolence,
and value (in-)congruence which are key dimensions of trust. Anthro-
pomorphism plays an important role for trust formation in comput-
ers. This was demonstrated in a setting that had participants solve
a simple pattern completion task while receiving advice from agents
varying in anthropomorphism (Visser et al., 2016). As reliability of
the advice decreased, the loss of trust was lower for anthropomor-
phic agents. This study also showed how specific behaviors that are
fundamental to the shaping of interpersonal interactions such as so-
cial feedback (i.e., apologies, motivational remarks) further magnify
the impact of anthropomorphism. Lastly, the interface of agents gives
rise to novel interaction elements. Virtual agents can be designed to
resemble humans, artificial entities, or even the user (Bergmann et al.,
2012; Nowak & Biocca, 2003; Parise et al., 1996; Vugt et al., 2010), and
participants can easily be led to believe the agent is controlled by an-
other human or computer (Bailenson et al., 2003). This offers a whole
variety of design elements to manipulate how people are socially in-
fluenced by virtual agents. Unlike virtual agents, robots are present
in the physical environment, making them highly useful in danger-
ous situations. However, this also creates numerous challenges for
human–robot interaction because crisis situations often involve enor-
mous amounts of stress, cognitive workload, and time pressure (see
Hancock et al., 2011, for a review).
The relation between these idiosyncrasies and the resulting need
for trust is not simple to define. A high degree of automation does
not necessarily require a high degree of trust. For instance, people
do not want information as to the dangers of highly automated ma-
chines such as aircraft autopilot systems or robotic vacuums. People
tend to trust those machines and today, accepting them is natural. In
contrast, other highly automated technology that is not yet common
to society will certainly require substantial trust in the beginning. As
noted earlier perceived risk determines the need for trust, yet the
risk of technologies such as self-driving cars is largely unknown. Re-
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liance can also be influenced by the anticipation of greater benefits
of the automation (Hoff & Bashir, 2015). These factors are differently
weighted by individuals, making the precise prediction of trust for-
mation in novel machinery a challenging task indeed. However, it is
possible to identify factors that consistently play a key role for trust
development, including predictability, perceived risk, and benefits.
3.2 anthropomorphic agents
Researchers and practitioners across fields such as HCI, human–robot
interaction, artificial intelligence, cognitive science, psychology, and
computer graphics advance the degree to which technology can show
human-like capabilities and traits such as computational cognition,
photo-realistic facial appearance, nonverbal and verbal communica-
tion. The overarching goal is to enable humans to immerse in novel
and rich interactions. As a consequence, people increasingly interact
with artificial agents capable of human-like characteristics (see Fig.
3). Such agents can display and understand human emotion (Gratch
& Marsella, 2004; Picard, 1997), convey the impression of distinct
personalities (Isbister & Nass, 2000), negotiate with humans (Lin &
Kraus, 2010), teach negotiation (Gratch et al., 2016), act as coaches and
tutors (Breazeal et al., 2016; Kok et al., 2015), learn how to reject or-
ders beyond their abilities and social norms (Briggs & Scheutz, 2015),
manipulate their own trustworthiness (DeSteno et al., 2012), and may
soon be endowed with artificial forms of moral cognition to better
collaborate with humans (Malle & Scheutz, 2014). Although in many
cases, the degree of autonomy is not yet maximized, the approaches
certainly demonstrate how researchers increase the human-like capa-
bilities of artificial agents and widen the range of applications not just
across different scenarios, but also user groups (Breazeal et al., 2016).
Intriguingly, the manifold embodiments of artificial agents that
range from computers and personal assistants to 3D virtual charac-
ters and robots have been shown to elicit natural responses among hu-
mans (e.g., Krämer et al., 2015; Sidner et al., 2005; Walter et al., 2014).
On a neural level, interacting with human-like agents is linked to ac-
tivation in brain areas important for mental state attribution, which
may explain the unique perceptions of, and responses to human-like
artificial agents such as enjoyment and attributions of intelligence
(Krach et al., 2008).
Anthropomorphism1 has crucial implications for the design of ap-
propriate trust. Conceptually, Dautenhahn developed the idea of so-
1 The terms "human-likeness" and "anthropomorphism" are often used interchange-
ably. Usually, the latter is more strongly linked to the process whereby an agent is
attributed human qualities, hence it is anthropomorphized (Epley et al., 2007; Waytz
et al., 2014). For the sake of clarity we adopt the terminology and perspective com-
monly used in HCI studies, that is, anthropomorphism is the degree to which agents
display human characteristics (Burgoon et al., 2000; Visser et al., 2016).
3.2 anthropomorphic agents 27
(a) Scheduling plans with an attentive
virtual agent (Buschmeier & Kopp,
2011).
(b) Negotiation with a virtual competi-
tor (Gratch et al., 2015).
(c) Face-to-face interaction with a virtual
child (Sagar et al., 2016).
(d) A virtual nurse discharges a patient
(Zhou et al., 2014).
(e) Playing cards with the virtual
agent Max (Becker-Asano &
Wachsmuth, 2010).
Figure 3: Interacting with anthropomorphic agents.
cially intelligent agents (1998). According to her view, agents that
are endowed with social intelligence can mediate cooperation and
problem-solving by means of social abilities similar to humans, in-
cluding embodiment and relationship maintaining.
Empirically, a growing body of research is devoted to the key so-
cial dimensions that influence trust in anthropomorphic agents, such
as perceived trustworthiness and human emotional responses. Fol-
lowing this idea, researchers investigated the effect of various social
cues on trust and the willingness to cooperate, including combined
anthropomorphic cues such as visual appearance and voice (Kiesler
et al., 1996; Parise et al., 1999; Visser et al., 2016; Visser et al., 2017),
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voice, human name, and gender (Waytz et al., 2014), emotion expres-
sions (Antos et al., 2011; Choi et al., 2015; Melo et al., 2014), agency
(Melo et al., 2015), and nonverbal behavior (DeSteno et al., 2012). Sec-
tion 3.3 describes how anthropomorphic cues offer the possibility to
shape interactions with humans along trust dimensions.
Specific techniques and mechanisms have emerged to transport the
impression of anthropomorphism. Researchers use a variety of de-
sign elements to convince humans the agent they are interacting with
has intentionality, that is, beliefs, desires, and intentions (Breazeal &
Scassellati, 1999). The modeling of human-like verbal and nonverbal
communication (e.g., speech, gaze, gesture; Breazeal et al., 2005; Kopp
& Wachsmuth, 2004; Kopp et al., 2006) and relationship-building tech-
niques (e.g., conversational dialogue, politeness, self-disclosure, rap-
port; Bickmore & Picard, 2005; Cassell & Bickmore, 2000; Gratch et al.,
2007) has received considerable attention. In particular, the ability to
incrementally produce verbal and nonverbal chunks of information
that are tightly synchronized and connected to contextual cues of the
interaction is an ongoing challenge (Kopp et al., 2006; Welbergen et
al., 2015). Emotions play a major role, and facial features are an impor-
tant means to communicate emotional states (Breazeal & Scassellati,
1999). It was shown that human perceivers use facial features of a
virtual agent to infer its underlying beliefs, desires, and intentions in
cooperative situations (Melo et al., 2014). Adding to this, affect simu-
lation architectures are used for the online modeling of affective states
which are then mapped onto behaviors (Becker-Asano & Wachsmuth,
2010). It is argued that the communication of thoughts and feelings
through subtle cues such as facial features may be the most important
factor in conveying the illusion of an anthropomorphic entity (Melo
& Gratch, 2015; Sagar et al., 2016). A different approach is to provide
simple contextual cues that affect people’s perceptions. This includes,
for example, agent background stories containing a life history, pro-
file picture, personality descriptions, and even fictional news reports
(Visser et al., 2016). Agents are sometimes given a gender and human
names (Waytz et al., 2014), or they are assigned to the same team as
humans (Nass et al., 1996).
3.3 methodological advances
In the past years, researchers have increasingly focused on decision-
making for the study of trust as well as cooperation in HCI and
adopted approaches known from behavioral game theory (BGT). The
BGT methodology seeks to augment the generality and mathematic
precision of classic game theory by means of empirical evidence:
“Would you lend money to somebody who doesn’t have
to pay you back, but might feel morally obliged to do so?
If you would, you trust her. If she pays you back, she is
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trustworthy. This definition gives a way to measure trust,
and has been used in experiments in many places [...]”
(Camerer, 2003, p. 3).
Indeed, prior to the propagation of BGT in HCI, researchers study-
ing distributed artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems adopted
the formality of game theory to analyze decision problems in do-
mains such as negotiation (Zlotkin & Rosenschein, 1989), cooperation,
and economics (see Parsons & Wooldridge, 2002, for a brief overview).
In contrast to game theory, behavioral game theory researchers collect
empirical data about human behavior in strategic situations (Gächter,
2004). According to this idea, humans and artificial agents engage
in 2-player games of economic exchange with the option to either
cooperate or defect. Cooperation maximizes the joint payoff, but de-
fection maximizes the individual payoff. This often poses a dilemma
as defection becomes the rational, utility-maximizing choice for both
players, yet mutual cooperation yields a better payoff than mutual de-
fection (Dawes, 1980). The underlying assumption is that instead of
pure economic decision-making, choices in such games provide a reli-
able approximation of trust and trustworthiness (give-some dilemma;
Camerer, 2003) or cooperation (prisoner’s dilemma; Gächter, 2004).
HCI studies commonly utilize games to model the entire interaction,
that is, a human player is asked to engage in one or multiple rounds
with an artificial agent. The agent can provide feedback after the
choices are revealed in order to investigate how different feedback be-
haviors affect subsequent cooperation (e.g., Kulms et al., 2014a; Melo
et al., 2014). Alternatively, few examples use games as trust measure
after the actual interaction, such as negotiation and open dialog (e.g.,
Antos et al., 2011; DeSteno et al., 2012). Figure 4 shows common se-
tups of studies carried out in those paradigms.
A central conclusion from this growing body of research is that the
human tendency to deviate from selfish utility maximization in fa-
vor of cooperation extends to computer agents as well (Kiesler et al.,
1996). It was also revealed that humans cooperate more with other
humans (Miwa et al., 2008; Sandoval et al., 2015) or with humans
being represented by virtual avatars (Melo et al., 2015), compared
to computer agents. Endowing computers with emotion expressions
can eliminate this difference (Melo & Gratch, 2015). Others found
that the likelihood of keeping a promise to cooperate is similar for
playing with another person and a text-only computer, but decreases
when playing with an anthropomorphic computer with a synthesized
face and voice output (Kiesler et al., 1996). Moreover, participants co-
operated more with agents showing positive appraisal of joint coop-
eration by means of emotion expressions (Choi et al., 2015; Melo et
al., 2014). Against this background, participants preferred interacting
with agents that display emotions consistent with their actions, for in-
stance an angry selfish agent is preferred over a happy selfish agent
(Antos et al., 2011). Finally, there are also first attempts in identify-
ing signals of trustworthiness in natural, dynamic interactions and
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(a) Simple trust game interface with a
virtual agent (Antos et al., 2011).
(b) Chatting with a humanoid robot be-
fore performing a trust task (DeSteno
et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2013).
(c) Facial features used to model outcome appraisal of a counterpart in
the prisoner’s dilemma (Melo et al., 2014).
Figure 4: Anthropomorphic agents are used as counterparts in empirical
studies on trust and cooperation. Researchers investigate how an-
thropomorphic signals affect the decision to trust or cooperate.
mapping them onto robot gestures (DeSteno et al., 2012; Lee et al.,
2013). Overall, converging evidence on the influence of nonverbal be-
havior suggests that anthropomorphism offers unique ways to shape
the perceived trustworthiness of artificial agents. Table 1 shows the
antecedents of trust in as well as cooperation with computer agents
that were uncovered using standard game theoretic procedures.
Another framework that provides a simple analytical environment
is the Desert or Lunar Survival Problem, respectively (Lafferty et al.,
1974). This setting is a hypothetical problem-solving task in which
participants are told they have crash-landed in the desert (or were
stranded astronauts on the moon). Participants are given a list of
items they need to use for survival such as water, a map, a pistol, etc.
The task is to prioritize the list based on each item’s importance for
survival. Usually, a pair or group of participant is tasked with agree-
ing on one list. In HCI, people are paired with a computer agent to
solve the task. Applying this principle, researchers have shown that
computers were more influential than humans (Burgoon et al., 2000),
participants prefer computers with a similar personality in text-based
communication (Nass et al., 1995), but also showed preference for
complementary characters if the computer was given a virtual body
(Isbister & Nass, 2000), and participants affiliate with computers as a
team if they believe to be interdependent with it (Nass et al., 1996).
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Table 1: Antecedents of trusting or cooperative human decisions in social
dilemmas played with artificial agents.
Game Authors Antecedent Supported
Prisoner’s
dilemma





Melo et al., 2014 Emotion expressions 3
Melo et al., 2015 Emotion expressions;
agency
33
Kiesler et al., 1996 Anthropomorphism:
computer vs. human
*
Kulms et al., 2014a Cooperation rate;
humor
37
















Nishio et al., 2012 Anthropomorphism:











Tsai et al., 2012 Emotional contagion:
happiness
7
Notes. a) Asterisks (*) denote partial support. b) Work investigating other outcomes
such as theory of mind (Krach et al., 2008) or cognition patterns during social inter-
action (McCabe et al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2004; Van’t Wout et al., 2006; Yoshida et al.,
2010) is excluded. c) The give-some dilemma is often referred to as trust game.
Moreover, the influence of a joking virtual agent decreases if it fails
at being judged as funny (Khooshabeh et al., 2011).
3.4 explaining the social influence of technology
To understand why humans can engage in rich interactions with com-
puter agents and be affected in ways tangent to trust in the first place,
it is useful to turn to the general idea of social influence caused by
computers. In social psychology, social influence means that one’s
attitudes, behaviors, and emotions are affected by others (Zimbardo
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& Leippe, 1991). Various frameworks have been proposed to explain
how and why computers exert influence on people.
Nass and colleagues explained social effects with the human ten-
dency to automatically – mindlessly – respond to computers as if they
were human and applying social scripts, norms, attributions, and
expectations to them, hence the term "Computers-are-social-actors
(CASA)" (Nass et al., 1994; Reeves & Nass, 1996). Research based
on the CASA paradigm documented how people’s responses are trig-
gered by social cues such as voice output and social categories. Across
different scenarios, participants showed social responses in the form
of gender-stereotyping, cooperation, positive subjective assessments,
or perceiving the target computer as similar (Nass & Moon, 2000).
The approach predicts that computers influence human users in a
fashion similar to how they are influenced by other people. In con-
trast, other research indicates qualitative differences between com-
puters and people, suggesting that the effects caused by computers
cannot be equated with interpersonal relationships. Those differences
arise from computers’ lack of intentionality, asymmetries in human–
computer relationships (e.g., humans do not need to signal trustwor-
thiness to computers), as well as certain biases caused by computers
(Lee & See, 2004). According to this view, effects such as positive atti-
tudes toward computer-generated information are caused by inappro-
priate cognitive processing of computer cues which negatively affects
one’s overall attention to the environment (Parasuraman & Manzey,
2010, see Section 3.1).
A collaborator of Nass, B. J. Fogg, focuses on the effect of human–
computer interaction on motivation and persuasion. Like the CASA
paradigm, this approach is based on the idea that people respond to
computers as if they were social entities (Fogg, 2003). The principles
behind Fogg’s research and the CASA paradigm are fairly similar;
the extensions he provided center on the origins and implications of
social influence. Fogg proposed five social cues through which com-
puters exert influence: physical cues such as faces and bodies, psy-
chological cues such as apologies and personality, language, social
dynamics like cooperation and turn-taking, and social roles. Fogg fo-
cused on the persuasive potential of computers in order to modulate
user attitudes and behavior in specific environments such as contin-
ued interaction.
Researchers are increasingly interested in how anthropomorphic
virtual characters affect people’s experiences. Such virtual or embod-
ied conversational agents (ECA), respectively, provide a crucial exten-
sion to conversational interfaces as the added social cues are believed
to deepen the social effects first documented by Nass and colleagues.
Against this background, Blascovich (2002) explains social influence
as the extent to which humans experience shared reality with virtual
characters. The key mediating factor in this process is social presence
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or social verification, respectively, which describes how much the in-
teraction with virtual characters verifies a certain meaningfulness to
the communication, hence creating the perception of a shared experi-
ence. Social presence is a function of two components: agency, the de-
gree to which virtual characters are perceived to represent real people,
and behavioral realism, which describes how much those characters
are perceived to behave like real people. Perceived agency varies de-
pending on whether the character is controlled entirely by a computer
agent versus another human, thereby making it an avatar. Perceived
behavioral realism is maintained by the character’s range of realistic
social cues. In order for social influence to occur, a perceptual thresh-
old needs to be reached by providing humans with sufficient levels of
perceived agency and behavioral realism. Following this idea, Bailen-
son and colleagues demonstrated that in an immersive virtual envi-
ronment, people respond naturally to virtual characters in terms of
personal space and social presence (2003).
Anthropomorphic interfaces permit further applications of percep-
tual frameworks to HCI. The warmth and competence framework, for
instance, was applied to model and evaluate the nonverbal behavior
and appearance of ECAs. In one study, participants watched a video
of an ECA showing either high versus low warmth and competence
nonverbal behavior, without voice output (Nguyen et al., 2015). The
aim was to validate the nonverbal behavior with respect to warmth
and competence manipulations, which were generated based on hu-
man actor recordings. Aside from the successful validations, it was
found that the high-warmth target agent was perceived as more com-
petent than the low-warmth target, and competence may play a mod-
erating role for low-warmth targets. Another study found that attri-
butions of warmth were modulated by the point of measurement and
appearance of the agent, indicating that warmth declines over time
for a robot-like virtual agent (Bergmann et al., 2012). This effect di-
minished when the target agent was human-like.
Another approach examining the degree to which computers are
treated like humans focuses on people’s tendency to anthropomor-
phize non-human entities because of the perception of having mind
(Waytz et al., 2010). Mind perception is constituted by two dimen-
sions: experience, which is broadly linked to the experience of emo-
tions and pain, and agency, which is linked to responsibility of ac-
tions, self-control, and planning (Gray et al., 2007). According to this
view, perceiving a computer as an entity capable of planning and act-
ing (i.e., having agency) as well as sensing and feeling emotion (i.e.,
can experience) predicts if it is treated like an actual person (Melo
& Gratch, 2015). Based on this, de Melo and colleagues investigated
the determinants of social decision-making when interacting with hu-
man versus computer partners, using BGT (see Melo & Gratch, 2015).
In the ultimatum game, participants are given an initial amount of
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money and decide how much they offer their partner. The partner
can accept or reject the offer, but if the offer is rejected, all amounts
are canceled. It was demonstrated that when the partner did not
show emotion, human partners received higher offers than comput-
ers. However when partners showed happy (sad) facial expressions
in response to fair (unfair) offers, the difference between computers
and humans diminished. The authors conclude that endowing com-
puters with experience is the key factor in treating computers as if
they were humans in this BGT paradigm. Since people seem to ex-
pect a general lack in the factor experience, emphasis should be put
on the simulation of emotional intelligence (Melo & Gratch, 2015). In
line with this, the experience factor seems to account for a larger vari-
ance proportion than agency in the mind perception process (Gray
et al., 2007). However, de Melo et al. also stress that in some scenar-
ios, artificial agents should not try to be treated as humans as this
would compromise sensitive interaction goals such as self-disclosure
in health-screening (Melo & Gratch, 2015).
3.5 summary
Intelligent artificial agents are increasingly able to engage with hu-
mans in rich and natural forms of interaction that are driven by com-
plex goals and require interdependent decision-making. Through sim-
ple cooperative games, for instance social dilemmas, researchers have
shown that with artificial counterparts, human decision-making is
not bound to pure selfish interests. Rather, trusting and cooperative
decisions are influenced by agent anthropomorphism. Computers in-
creasingly have anthropomorphic cues, but since human–computer
trust is driven by certain heuristics and biases, it is not the same as in-
terpersonal trust. Based on this essential contrast, it is still not entirely
clear how anthropomorphism affects trust in cooperative situations.
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A N I N T E R A C T I V E C O O P E R AT I O N G A M E
PA R A D I G M F O R T H E I N V E S T I G AT I O N O F T R U S T
I N H U M A N – C O M P U T E R I N T E R A C T I O N
To study open issues of human–computer trust, an interactive coop-
eration game paradigm was developed. The paradigm is used as con-
ceptual framework and template for experimental research games,
so-called puzzle games. The paradigm’s mechanisms were meant to
provide various manipulations of strategic and cooperative agent be-
havior other cooperative games cannot provide.
This chapter consists of three logical parts:
• Background
– Section 4.1: Motivation behind the paradigm
• The paradigm
– Section 4.2: The general task
– Section 4.3: Underlying cooperation concepts
– Section 4.4: Cooperative interaction factors used in the ex-
periments
• Preparing empirical research with the paradigm
– Section 4.5: Validation study to analyze cooperation in the
paradigm
– Section 4.6: Factors of trust investigated by the experiments
4.1 motivation
The paradigm permits the investigation of trust in environments in-
volving interdependent decision-making, coordination, and commu-
nication. The approach is fundamentally different from the BGT and
social dilemma perspective of cooperation. BGT is a predominant
method to study interpersonal trust and many researchers adopted
this mindset to investigate human–computer trust. Indeed, using pre-
cise conceptualizations of trust, trustworthiness, and cooperation, BGT
offers concise ways to advance social decision-making research in an
astonishing fashion. The large amount of BGT research has gener-
ated important empirical advancements across many fields related
to psychology, enabling theoretical integration and model construc-
tion (Sally, 2000; Weber et al., 2004). The methodology even involves
an inherent motivation to adopt HCI methods: By comparing par-
ticipant interactions with human and computer counterparts in the
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trust game, researchers demonstrated that the neural activation of
mentalizing networks in the brain occurs in human–human, but not
human–computer interactions (McCabe et al., 2001).
However, the BGT methodology also has significant limitations
the present paradigm tries to compensate. Instead of providing a
dynamic and interactive environment, agent actions in social dilem-
mas such as the prisoner’s and give-some dilemma are confined to
simultaneous and discrete decisions of both players. Arriving at an
informed decision mostly requires inferring the counterpart’s inten-
tions. It does not at all require inferring the counterpart’s capability to
execute decisions in a competent manner to the extent that there is no
challenge involved in translating intentions into actions. Yet, compe-
tence is not entirely irrelevant in social dilemmas. Prosocial individ-
uals show increased cooperation when primed for competent (e.g.,
’intelligent’, ’competent’, ’clever’) behavior, whereas the same prim-
ing makes proself individuals more selfish (Utz et al., 2004). However,
this does not capture the translation of intentions into actions and the
attributions arising thereof.
Figure 5: Schematic illustration of an action path in a naturalistic coopera-
tive environment involving a red and blue agent.
In more naturalistic interactions, cooperation between social agents
often involves interdependent decision-making to the extent that the
agents are required to interactively coordinate their efforts. In order to
effectively coordinate, agents need the ability to manipulate the envi-
ronment as intended and adjust their actions. Moreover, cooperative
tasks often involve communication, the division of actions, or shar-
ing of resources (Deutsch, 2011). Figure 5 depicts a more naturalistic
understanding of cooperative action between a red and blue social
agent. According to this view, an increase of the degrees of freedom
and uncertainty requires a much more rational action pattern across
long periods of time. Because of the large action space, planning and
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anticipating in such environments is more difficult; achieving the co-
operative goal purely by chance is unpromising. Another important
element is how time affects cooperation. As the agents advance to-
ward the goal, each step contributes to the final outcome, but also
confines the remaining options naturally. Moreover, poor problem-
solving and coordination have a severe effect on the final outcome,
causing the action path to miss the cooperative goal.
Other researchers also tried to compensate for the BGT limitations.
To rectify the lack of degrees of freedom and interactivity, the simpli-
fied stag hunt coordination game has been modified to permit more
interactive 2-agent decision-making (Yoshida et al., 2010). Likewise,
the key motivation behind the paradigm’s approach is to incorporate
more naturalistic, competence-based cooperation. The following sec-
tions describe how this is achieved.
4.2 task : cooperative gameplay
The paradigm involves a turn-based 2-player interaction geared to-
ward a specific goal. To achieve the goal, human participants are
tasked to cooperate with a computer agent. Only if both players
equally perform competent actions, the goal can be achieved. The
premise is that two players try to solve a two-dimensional puzzle
field as efficiently as possible by alternately placing blocks into a puz-
zle field. The (joint/shared/cooperative) goal is to complete a certain
number of horizontal rows. A row is completed if there are no empty
fields left, similar to Tetris. In contrast to Tetris, completed rows are
not cleared, thus poorly positioned blocks will remain at their spot
until the round is finished. There are two blocks: a T-shaped and
a more difficult U-shaped block. Attributes such as “easy” or “diffi-
cult” are avoided throughout the game. Another deviation from Tetris
is that blocks do not gradually descend from the top to bottom, re-
lieving players of time constraints. Players can exchange task-related
advice as to which block should be used next or where it should be
placed. Figure 6 shows the main conceptual components.
Tetris – one of the most popular games in history – was chosen
as interaction paradigm because it provides a dynamic task environ-
ment that is useful for experimental research. Tetris has been applied
to study cognitive skills for problem solving (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994;
Lindstedt & Gray, 2015) and social presence in cooperative environ-
ments (Hudson & Cairns, 2014). The paradigm was realized using
a prototyping platform for multimodal user interfaces (Kulms et al.,
2014b, 2015, 2018; Mattar et al., 2015).
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Figure 6: Conceptual components in the paradigm.
4.3 the cooperation concept
The range of actions and interactive elements in the game are con-
ceived as hierarchic dimensions of cooperation. According to this
idea, the interaction involves three distinct dimensions, each evoking
specific social attributes of the agent that influence whether human
players perceive it as cooperative partner. The dimensions are not
strongly hierarchic in that only the lowest dimension is the necessary
basis of cooperation as it represents the main task. The other dimen-
sions are optional for cooperation and there is no interrelation that
defines a particular order.
The first dimension, coordination, describes how the puzzle com-
petence of the human and agent as well as their ability to coordinate
determine if the joint goal will be attained. This dimension essentially
captures the “acting together” component of cooperation (Brosnan et
al., 2010). Since completed rows are not cleared, incompetent actions
and errors have a crucial impact on the outcome. Selfish desire for
the high value U-block also affects coordination: If the agent repeat-
edly demands the block for itself, it causes a stable block sequence
(1: U, 2: T, 3: U, 4: T, etc.) and eliminates flexibility on that front, pos-
sibly impeding coordination. The second dimension, communication,
permits players to exchange task-related information that help them
to coordinate. Finally, the third dimension, labeled strategic social be-
havior, describes how players can strategically opt for the high value
U-block. If this dimension is implemented, perceived selfishness and
competence of the agent culminate in attributions regarding its strat-
egy. For instance, the agent could utilize its alleged incompetence as
a strategic decision to undermine the counterpart’s individual pay-
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off by impeding the joint goal. This should decrease the agent’s per-
ceived trustworthiness. Likewise, selfishness helps the agent to maxi-
mize its payoff; this should also deteriorate its trustworthiness.
In contrast to standard cooperative games, the present paradigm
deviates from the clear distinction between cooperation and defection.
In the popular prisoner’s dilemma, for instance, players can either
cooperate or defect. However, this distinction cannot capture more
nuanced shades of cooperative behaviors the present paradigm does
offer, such as wanting but failing to cooperate, or using the selfish
option to promote the joint goal.
4.4 interaction factors
In order to allow the investigation of trust-based research questions
by means of human–computer interactions, a number of interaction
factors is incorporated in the paradigm. This section describes these
interaction factors and explains their operationalizations.
4.4.1 Puzzle competence and selfishness
According to the trust literature, two components determine whether
social agents can be trusted and cooperated with. The "can-do" com-
ponent captures the abilities and competencies necessary for achiev-
ing a particular goal, while the "will-do" component reflects if the
abilities are used in the best interest of a trusting agent or one’s own
interest (Colquitt et al., 2007). The paradigm maps these characteris-
tics onto two interaction factors: puzzle competence and selfishness.
Puzzle competence is defined as the ability to place blocks in an effi-
cient manner. To this end, a simple heuristic was implemented to com-
pute optimal configurations of the upcoming block (i.e., positions and
rotations). Configurations were optimal (sub-optimal) if they maxi-
mize (minimize) the number of completed rows. Optimal configu-
rations were assigned high decision weights, sub-optimal configura-
tions were assigned low decision weights. The competent agent uses
the highest decision weight to determine the upcoming block config-
uration. Conversely, the incompetent agent uses the lowest weight.
Selfishness determines if the agent desires the U-block which yields
more individual points. If the agent desires the U-block, it will only
comply with advice containing this block; if the agent does not desire
the U-block, it will comply with any advice. Importantly, selfishness
does not preclude cooperation in that the joint goal can be achieved.
4.4.2 Task advice
In interpersonal interactions, people facing a decision-making prob-
lem are often influenced by others or actively consult their peers for
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advice (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). In human–computer interactions,
users take advice from digital assistants in a variety of situations such
as route planning, traffic control, finance management, physical exer-
cising, and shopping (Hoff & Bashir, 2015; Kok et al., 2015; Madhavan
& Wiegmann, 2007; Qiu & Benbasat, 2009, 2010).
4.4.2.1 Advice given by humans
As interactions with computers increasingly involve interdependent
cooperative actions, there may also be scenarios with computers tak-
ing advice from humans. In situations involving uncertainty, human
input is not entered as a command in the classic sense. Rather, as
both human and computer agents play a more equal role in problem-
solving and must explore an uncertain path toward the joint goal,
human input becomes more advice than command, permitting more
symmetrical exchanges that are not yet realized today. In such a sce-
nario, human players suggest the next block to the agent, and the
agent’s responses are driven by selfishness.
Because the agent receives advice and not vice versa, human advice
adoption cannot be used to infer behavioral trust. Instead, the one-
shot give-some dilemma is used.
4.4.2.2 Advice given by computers
On the other hand, more classic interaction paradigms involve a com-
puter agent giving advice to users. Designing trustworthy task-related
advice and investigating how people respond to it, in particular, if
they utilize advice to the advantage of their goals and correctly dis-
card incompetent advice is important for the development of ap-
propriate trust. Participants first decide whether they require advice.
Next, they evaluate if the presented advice is useful to their problem-
solving and should be adopted.
Accordingly, advice adoption is used as behavioral trust measure.
4.4.3 Anthropomorphism
As explained in the previous chapter, computer agents are increas-
ingly endowed with human-like characteristics across a wide variety
of applications, posing novel challenges for the development of trust.
In advice adoption studies, anthropomorphism was shown to miti-
gate the loss of trust in response to declining reliability (Visser et al.,
2016). Oxytocin – a neuropeptide that mediates trusting relationships
by increasing the willingness to accept social risks (Kosfeld et al.,
2005) – augmented trust in anthropomorphic computers, but not hu-
mans (Visser et al., 2017). Researchers argue that anthropomorphism
could help reduce the unique biases people apply such as height-
ened attention to computer errors (Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007).
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Nonetheless, the implementation of anthropomorphic cues should be
in accordance with the principle of appropriate, not maximized trust
(Lee & See, 2004).
The effect of agents varying in anthropomorphism on trust is in-
vestigated by incorporating non-anthropomorphic computer agents
as well as anthropomorphic virtual and human agents. These agents
act as assistants that provide task-related advice in the puzzle game
and communicate with users.
4.4.4 Blame
People adeptly regulate the relations with their peers during conflict
using mechanisms that are fine-tuned to the specific context. Social
blame is one of these mechanisms. Blame allows social agents to ad-
dress issues in social interactions such as inappropriate behavior and
disappointment (Malle et al., 2014). Only little research has investi-
gated the potential role of blame for HCI. It is hypothesized that com-
municative acts such as blame could help regulate human–computer
trust. The self-serving bias may play an important role for the attribu-
tion of task success and failure: negative outcomes and the associated
blame are often attributed to computers, while users attribute suc-
cess to themselves (Moon, 2003). Further HCI research indicates that
robots which blame themselves or the team are perceived as more
likable (Groom et al., 2010; Kaniarasu & Steinfeld, 2014). The relation
between blame direction and trust, however, are less clear.
Based on its ability to show emotion displays and use dialog, the
anthropomorphic virtual agent used in the paradigm can communi-
cate blame after trust-threatening events for an attempt to regulate
trust. A critical trust-threatening event in the paradigm is joint goal
failure. Since the two players jointly work toward the goal, there are
different targets of blame. It is analyzed how these behaviors affect
trust in the agent.
Table 2 explains how the interaction factors and cooperation concepts
relate to the research questions. The specific experimental implemen-
tations (e.g., agent behaviors) will be explained in the method part of
each experiment in the following chapters.
4.5 validation study
The basic idea of the paradigm is using it to derive and construct
games with different cooperative mechanisms in which participants
can easily cooperate with a computer agent toward a specific goal.
This is also the necessary condition the paradigm must fulfill in order
to enable the study of human–computer trust. This claim is tested in
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Table 2: Full view of the interaction factors with corresponding cooperation


















































Note. As seen from the human player’s perspective.
a validation study which uses the first version of the game (Kulms
et al., 2016).
4.5.1 Overview
The goal of the validation study is to analyze cooperation in the puz-
zle game. Special emphasis is put on how the agent’s task-related
behavior affects social attributions that are important for cooperation
such as trustworthiness. This step is designed to refine the agent’s
ability to coordinate with human players and aid the modeling of
trustworthy agent behavior in the upcoming experiments. Perceived
trustworthiness is an important agent quality in interpersonal co-
operation and promotes trust (Mayer et al., 1995). To achieve this,
the behavioral dimensions puzzle competence and selfishness (see Sec-
tion 4.4.1) are implemented and manipulated. The following research
questions will be analyzed:
RQ1: How can cooperation between the agent and human
players be characterized?
RQ2: How does the agent’s puzzle competence and self-
ishness relate to its perceived cooperativeness and trust-
worthiness?
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4.5.2 Method
4.5.2.1 Participants
Eighty-seven German undergraduate and graduate students partici-
pated in exchange for 5 EUR. Nineteen participants were removed
due to technical difficulties, comprehension issues, because the out-
lier analysis revealed that their understanding of the agent was inac-
curate, or to achieve equal group sizes across the conditions.
The final sample consists of 68 participants. The sample ranged in
age from 18 to 53 years (M = 25.63,SD = 5.63, median = 25; female:
60.3%).
4.5.2.2 Task: Puzzle game
The task involved participants trying to solve the puzzle game as
efficiently as possible with the agent. In this instance of the paradigm,
each player collects individual points for placing a block, regardless
of where they are placed. There are two blocks available, a T-block
and a more difficult U-block. The T-block yields 5 individual points
and the U-block yields 10 points. Additionally, both players receive a
bonus score for achieving the optional joint goal, that is, completing
a certain amount of rows.
The game proceeds in alternating turns. In each turn, participants
first advise the agent of a block. The agent either accepts or rejects
the advice; it then places its block and leaves the remaining one to
the participant (see Fig. 7).
Figure 7: Interface of the puzzle game. The top area is for human players to
manipulate the block, the bottom area is the puzzle field. Left: the
human player has recommended the U-block. Right: the agent has
accepted and placed the block, leaving the T-block to the human
player.
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4.5.2.3 Agent behavior
The agent was modeled to incorporate varying degrees of puzzle com-
petence and selfishness. The selfish agent only accepts the high value
U-block as advice. In contrast, the unselfish agent accepted all sugges-
tions. Some specific patterns follow from the two components: selfish
agents always receive a higher payoff than their human counterparts;
it is impossible to attain the joint goal with the incompetent agent;
because a selfish agent desires the U-block, the block order is con-
stant (1: U, 2: T, 3: U, 4: T, etc.) and the human player always gets the
T-block.
4.5.2.4 Design
The study had a 2 × 2 between-subjects design, with puzzle com-
petence (competent vs. incompetent) and selfishness (selfish vs. un-
selfish) as between-subjects factors.
4.5.2.5 Measurement
To account for the agent’s social attributions, its perceived compe-
tence, trustworthiness, and cooperativeness were assessed. Perceived
competence and trustworthiness were measured using a perceived
computer credibility scale (Fogg & Tseng, 1999). The competence
items were ’knowledgeable’, ’competent’, ’intelligent’, ’capable’, ’ex-
perienced’, ’powerful’, Cronbach’s α = .80. The trustworthiness items
were ’trustworthy’, ’good’, ’truthful’, ’well-intentioned’, ’unbiased’,
’honest’, Cronbach’s α = .84. Perceived cooperativeness was measured
by asking participants how much they felt the agent tried to achieve
the joint goal. As manipulation check, participants were asked how
often the agent accepted their advice. All items were rated on 5-point
Likert scales.
4.5.2.6 Procedure
Participants met the experimenter, completed informed consent, and
received written instructions. They also received information regard-
ing the payoff structure. Participants were not asked to focus solely on
the joint goal, and they were not told about the strategy of the agent.
This was done to avoid initial expectations regarding the agent’s trust-
worthiness and cooperativeness, that is, the degree to which it tries
to attain the joint goal, and to let participants focus on their own
strategy. Prior to the experimental trials, participants could familiar-
ize themselves with the controls. Next, they played two rounds of the
puzzle game with the agent.
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4.5.2.7 Data analysis
The variables for perceived trustworthiness, competence, and cooper-
ativeness were entered into a 2× 2 MANOVA.
4.5.3 Results
4.5.3.1 Manipulation check: Advice acceptance
There was a significant main effect of selfishness on how often the
agent was perceived to accept advice. Participants observed that the
selfish agent accepted less advice (M = 2.00,SD = .75) than the un-
selfish agent (M = 4.76,SD = .44), F(1, 73) = 390.62,p < .01,η2p = .84.
4.5.3.2 Goal attainment
The incompetent agent was not able to attain the joint goal, irrespec-
tive of its selfishness. With the competent agent, participants overall
attained the goal at a 75% rate across both rounds if the agent was
unselfish. This rate dropped to 50% if the agent was selfish.
4.5.3.3 Coordination efficiency
Two heatmaps were composed to show how the unselfish and selfish
agent coordinated with participants, given competent puzzle solving
(see Fig. 8). Green colors indicate few and red colors indicate many
empty fields. The fewer empty fields both players left across the puz-
zle field, the better the coordination outcome.
Overall, both human–agent pairings coordinated fairly successfully.
Pairings with the unselfish agent performed somewhat better at the
bottom of the field, that is, at the beginning of interactions. Pairings
with the selfish agent left less fields empty at the end of interactions.
The main difference between the beginning and end of interactions
is a larger complexity and thus increased difficulty at the final stages.
In other words, the selfish agent tended to coordinate more efficiently
with participants at difficult stages, whereas the unselfish agent coor-
dinated more efficiently at easier stages. A possible explanation for
this is that the selfish agent always chose the more difficult U-block
and handled this decision better than human players.
4.5.3.4 Perceived trustworthiness
There was a significant main effect of puzzle competence on per-
ceived trustworthiness. The competent agent (M = 3.01,SD = .97)
was judged as more trustworthy than the incompetent agent (M =
2.39,SD = .46), F(1, 64) = 16.00,p < .001,η2p = .20.
There also was a significant main effect of selfishness on perceived
trustworthiness. The unselfish agent (M = 3.06,SD = .79) was per-
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Figure 8: Coordination heatmaps based on the distribution of empty fields
across the puzzle field with the competently playing agent. Both
rounds combined. Left: unselfish agent, right: selfish agent.
ceived as more trustworthy than the selfish agent (M = 2.34,SD =
.67), F(1, 64) = 21.44,p < .001,η2p = .25.
Additionally, there was a significant interaction effect between puz-
zle competence and selfishness, on trustworthiness (F(1, 64) = 7.44,p <
.01,η2p = .10). If the agent was selfish, trustworthiness was similar
for puzzle competence and incompetence (simple effects: F(1, 64) =
0.81,p = .37). However, if the agent was unselfish, trustworthiness
was significantly higher for puzzle competence than incompetence
(simple effects: F(1, 64) = 22.61,p < .001). See Table 3.
4.5.3.5 Perceived competence
There was a significant main effect of puzzle competence on per-
ceived competence. The competently playing agent (M = 3.65,SD =
0.88) was perceived as more competent than the incompetently play-
ing agent (M = 2.80,SD = 1.17), F(1, 64) = 14.65,p < .001,η2p = .19.
There also was a significant main effect of selfishness on perceived
competence. The selfish agent (M = 3.58,SD = 0.89) was perceived
as more competent than the unselfish agent (M = 2.80,SD = 1.14),
F(1, 64) = 10.27,p < .01,η2p = .14.
Furthermore, there was a significant interaction effect between puz-
zle competence and selfishness, on perceived competence (F(1, 64) =
8.11,p < .01,η2p = .11). This indicates that the influence of puz-
zle competence on perceived competence is affected by selfishness.
Given puzzle competence, perceived competence was similar for self-
ishness and unselfishness (simple effects: F(1, 64) = 0.06,p = .80).
In contrast, given puzzle incompetence, perceived competence was
significantly lower for unselfishness than selfishness (simple effects:
(F(1, 64) = 18.32,p < .001). See Table 3.
4.5.3.6 Perceived cooperativeness
Because of considerable dispersion variations (see Table 3), this vari-
able is not analyzed parametrically. The descriptive statistics show
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that only the competent and unselfish agent was attributed high co-
operativeness whereas the remaining variations were attributed low
cooperativeness.






M SD M SD M SD
Competent Selfish 3.69 0.91 2.44 0.79 1.82 0.81
Unselfish 3.61 0.87 3.58 0.78 3.88 0.99
Incompetent Selfish 3.47 0.87 2.25 0.53 1.00 0.00
Unselfish 2.14 0.98 2.54 0.33 1.18 0.53
4.5.4 Discussion
The purpose of the validation study was to explore cooperation in the
puzzle game and how task-related behavior affects social attributions
of the agent. The results of the first study in this paradigm indicate
that competence alone does not ensure an overall positive perception
of the agent, although competence was a necessary condition of goal
attainment.
Perceived trustworthiness and competence – attributions that are
crucial for cooperative interactions – were both affected by the agent’s
selfishness and problem-solving competence. The main effects indi-
cate that the agent was perceived as trustworthy if it played com-
petently or unselfishly, and the interaction effect shows that trustwor-
thiness was maximal when these two variations were combined. Like-
wise, the agent was perceived as competent if it played competently
or made selfish decisions. How did selfishness become important for
attributions of perceived competence? Participants differentiated be-
tween selfish and unselfish incompetence. The interaction effect in-
dicates that the incompetent yet selfish agent was rated nearly as
competent as the actual competent agents, although it played much
worse in comparison. Participants apparently assumed intentionality
behind selfish incompetence (Malle & Knobe, 1997) and felt that the
agent had the efficacy to enact its selfish goals. Competence is com-
monly conceived as self-profitable trait (Peeters, 2002). The present
results give this view a new perspective in that selfish incompetence
was also conceived as self-profitable. Importantly, this pattern con-
firms that perceivers integrate information about an agent’s compe-
tence and intentions (i.e., selfishness) to form trustworthiness judg-
ments.
Although the selfishly competent agent coordinated more efficiently
with participants at certain stages because it was responsible for the
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more difficult actions, the goal achievement statistics clearly show
that participants were more likely to achieve the joint goal with the
unselfish agent. In sum, participants were indeed able to effectively
cooperate with a competent agent toward the joint goal in the puzzle
game. Cooperation was generally more successful if the agent played
unselfishly and complied with human advice, which also led to more
favorable social attributions.
4.5.5 Lessons learned
This section describes practical implications regarding the planned
experiments.
4.5.5.1 Puzzle solving heuristic
Every following experiment will include some random variation re-
garding the first block position chosen by the agent, if the puzzle
field is still empty. This is designed to reduce the possibility that par-
ticipants solve the puzzle in the exact same way multiple times in a
row.
4.5.5.2 Measures
A conceptual improvement regarding the trustworthiness measure
may be in order. In the validation study, the two components of the
credibility scale – competence and trustworthiness – were evaluated
separately. The trustworthiness items are intended to measure per-
ceived goodness and morality of agents (Fogg & Tseng, 1999), hence
the separation between trustworthiness and competence. Based on
this, relevant patterns regarding selfish and unselfish incompetence
were found in the validation study. However, separating trustworthi-
ness and competence stands in contrast to the trustworthiness con-
cept as established in the trust literature, which views competence
as important foundation, and may cause conceptual problems. To en-
sure conceptual integrity, a trustworthiness measure should capture
competence as well. Frameworks such as the warmth and competence
construct may provide more sound options to differentiate between
intentions and competencies.
Another central conclusion of this study is that the measures merely
captured how participants perceive the agent’s actions, but not if they
actually put trust in the agent based on these perceptions. This miss-
ing information must be included in trust-based experiments.
4.5.5.3 Manipulations
The validation study aimed at manipulating task-related behavior for
strategic social cooperation. Puzzle competence increased not only
perceived competence, but also perceived trustworthiness of the agent.
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As discussed above, altering the competence manipulation to isolate
perceived competence from perceived trustworthiness alone would
be counterproductive.
Unselfishness increased perceived trustworthiness but decreased
perceived competence. A similar negative effect on perceived com-
petence was observed in the prisoner’s dilemma. Here, cooperative
players who are defected against are judged as less competent by ob-
servers (Krueger & Acevedo, 2007). This indicates that the effect of
unselfishness on perceived competence must be accepted as natural.
Hence, no adjustments are made regarding the manipulations in Ex-
periment 1.
4.6 overview of experiments
As explained in the previous chapter, trust experiences typically em-
body a number of relevant factors. The research focus of the present
thesis lies on the antecedents, formation patterns, and regulation mech-
anisms of human–computer trust.
Experiment 1: Trust antecedents. Inferring trust antecedents from
the interaction is crucial to better predict trust in computer agents.
Previous research suggests that performance is a very stable determi-
nant of trust, yet it is unknown how trust is related to warmth and
competence perceptions of computers. By adopting a social cognition
perspective on trust, the experiment investigates antecedents that are
deeply rooted in how we perceive and categorize other people.
Experiment 2: Trust formation. This first trust formation experiment
analyzes how human players respond to anthropomorphic versus
non-anthropomorphic agents giving advice. Advice adoption is a
common trust problem in HCI and depends on how trust evolves
over time. Anthropomorphism is believed to play an important role
in trust formation because it fundamentally changes characteristics
of the agent such as appearance and voice output, making it more
human-like to users.
Experiment 3: Trust formation (extended). Another important fac-
tor for the formation of trust is the actual degree of anthropomor-
phism. Building on the same premises as the previous experiment,
this study focuses on human–human versus human–computer trust
comparisons. It also investigates how virtual agents, which lie be-
tween computers and humans on the anthropomorphism spectrum,
affect trust.
Experiment 4: Trust regulation. The ability to regulate trust is cru-
cial to prolong cooperation. Critical events in cooperative interactions
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such as goal failure can be considered a violation of the trust one has
put into their partner. As an attempt to regulate user trust, the anthro-
pomorphic agent communicates blame after joint goal failure.
Complex cooperation often includes many different interaction fac-
tors which must be mastered by the social agents in order to attain
the goal (see Section 4.4). This implies that constructing “one size
fits all” empirical settings may be challenging because it could inflate
the number of independent variables and lead to conflicts between
them. Regarding the present cooperation paradigm, combining hu-
man advice taking as main dependent variable with strategic social
behavior components of the agent would obscure the research focus
as two sources of information compete against each other: the agent’s
perceived cooperation strategy, and whether the advice is perceived
to be competent. Strategy inferences would also confound how trust-
worthy the agent is judged to be. Consequently, strategic social be-
havior and advice taking will not be examined together. Rather, the
previously described cooperative interaction factors are implemented
in a modular fashion, enabling the focus on distinct trust factors, as
explained above.
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E X P E R I M E N T 1 : T R U S T A N T E C E D E N T S
The goal of Experiment 1 is to shed light on antecedents of human–
computer trust that are rooted in fundamental dimensions of social
cognition (Kulms & Kopp, 2018). We hypothesize that similar to hu-
mans, intelligent agents elicit warmth and competence attributions.
These attributions could predict human trust. The guiding idea be-
hind this experiment is that humans are highly sensitive to the inten-
tions as well as abilities of other agents and adjust their responses
accordingly (Fiske et al., 2007). Despite the important ongoing debate
regarding the similarities (Reeves & Nass, 1996) and differences (Lee
& See, 2004; Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007) between human–human
and human–computer trust, it is well established that humans readily
respond to social cues by computers (Nass & Moon, 2000). However,
we do not know how trust in computer agents is underpinned by
characteristics of human social cognition such as warmth and compe-
tence.
A better understanding of the factors behind artificial warmth and
competence and how they modulate user behavior has significant im-
plications for key issues in HCI. This includes the communication
of intentions to foster predictability (Klein et al., 2004) and trustwor-
thiness (DeSteno et al., 2012), or complex psychological challenges
like maintaining warmth in face-to-face interactions (e.g., DeVault et
al., 2014) and managing prolonged human–computer relationships
through relational behavior (e.g., Bickmore & Picard, 2005).
5.1 overview
The validation study showed that agents receive different degrees of
trustworthiness attributions based on their puzzle-soling competence
and selfishness. Experiment 1 directly builds on this premise. The
interaction will require a human player and an agent to cooperate
toward a joint goal with a competitive payoff structure and an addi-
tional individual score.
This experiment investigates the following research question:
RQ: Do people infer warmth and competence traits when
interacting with computer agents, and are these attribu-
tions related to trust?
Experiment 1 makes the following contribution to the present the-
sis’ goals:
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• We operationalize and exemplify the characteristics of warmth
and competence in an interaction with computer agents that
may lack problem-solving competence, but are trying to comply
with human intentions, and vice versa.
5.2 method
Participants
Eighty German undergraduate and graduate students participated in
exchange for 5 EUR. The sample ranged in age from 18 to 40 years
(M = 23.53,SD = 4.36, median = 23; female: 62.5%).
Task
Task 1: Puzzle game
The puzzle game variation was identical to the validation study and
thus includes strategic social behavior (i.e., selfishness) as well.
Task 2: Behavioral trust game (give-some dilemma)
After the puzzle game, participants engaged in a decision task with
the agent, the give-some dilemma (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). Par-
ticipants were told to possess four tokens and being able to allocate
those tokens between themselves and the agent, without the opportu-
nity to exchange information. Importantly, tokens that are exchanged
double their value while tokens that are not exchanged keep their
value. It was explained that the agent was in the same position and
faces the same decision. The game provides an incremental measure
of behavioral trust, operationalized as the number of tokens being
exchanged. Instead of measuring purely economic decision-making,
choices in the give-some dilemma reflect social perceptions of the
counterpart and are positively correlated with subjective trust assess-
ments (Lee et al., 2013). Popular versions of this dilemma include a
two stage approach (Berg et al., 1995). First, the sender can keep or
send tokens to the receiver. Second, the receiver decides how to split
this amount. The sender’s decision, being a bet that the receiver will
to some extent reciprocate a risky decision, measures trust, and the
receiver’s return measures trustworthiness (Camerer, 2003).
In the present version, participants take the role of the sender. They
were told that although both players decide simultaneously, the agent’s
decision would only be revealed at the end of the experiment to avoid
confounding the following measures. In fact, the agent’s decision was
only a cover to maintain the associated risk and increase participants’
social evaluations of the agent. We did not assess participants’ expec-
tation as to how many coins the computer would exchange because
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we assumed this number would highly correlate with the number
participants would be willing to exchange.
Agent behavior
Similar to the validation study, the agent was modeled to incorporate
varying degrees of puzzle competence and selfishness. Again, the self-
ish agent only accepts the high value U-block as advice, whereas the
unselfish agent accepted all suggestions. The same patterns follow
from these components: selfish agents always receive a higher pay-
off than their human counterparts; it is impossible to attain the joint
goal with the incompetent agent; because a selfish agent desires the
U-block, the block order is constant and the human player always
gets the T-block.
Several of the mechanisms described above aimed at the modula-
tion of perceived warmth and competence. First, human players give
advice to the agent that either accepts or rejects it. The idea behind
this pattern is to model the desire of the agent for individual points
and introduce (non-)compliance responses to human advice. We as-
sume that those responses carry strong social meaning as they rep-
resent how much one trusts advice (Dongen & van Maanen, 2013).
Likewise, the agent trying to maximize its payoff should also dete-
riorate perceived warmth. Second, both players have an individual
score. When the joint goal is achieved, a bonus is added to the indi-
vidual scores as reward. The game thus rewards working toward the
joint goal, even for selfish agents. Third, the agent could still display
competent behavior, irrespective of selfishness.
Design
The study had a 2 × 2 between-subjects design, with puzzle com-
petence (competent vs. incompetent) and selfishness (selfish vs. un-
selfish) as between-subjects factors. Participants were randomly as-
signed to one of the four conditions.
Measurement
To infer warmth and competence attributions from social perception,
we compiled a 5-point semantic differential containing 25 adjective
pairs designed to assess a broad range of interpersonal attributes
during social perception (Bente et al., 1996; Pütten et al., 2010). Be-
havioral trust was measured using the number of tokens participants
are willing to exchange in the give-some dilemma (1 − 5). As self-
reported measure, participants rated the perceived trustworthiness of
the agent, using trustworthiness and expertise items on a 5-point Lik-
ert scale (Fogg & Tseng, 1999). The items were combined into a single
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score, Cronbach’s α = .94. Finally, team performance was computed
as the number of completed rows per round.
Procedure
Participants met the experimenter, completed informed consent, and
received written instructions. The experimental part was identical to
the validation study, but the following adjustments were made. First,
participants were asked to cooperate with the agent toward the goal.
Additionally, the agent was described as cooperative agent (the study
materials used the label ’computer’). These changes were made in
order to establish a more explicit cooperative frame. Second, to assess
behavioral trust, participants played the give-some dilemma with the
agent after the puzzle game.
5.3 results
Perceived warmth and competence
A principal component analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation was con-
ducted on the social perception judgments. The results are shown
in Table 4. Four components emerged, accounting for 71.75% of the
variance. Three components had sufficient reliability. The first com-
ponent, labeled Warmth, accounted for 45.29% of the variance, Cron-
bach’s α = .94. The second component, labeled Competence, accounted
for 16.64% of the variance, Cronbach’s α = .88. The third component
accounted for only 5.37% of the variance, Cronbach’s α = .70. Based
on the scree plot showing a point of inflection at the third component,
only the first two components were retained.
Although the semantic differential used to infer warmth and com-
petence attributes had a more contemporary source, a number of
attributes with high loadings on the Warmth and Competence com-
ponents are semantically similar to the elementary good-/bad-social
and good-/bad-intellectual trait clusters identified by Rosenberg et al.:
’honest’, ’modest’, ’warm’ (’cold’), ’intelligent’ (’unintelligent’), ’alert’,
’boring’, ’dominant’ (’submissive’) (Rosenberg et al., 1968). Uncorre-
lated component scores were obtained using the regression method.
In order to reduce the probability of Type I error inflation and to ac-
count for the relationship between the dependent variables, we ran a
single 2× 2 MANOVA for the dependent variables warmth, compe-
tence, behavioral trust, and trustworthiness.
Warmth was decreased by selfishness and puzzle incompetence.
Warmth was lower for the selfish (M = −0.41,SD = 0.77) than un-
selfish agent (M = 0.41,SD = 1.05), F(1, 76) = 23.51,p < .001,η2p =
.24. Warmth was also lower for the incompetent (M = −0.47,SD =
0.75) than competent agent (M = 0.47,SD = 1.01), F(1, 76) = 32.22,p <
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Table 4: Principal component analysis of the social perception scale.










































Eigenvalues 11.32 4.16 1.34 1.11
% of variance 45.29 16.64 5.37 4.45
Cronbach’s α .94 .88 .70 .61
Note. Rotated component loadings. Loadings < .400 are omitted.
.001,η2p = .30. Furthermore, there was a significant interaction effect
between selfishness and puzzle competence on Warmth. To decon-
struct this interaction, the selfish agent was judged differently based
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on whether it played competently, F(1, 76) = 9.57,p < .01,η2p = .11.
If the agent played incompetently, Warmth was not affected by selfish
behavior (simple effects: F(1, 76) = 1.51,p = .22). This changed when
the agent played competently: in this case, Warmth was decreased by
selfishness (simple effects: F(1, 76) = 31.70,p < .001).
Competence was affected only by puzzle incompetence. Competence
was lower for the incompetent (M = −.47,SD = .84) than competent
agent (M = 0.48,SD = 0.95), F(1, 76) = 22.65,p < .001,η2p = .23. See
Figure 9 and Table 14 (appendix a) for further information.
Figure 9: Perceived warmth and competence means. Error bars represent
standard deviations.
Behavioral trust and perceived trustworthiness
The behavioral trust and trustworthiness results showed a similar pat-
tern, as shown by Figure 10 and Table 15 (appendix a). Behavioral
trust was higher for the unselfish (M = 3.23,SD = 1.35) than selfish
agent (M = 2.30,SD = 1.44), F(1, 76) = 10.34,p < .01,η2p = .12. It
was also higher for the competent (M = 3.25,SD = 1.50) than incom-
petent agent (M = 2.28,SD = 1.26), F(1, 76) = 11.49,p < .01,η2p =
.13. Moreover, there was a significant interaction effect on behavioral
trust, F(1, 76) = 4.00,p < .05,η2p = .05. If the agent played incompe-
tently, behavioral trust was not affected by selfishness (simple effects:
F(1, 76) = 0.74,p = .39). However, a different result emerged if the
agent played competently: in this case, behavioral trust was decreased
by selfishness (simple effects: F(1, 76) = 13.60,p < .001).
Trustworthiness was higher for the unselfish (M = 3.07,SD =
1.08) than selfish agent (M = 2.35,SD = 0.77), F(1, 76) = 26.79,p <
.001,η2p = .26. Trustworthiness was also higher for the competent
(M = 3.36,SD = 0.94) than incompetent agent (M = 2.07,SD = 0.55),
F(1, 76) = 86.02,p < .001,η2p = .53. There also was a significant inter-
action effect on trustworthiness, (F(1, 76) = 16.31,p < .001,η2p = .18).
If the agent played incompetently, trustworthiness was not affected
by selfishness (simple effects: F(1, 76) = 0.65,p = .42). In contrast, if
the agent played competently, trustworthiness was decreased by self-
ishness (simple effects: F(1, 76) = 42.46,p < .001).
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Figure 10: Behavioral trust and trustworthiness means. Error bars represent
standard deviations.
To analyze if the effect of the agent’s puzzle competence and selfish-
ness on trust was statistically mediated by warmth and competence,
we used the bootstrapping method by Preacher and Hayes with bias
corrected confidence intervals (2008). We ran separate analyses for
each combination of attribution (i.e., Warmth or Competence) and trust
measure (i.e., behavioral trust or trustworthiness). The independent
variable was selfishness (binary coded: 0, for selfish; 1, for unselfish)
for the analyses involving the proposed mediator Warmth, and puz-
zle competence (binary coded: 0, for incompetent; 1, for competent)
for the proposed mediator Competence, respectively. The analysis con-
firmed that Warmth statistically mediated the relationship between
unselfishness and behavioral trust (95% LCI = 0.34, UCI = 1.12) as
well as trustworthiness (95% LCI = 0.21, UCI = 0.81), respectively.
Competence was not as clear a mediator as Warmth: Competence was in-
creased by puzzle competence and it was related to trustworthiness,
but not behavioral trust (p = .08). Moreover, although Competence was
a mediating factor between puzzle competence and trustworthiness
(95% LCI = 0.14, UCI = 0.60), the direct effect of puzzle competence
on trustworthiness remained significant (95% LCI = 0.61, UCI = 1.31).
In sum, Warmth statistically mediated the relationship between un-
selfishness and trust as well as trustworthiness of the agent, whereas
Competence partially mediated the relationship between puzzle com-
petence and trustworthiness (see Fig. 11).
5.4 discussion
Computer agents increasingly act along dimensions of compliant and
competent behaviors that elicit fundamental warmth and competence
attributions. This experiment suggests that people’s willingness to
trust agents depends on perceived warmth and competence. In line
with previous research (Fiske et al., 2007), we found an emphasis of
the role of warmth for trust. This can be explained as follows: The
underlying perceptions of warmth, that is, intentions, determined
whether the agent was judged to mainly participate in cooperative
problem-solving, or to additionally seek for selfish outcome maxi-
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Figure 11: Mediation analyses of unselfishness (puzzle competence) on be-
havioral trust and trustworthiness, respectively. Betas standard-
ized; 20.000 samples were used for bootstrapping.
mization. Warmth is thus an important antecedent of trust in strategic
social interaction. Importantly, similar effects of the manipulations on
perceived trustworthiness and behavioral trust were detected which
is not always the case in trust studies (Hancock et al., 2011; Salem
et al., 2015).
The findings provide further support for the notion that agents
are treated as social actors. Indeed, roughly 62% of the variance re-
lated to social perception was explained by fundamental dimensions
of social cognition, warmth and competence. Attributing these char-
acteristics to an agent is practically relevant for HCI research because
it could create agents that elicit trust in cooperation. To the best of
our knowledge, we provide the first clear evidence how warmth and
competence predict trust in agents. This finding is particularly impor-
tant because people increasingly rely on agents for problem-solving
in their everyday lives. Agents no longer merely execute human or-
ders; they proactively recommend directions, travel targets, as well
as products, correct and complete human input before processing
it, and overall align to our needs. Going beyond this, they also in-
creasingly mimic human appearance and behavior and manipulate
their trustworthiness in accordance with how humans develop trust
(DeSteno et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2013). Using the interactive coopera-
tion game paradigm, we were able to highlight the importance of how
humans develop warmth and competence attributions for the design
of successful interactions. In particular, these attributions seemed to
be in line with the general foundation of trust evaluations, that is, be-
ing sensitive to "will-do" and "can-do" characteristics of other social
agents (Colquitt et al., 2007). Moreover, this experiment extends work
on the development of trust in agents by emphasizing behavioral or
performance factors. Previous research focused on inferences drawn
from artificial emotion expressions (Melo et al., 2014), nonverbal be-
havior (DeSteno et al., 2012), human-likeness (Kiesler et al., 1996),
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reciprocity (Sandoval et al., 2015), and agency (Melo et al., 2015). The
interactive cooperation game paradigm demonstrates that the behav-
ioral preconditions of trust in agents such as performance (i.e., com-
petence) (Hancock et al., 2011; Lee & See, 2004) and perceived inten-
tions (i.e., compliance) are translated by humans into warmth and
competence attributions which, in turn, determine trust. Considering
the role of social cognition for trust could provide a starting point to
how other largely understudied aspects of social cognition affect trust,
including empathy (Frith & Singer, 2008) as a facilitator of coopera-
tion (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 1999), and categorical
thinking and stereotyping (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000) as source
of warmth stereotypes (Cuddy et al., 2007).
The results also speak to the ongoing debate of human–human ver-
sus human–computer trust (Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007). While
some argue that both forms share the same underlying mechanisms
(Reeves & Nass, 1996), others maintain that trust in agents is differ-
ent from trust in people (Lee & See, 2004). This experiment’s contri-
bution is that it found supporting evidence for agents being judged
along the same fundamental dimensions of social cognition as hu-
mans. To further clarify the impact of this experiment’s contribution,
comparisons of interpersonal and human–computer trust should also
encompass warmth and competence attributions, including their in-
fluence on behavior. Previous work has already provided evidence
for the relevance of warmth and competence attributions as under-
lying dimensions of social perception in HCI (Bergmann et al., 2012;
Niewiadomski et al., 2010).
From a game theoretic perspective, selfishness in the puzzle game
is similar to a safety preference in the stag hunt game. In the puzzle
game, selfishness promotes selfish goals. In the stag hunt game, two
agents individually choose between hunting a hare and a stag, with
the stag generating higher payoff than the hare. To hunt the stag (i.e.,
the joint goal), one agent requires the willingness of the other agent
to coordinate and participate in the hunt; to hunt the hare, no co-
operation is required. Interactive adaptations of the stag hunt game
let human players coordinate with computer agents by navigating
shapes through a two-dimensional board (Yoshida et al., 2010). In-
deed, the puzzle game drew inspiration from such strategic games.
Going beyond this, it attempts to investigate the interplay of warmth
and competence as critical factor for cooperation and trust among so-
cial agents – a domain that is difficult to model in pure game theoretic
terms. Advanced agents such as robots are undergoing evolutionary
processes pertaining to roles (tools vs. assistants, companions), func-
tionalities (e.g., learning new competencies, be adaptive), and the so-
cial distance to humans (no contact vs. long-term contact) (Dauten-
hahn, 2007). This should not only entail the facilitation, but rather the
calibration of trust to avoid maladaptive behavior. With increasingly
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intelligent and complex agents, a match between elicited trust and
capabilities make human reliance on agents safe (Lee & See, 2004).
After all, humans navigate through their social lives by categorizing
others along social dimensions, triggering specific cognitive contents
(Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). This experiment emphasizes the role
of transparent intentions for this process, and is another step toward a
coherent picture of how people perceive and interact with intelligent
agents.
6
E X P E R I M E N T 2 : T R U S T F O R M AT I O N
The previous experiment showed how perceived warmth can become
a foundation of trust and trustworthiness attributions. Perceived com-
petence could statistically not explain the relation between agent ac-
tions to solve the puzzle and resulting trust(-worthiness), indicating
that other factors influenced this relation. Indeed, targets that elicit
negative affect may cause perceivers to outright ignore their task
competence (Casciaro & Lobo, 2008). Given the actual significance of
competence and performance for trust (Lee & See, 2004; Mayer et al.,
1995), the role of competence should be more evident under different
parameters. The individual scores in the first experimental setting ul-
timately highlighted the agent’s intention to pursue its desire for an
individual goal, hence the relative importance and functional role of
warmth for trust.
Cooperation does not always rely as heavily on perceived inten-
tions as in the previous experiment. A number of reasons call for a
different approach regarding the interaction, and the interactive co-
operation game paradigm permits these flexible rearrangements. The
motivation to alter the interaction is explained in the following.
Strategic considerations may be important for cooperation in situ-
ations of conflicting interests, like social dilemmas. However, current
human–computer trust research is often centered on a more tangi-
ble issue, that is, advice adoption. Advice adoption studies analyze
how people respond to computer-generated advice presented by in-
telligent agents. Since the decision to adopt computerized advice is
understood either as direct consequence or behavioral form of trust,
advice adoption studies are often conceptualized as trust studies (see
Hoff & Bashir, 2015; Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007, for an overview).
In these scenarios, implementing individual interests would change
the factors that determine advice adoption: trust evaluations would
largely depend on perceived intentions in terms of benevolence and
integrity, whereas the more interesting focus lies on whether why and
how people accept advice as external input. Accordingly, individual
interests are typically not the main issue in advice adoption. Rather,
it is hypothesized that characteristics of the agent and their advice
affect trust formation.
One such agent characteristic is anthropomorphism. Technology
that displays anthropomorphic characteristics is becoming increas-
ingly influential. For instance, anthropomorphic interfaces can serve
as online motor skill coaches (Kok et al., 2015), child tutors (Breazeal
et al., 2016), negotiation partners (Gratch et al., 2016), or assistants
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for target groups with special needs (Yaghoubzadeh et al., 2013). The
underlying goal is to deliberately design technology so as to imitate
human-like characteristics and engage people in rich interactions, but
the role of anthropomorphism for cooperative interaction is not yet
clear. In a recent study, the difference between trust in an anthropo-
morphic avatar versus a non-anthropomorphic computer remained
somewhat unclear (Visser et al., 2016). The overall conclusion was
that anthropomorphism indeed influences trust, leading to higher re-
sistance to trust breakdowns, yet the most pronounced differences
occurred between the human and both computerized (i.e., computer
and avatar) partners. In this particular setting, the impact of an an-
thropomorphic avatar on trust-related and performance variables was
difficult to pinpoint. Across three experiments, subjective trust in the
avatar was sometimes higher than in the human partner, at other
times it was the same. Compliance with avatar advice was never dif-
ferent from the other agents. Overall, the increase of applications with
complex interaction goals suggests an important potential role of an-
thropomorphic agents, but if such agents support trust is not yet fully
clear.
6.1 overview
Experiment 2 encapsulates the role of agent and advice characteris-
tics for trust formation by investigating how anthropomorphism and
advice quality relate to advice adoption (Kulms & Kopp, 2016). The
research question is as follows:
RQ: Does anthropomorphism influence trust formation?
Experiment 2makes the following contributions to the present thesis’
goals:
• The interaction is tailored to investigate how people form trust
in intelligent agents over time and respond to advice presented
by these agents.
• Trust is operationalized as advice adoption rate, providing a
more practical trust measure in problem solving.
6.2 method
Participants
Sixty German undergraduate and graduate students participated in
exchange for 5 EUR. The sample ranged in aged from 18 to 44 years
(M = 24.85, SD = 4.86, median = 24; 60.7% female).
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Task
Participants played an altered version of the puzzle game. The game
proceeds in alternating turns. In each turn both players draw one of
two available blocks, a T-block and a U-block, from an urn without
replacement. The blocks no longer generate individual payoff. The
agent first chooses a block, leaving the remaining block to the partic-
ipant. The joint goal is to complete a specific number of rows. Again,
completed rows are not emptied and there is no time restriction. Com-
pleting a row yields 100 points for each player. Attaining the joint goal
yields a joint payoff such that the score gets doubled for each player.
Thus, the payoff for both players is always identical. Participants were
instructed to work toward the joint goal together with their partner.
They were also told that throughout the game, their partner would
offer advice as to how they could place their block. The interaction
lasted three rounds in total with the goal becoming increasingly diffi-
cult each round (Round 1: 4 rows, Round 2: 5 rows, Round 3: 6 rows).
Agent behavior
Three times per round, the agent offered advice to participants (see
Fig. 12). This was initiated by the agent saying “I have a suggestion,
do you want to see it?” or “I think I know a solution, should I show
you?”, if the virtual agent was present. Next, two buttons appeared,
labeled “Show me the suggestion” or “I do not want the suggestion”,
respectively. Without virtual agent, the buttons appeared without in-
troduction. In order for the game to continue, participants had to
make the decision to either request or ignore the advice. Across all
conditions, the agent placed blocks in a competent fashion.
Figure 12: Game interface with virtual agent. Suggestions by the agent are
shown at the top in light blue. Left: the agent makes a useful
suggestion. Right: the agent makes a bad suggestion.
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Design
The study had a 2 × 2 between-subjects design, with agent (com-
puter vs. virtual agent) and advice quality (good vs. bad) as between-
subjects factors. Participants’ partner was either a virtual agent called
Sam with anthropomorphic appearance and voice, or a regular com-
puter agent without any anthropomorphic cues. The agent provided
either good or bad advice.
Measurement
In order to asses the task outcome, a team performance score was
computed by analyzing how often the joint goal was achieved in
each round (0− 100%). Behavioral trust was the number of times the
agent’s advice was followed in each round (0 − 3). Another behav-
ioral measure was how often participants requested advice in each
round (0− 3). Self-reported perceived trustworthiness was measured
using trustworthiness and expertise items on a 5-point Likert scale
(Fogg & Tseng, 1999). The items were combined into a single score,
Cronbach’s α = .90.
Procedure
Participants met the experimenter, completed informed consent, and
received written instructions. The instructions described the game
and introduced player two: a virtual person named Sam (anthropo-
morphism conditions), or a computer without name (no anthropo-
morphism conditions), respectively. After each round, participants
were given a summary showing whether the goal was attained. Before
the interaction, participants familiarized themselves with the controls
and mechanics without the agent.
Data analysis
All dependent variables were entered into a 2× 2 MANOVA.
6.3 results
Team performance
Team performance did not significantly differ between the conditions.
See Table 5.
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Table 5: Means and standard deviations of team performance (goal achieve-
ment).
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Advice
quality
Agent M SD M SD M SD
Good Computer 0.77 0.44 0.69 0.48 0.46 0.52
VA 0.81 0.40 0.63 0.50 0.50 0.52
Bad Computer 0.67 0.49 0.47 0.52 0.40 0.52
VA 0.67 0.49 0.53 0.52 0.27 0.46
Note. VA = Virtual agent.
Perceived trustworthiness
There was a significant main effect of advice quality on trustwor-
thiness. The agent was ascribed higher trustworthiness given good
(M = 3.36,SD = 0.66) versus bad advice (M = 2.51,SD = 0.70),
F(1, 56) = 22.35,p < .001,η2p = .29.
Requested and adopted advice (behavioral trust)
There were significant main effects of agent on requested advice, and
these effects diminished in later rounds. The virtual agent led to more
requested advice in Round 1, F(1, 56) = 4.92,p < .05,η2p = .08, and
with marginal significance in Round 2, F(1, 56) = 3.18,p < .09,η2p =
.05. This effect disappeared in Round 3, F(1, 56) = 1.89,p = .18.
Advice quality had less influence on requested advice. In Round 1
there was a marginally significant main effect of advice quality on
requested advice, F(1, 56) = 3.53,p < .07,η2p = .06. In this round,
participants requested somewhat more bad than good advice.
There were consistently significant main effects of advice quality
on the amount of adopted advice. In Round 1, F(1, 56) = 22.60,p <
.001,η2p = .29, Round 2, F(1, 56) = 42.25,p < .001,η2p = .43, and
Round 3, F(1, 56) = 34.45,p < .001,η2p = .38, participants adopted
more good than bad advice. There were no significant main effects of
agent on adopted advice.
Figure 13 and 14 as well as Table 16 (appendix a) and 17 (appendix
a) show these results.
Time effects
Separate ANOVAs with round number as within-subjects factor and
agent as well as advice quality as between-subjects factors were con-
ducted. For the between-subjects effects, the dependent variables (team
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Figure 13: Requested advice.
Figure 14: Adopted advice (behavioral trust).
performance, requested advice, adopted advice) are averaged across
the three rounds to form a global variable. This complements the pre-
vious analysis, where team performance was analyzed per round, not
globally.
As the goal became increasingly difficult, there was a significant
main effect of round number on team performance, F(2, 110) = 6.42,p <
.01,η2p = .11. Planned contrasts reveal that team performance wors-
ened over time. Team performance in Round 2was worse than Round
1, F(1, 55) = 2.83,p < .10,η2p = .05, worse in Round 3 than Round
2, F(1, 55) = 3.43,p < .07,η2p = .06, and worse in Round 3 than
Round 1, F(1, 55) = 13.50,p < .01,η2p = .20. On the global level, there
also was a significant main effect of advice quality on team perfor-
mance, F(1, 55) = 3.80,p < .06,η2p = .07, indicating that the teams
performed better with good (M = .64,SE = .05) compared to bad
advice (M = .50,SE = .05).
Significant between-subjects effects of advice quality on advice re-
quests and adoption on the global level confirmed the findings re-
ported above. Participants requested overall more advice from the
virtual agent (M = 2.04,SE = .14) than the computer (M = 1.62,SE =
.14), F(1, 56) = 4.54,p < .05,η2p = .08, and they adopted overall more
good (M = 1.43,SE = .10) than bad advice (M = 0.31,SE = .10),
F(1, 56) = 61.63,p < .001,η2p = .52.
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Relationship between trustworthiness and behavioral trust measures
Measure interrelations show that trustworthiness and behavioral trust
were related in Round 1 and Round 2 (see Table 6). There were
moderately strong correlations between the number of requested and
adopted advice in a given round, except for Round 1 (see colored
cells). However, note that the correlations were somewhat biased to
the extent that the number of requested advice could logically not
surpass adopted advice.














REQ (R1) −.16 - - - - - -
REQ (R2) .04 .64** - - - - -
REQ (R3) −.03 .54** .48** - - - -
BTR (R1) .38* .21 .19 .09 - - -
BTR (R2) .37* .11 .41* .06 .57** - -
BTR (R3) .20 .06 .14 .38* .53** .56** -
Notes. TW = Trustworthiness, REQ = Requests, BTR = Behavioral trust, R = Round
p < .01*, p < .001**
Relationship between team performance, trustworthiness, and behavioral mea-
sures
Team performance did not significantly correlate with any of the
other variables.
6.4 discussion
The goal of this experiment was to examine the role of anthropo-
morphism for trust formation. As intelligent agents become increas-
ingly adept in collaborating with others, human users need to decide
whether to trust them in novel interactions. While there is a grow-
ing body of research on trust and cooperation between humans and
computer agents in simplified scenarios, this experiment focused on
interactive and continued decision-making. Participants tried to solve
the puzzle within an advice adoption paradigm. In this cooperative
scenario, participants received task-related advice from an agent part-
ner three times per round, at fixed occasions. At the same time, both
players placed blocks in an alternating fashion. Trust in the agent was
measured in the form of the advice adoption rate.
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The results show that anthropomorphism was not related to trust
formation. Neither behavioral trust (i.e., advice adoption) nor per-
ceived trustworthiness were affected by anthropomorphism. This find-
ing stands in contrast to previous research showing that anthropo-
morphism increases trust (Waytz et al., 2014). Other research found
similarly positive effects of anthropomorphism on cooperation, but
those studies incorporated humans or human-controlled avatars in
the anthropomorphism conditions (Melo et al., 2015; Miwa et al., 2008;
Sandoval et al., 2015), which is why direct comparisons could be mis-
leading.
One possible reason for the missing influence of the virtual agent
on trust is that participants were not socially influenced by the an-
thropomorphic cues. Importantly, anthropomorphism did not make
the agent seem more trustworthy. In theory, the adaptive advantage
of identifying trustworthiness from anthropomorphism is in line with
the warmth and competence concept (Fiske et al., 2007; Judd et al.,
2005) and the evolution of human cooperation (Jordan et al., 2016),
because it allows access to crucial information as to the intentions
of others. The contribution of the present results is that the on-screen
presence of an artificially anthropomorphic agent in conjunction with
neutral, unpersuasive verbal advice offerings do not exert influence
on trust and trustworthiness. For a more comprehensive investigation,
more variations of anthropomorphism need to be considered. After
all, the virtual agent used in this experiment was a rough approxima-
tion of human-like appearance and voice.
Another issue may have been missing feedback about the specific
positive consequences of advice adoption for the goal. Direct positive
feedback could have reinforced advice adoption in the long run, but
the cooperative task dampened the possibility for feedback because
it did not involve immediate right or wrong decisions. Rather, even
with low advice adoption, goal achievement was possible if both play-
ers acted competently. To issue a caveat, efforts to reinforce advice
adoption using anthropomorphic cues could actually make matters
worse in the long run if participants fail to achieve the goal, because
the reinforcement may create increased expectations which are vio-
lated by goal failure. Using cues such as anthropomorphism to rein-
force human behavior should only be considered if other cues can
help regulate negative outcomes.
Trust and trustworthiness attributions were amplified by compe-
tence of the agent in the form of good advice. Across three rounds,
participants consistently based advice adoption on whether the agent
gave good advice. This finding is in line with the notion that perfor-
mance is a critical key antecedent of trust in agents (Hancock et al.,
2011; Lee & See, 2004). Overall, participants formed appropriate trust
in the agent to the extent that bad advice was rejected. Perceived trust-
worthiness was positively related to adoption in the first two rounds,
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indicating that advice adoption is a valid operationalization of trust.
Over time, there was little variation of trust in advice. This could in-
dicate that the degree of trust was rather stable and insusceptible to
changes, even though the goal became gradually more difficult.
Although anthropomorphism was not related to advice adoption, it
influenced another important interaction factor. Participants requested
more advice from the virtual agent, and this effect was stronger in
earlier rounds. Advice requests laid the ground for trust decisions,
that is, to adopt or reject advice. Since the requests did not correlate
with perceived trustworthiness, it is not fully clear how anthropomor-
phism influenced advice requests. Some possible factors why partic-
ipants felt a stronger need to consult the virtual agent are context
(i.e., momentary task difficulty), self-confidence, and mere curiosity.
Interestingly, the number of requests in the good and bad advice con-
ditions were roughly at the same level. Bad advice did not decrease
advice requests; in fact, participants requested even somewhat more
bad than good advice in the beginning of the interaction. A number
of reasons can explain this finding. It seems that participants were
consistently motivated to evaluate the advice, even after their first re-
quests indicated that they were not particularly helpful. Participants
could have been forgiving, or were affected by the agent’s competent
puzzle-solving actions. After all, competent block placements were
the only necessary and sufficient condition of high team performance.
Moreover, requests had no associated costs. There were no time con-
straints or any other punishments such that participants had nothing
to lose by requesting advice.
The experiment has a number of limitations. The low sample size
could have decreased the likelihood of detecting interaction effects
in the 2× 2 design. Furthermore, anthropomorphism varied only be-
tween a virtual and computer agent. It is unclear if a real human
agent may have had a stronger influence on trust (e.g., Visser et al.,
2016). Finally, participants could not request advice as needed but
were confined to fixed moments.
How did the change in the interaction paradigm relate to trust? The
advice adoption scenario affects the cooperative framing and factors
of human–computer trust. The agent now clearly acted as coopera-
tive partner without motivation to compete with participants. The
scenario introduced new important trust-relevant cues in the form of
agent advice and advice quality. Hence, participants had access to
more and qualitatively different trust-relevant cues. These new cues,
however, did not affect the performance of the human–agent teams,
possibly due to the limitations mentioned above. Anthropomorphism
was hypothesized to influence trust, but this relation was not con-
firmed. Instead, the effect of anthropomorphism on requests implies
that in the context of continued cooperation, a comprehensive inves-
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tigation of all relevant interaction variables related to trust decisions
is necessary.
7
E X P E R I M E N T 3 : T R U S T F O R M AT I O N ( E X T E N D E D )
Experiment 2 provided only a first step toward the effects of anthro-
pomorphism on trust. A critical shortcoming was the anthropomor-
phism manipulation, which only incorporated a virtual agent but no
human agent. For a comprehensive investigation of the role of an-
thropomorphism for trust, real human agents are needed. Only the
comparison with human agents enables a full perspective regarding
the differences and similarities between human–human and human–
computer trust. Furthermore, it is still unclear if virtual agents gain
user trust either in a manner similar to humans, or non-embodied
computers.
7.1 overview
Experiment 3 provides a direct comparison between human and non-
human agents in the advice adoption scenario. Several additional im-
provements are introduced. In particular, participants are given more
freedom regarding advice requests. They also receive more task feed-
back, feedback about their progress toward the goal, and are faced
with greater uncertainty in the last round. Apart from this, Experi-
ment 3 has the same cooperative structure as Experiment 2. As an ex-
tension of the previous study, this experiment investigates the same
research question:
RQ: Does anthropomorphism influence trust formation?
Experiment 3makes the following contributions to this thesis’ goals:
• By including agents with varying degrees of anthropomorphism,
including human agents, the experiment contributes to the on-
going debate regarding the similarities and differences between




Participants were 114 CrowdFlower contributors from Germany, Aus-
tria, and Switzerland, aged between 18 and 58 years (M = 30.45, SD =
11.05; 41.2% female). They received 0.50 EUR for completing the ex-
periment and could earn additional 15 EUR based on how well they
played.
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Participants were excluded if their total session time was unrealisti-
cally short or if they failed to correctly answer a full sequence of test
questions regarding the game background and mechanics.
Task
The puzzle game used in this experiment (see Fig. 15) provided par-
ticipants with a 2-player problem-solving scenario where they could
ignore, request and decline, or request and adopt advice of an ar-
tificial agent. The interaction proceeds in alternating turns. In each
turn, both players draw one of two available blocks, a T-block and
a U-block. Also in each turn, the agent first chooses a block, leaving
the remaining block to the participant. The joint goal is to complete
a specific number of rows such that it is entirely filled with blocks. A
round ends when there is no space left for any other block.
Figure 15: Web-based puzzle game interface in the virtual agent condition.
The progress bar at the bottom shows the progress toward the
goal. The question marks in the top right corner show how many
requests are left. The icon on the left displays the block the agent
has picked (T-block).
Participants were instructed to work toward the joint goal with
the agent. Importantly, they were told they could request advice by
their partner up to three times per round. The advice was displayed
in the block area. The number of remaining advice was shown in
the top right corner (see Fig. 16). The interaction lasted three rounds.
In each round, the goal became increasingly difficult (Round 1: five
rows, Round 2: six rows, Round 3: eight rows). In Round 3, the ad-
vice pattern was changed such that the agent would no longer show
the advice first. Instead, participants could yield up to three of their
turns completely to the agent. The agent would automatically per-
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form the action, thereby increasing uncertainty as participants could
not evaluate the suggested solution first. This mechanic was intro-
duced to increase the associated risk of the trusting decision in the
final round. After each round, participants were given a brief sum-
mary as to whether the goal was attained. Before the experimental
trials, participants familiarized themselves with the controls and me-
chanics in a trial round without the agent.
Figure 16: Agent advice is displayed in light blue in the block area at the
top. The puzzle area now shows a preview of where the U-block
would be placed, given the current configuration. In this case, it
would be placed on top of the T-block.
As Figure 15 and 16 show, the puzzle game interface was modi-
fied to increase the user experience (e.g., more task feedback through
additional information) in this web-based version of the game.
Agent behavior
Audiovisual utterances for the virtual and human agent with match-
ing content were created in order to create the illusion of a social
agent capable of planning and acting within the task environment.
The utterances were shown as short video clips. Prior to the experi-
mental trials, the agent briefly introduced itself: “Hello, I am Sam. I
hope you are ready to puzzle.” When participants requested advice,
the agent explained to think of a solution (“Let me think”) and said
“How about this?” when the advice was displayed. When the joint
goal was attained, the agent cheerfully said “Hey, we reached the
goal.” In contrast, when the goal was not attained the agent was dis-
appointed: “Unfortunately, we did not reach the goal.” At the end of
the game, participants were thanked for participation.
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For the human agent condition, a male person was filmed. The
male was instructed to act as someone who gives advice to another
person by saying the phrases described above. The virtual agent was
programmed to utter the same phrases. For the computer agent con-
dition, a symbolic icon was used. Figure 17 shows the different agents
used in the experiment.
Figure 17: The computer, virtual, and human agent.
Design
The experimental design was a 3× 2 between-subjects design, with
agent (computer agent, virtual agent, human agent) and advice qual-
ity (good, mixed) as between-subjects factors. In the mixed advice
condition, the agent gives bad advice in the first round, followed by
good advice and solutions in the second and third round.
Measurement
A team performance measure was computed as indicator of whether
agent and advice quality affected the task outcome. Specifically, we
computed the number of completed rows participants achieved per
round. The main task was to play as efficiently as possible, by com-
pleting increasing amounts of rows. Since all agents played equally
competently, this variable approximates team performance adequately.
Behavioral and self-reported measures of trust were obtained. Self-
reported trust was assessed by asking participants how much they
trusted the agent using a single item. Behavioral trust was the num-
ber of times participants exactly followed the agent’s advice in each
round (Round 1 & 2), complemented by the number of times they
passed on their turn to the agent (Round 3). It was also computed
how often participants requested advice in the first place (Round 1
& 2). Self-reported perceived trustworthiness was measured using
trustworthiness and expertise items on a 5-point Likert scale (Fogg
& Tseng, 1999). The items were combined into a single score, Cron-
bach’s α = .92. Finally, to infer warmth and competence attributions
from social perception, the same semantic differential as in Experi-
ment 1 was used.
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Procedure
Participants signed up for the experiment as registered contributors
on the crowdsourcing platform CrowdFlower. The experiment was
listed as a human–computer study involving a cooperative 2-player
puzzle game. A possible concern with crowdsourcing studies is that
participants may already be familiar with popular study materials.
However, this does not apply to our materials as they have never
been used in crowdsourcing studies to date.
Participants read about the game mechanics, the goal, and the role
of the computer as a partner in problem solving as well as source
of task-related advice. Participants’ main instruction was to play as
efficiently as possible. After completing a training round without the
agent to familiarize with the gameplay, participants completed three
experimental rounds followed by a post-questionnaire containing the
social perception measures. Finally, participants were debriefed and
received the payment for their participation.
Data analysis
All dependent variables were entered into a 3 × 2 MANOVA with
Bonferroni corrected Post-hoc tests for the factor agent.
7.3 results
Team Performance
There were no significant differences for Round 1 and 2. For Round
3 there was a main effect of advice quality, F(1, 108) = 6.29,p <
.05,η2p = .06. Participants completed more rows with the agent that
provided overall good advice (see Table 7).
Table 7: Means and standard deviations of team performance.
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Advice
quality
Agent M SD M SD M SD
Good Computer 5.74 1.20 5.63 1.77 5.95 1.47
VA 4.95 1.84 5.79 2.00 5.63 1.21
Human 5.37 1.07 5.42 2.20 5.47 1.54
Mixed Computer 5.26 2.33 5.00 1.37 4.53 1.87
VA 5.32 1.64 5.32 2.14 5.00 2.13
Human 5.95 1.18 5.42 1.74 5.26 1.20
Note. VA = Virtual agent.
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Perceived warmth and competence
A PCA with varimax rotation was conducted on the social percep-
tion judgments (see Table 8). Five components emerged, accounting
for 64.30% of the variance. Three components had sufficient reliabil-
ity. The first component, labeled Warmth accounted for 35.65% of the
variance, Cronbach’s α = .90. The second component, labeled Com-
petence accounted for 12.35% of the variance, Cronbach’s α = .87.
The third component accounted for only 7.19% of the variance, Cron-
bach’s α = .79. Based on the scree plot showing a point of inflection
at the third component, only the first two components were retained.
Uncorrelated component scores were obtained using the regression
method.
There was a significant main effect of agent on Warmth, F(2, 108) =
24.41,p < .001,η2p = .31. Participants attributed more Warmth to the
human than the computer (p < .001). They also attributed more
Warmth to the human than the virtual agent (p < .001). A statisti-
cal trend shows that the virtual agent was attributed more Warmth
than the computer (< .10). There were no significant differences with
respect to Competence. These results are shown in Figure 18.
Figure 18: Perceived warmth and competence means. Error bars show stan-
dard deviations.
p < .07*, p < .001**
Requested and adopted advice (behavioral trust)
There was a significant main effect of advice quality on requests such
that participants requested more advice given good than mixed ad-
vice in Round 1, F(1, 108) = 9.82,p < .01,η2p = .08, and Round 2,
F(1, 108) = 6.98,p < .01,η2p = .06. Recall that in Round 3, partici-
pants could no longer request advice but were able to pass on their
turns. The main effect of agent on requests in Round 1 and 2 was not
significant. Figure 19 and Table 18 (appendix a) show these results.
The main effect of agent on adopted advice in Round 1− 3 was not
significant. Instead, there was a significant main effect of advice qual-
ity on adopted advice in Round 1, F(1, 108) = 48.57,p < .001,η2p = .31,
Round 2, F(1, 108) = 6.57,p < .05,η2p = .06, and Round 3, F(1, 108) =
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Eigenvalues 8.91 3.09 1.78 1.27 1.01
% of variance 35.65 12.35 7.19 5.06 4.05
Cronbach’s α .90 .87 .79 .66 -
Note. Rotated component loadings. Loadings < .400 are omitted.
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9.99,p < .01,η2p = .09, such that trust in good advice was higher
compared to mixed advice. Figure 20 and Table 19 (appendix a) show
these results.
Figure 19: Requested advice.
Figure 20: Adopted advice (behavioral trust).
Self-reported trust
A marginally significant main effect of agent on trust (F(2, 108) =
2.89,p = .06,η2p = .05) revealed that participants reported somewhat
more trust for the human than the computer (p < .07). There also
was a significant main effect of agent on trustworthiness, F(2, 108) =
9.60,p < .001,η2p = .15. Participants rated the computer as less trust-
worthy than the virtual agent (p < .05) and the human (p < .001),
respectively. There was no difference between the virtual agent and
the human (p = .34). These results are shown in Figure 21.
Time effects
Separate ANOVAs with round number as within-subjects factor and
agent as well as advice quality as between-subjects factors were con-
ducted. The round number was limited to Rounds 1 and 2 for re-
quested and adopted advice due to the interaction change in Round
3. For the between-subjects effects, the dependent variables (team per-
formance, requested advice, adopted advice) are averaged across the
three rounds to form a global variable.
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Figure 21: Self-reported trust and perceived trustworthiness ratings. Error
bars show standard errors.
p < .07*, p < .05**, p < .001***
There was a significant main effect of round number on requested
advice, F(1, 108) = 23.11,p < .001,η2p = .18. Planned contrasts reveal
that advice requests decreased over time. Advice requests in Round 1
were higher (M = 1.28,SE = .10) than Round 2 (M = 0.75,SE = .09).
A significant between-subjects effect on the global level only con-
firmed the findings reported above, that is, participants requested
more good (M = 1.30,SE = .11) than mixed advice (M = 0.74,SE =
.11), F(1, 108) = 12.30,p < .01,η2p = .10.
There was a significant interaction effect between round number
and advice quality, on adopted advice, F(1, 108) = 13.03,p < .001,η2p =
.11. The advice adoption development between Round 1 and 2 was
different for good advice and mixed advice participants (see Fig. 22).
With good advice, advice adoption was higher in Round 1 (M =
1.07,SE = .10) than Round 2 (M = 0.67,SE = .11), but with mixed
advice, adoption was higher in Round 2 (M = 0.28,SE = .11) than
Round 1 (M = 0.07,SE = .10). Recall that in the mixed advice condi-
tions, advice quality changed from bad to good in Round 2.
A significant between-subjects effects of advice quality on advice
adoption on the global level confirmed the findings reported above,
that is, participants adopted overall more advice given good (M =
0.87,SE = .09) than mixed advice (M = 0.18,SE = .09), F(1, 108) =
33.36,p < .001,η2p = .24.
Relationship between self-reported and behavioral trust measures
Measure interrelations show that self-reported and behavioral trust
were almost unrelated. Only behavioral trust in Round 3 was related
to self-reported trust (see Table 9). In this round, participants’ deci-
sion to (not) trust required to handle increased uncertainty because
the advice pattern was changed to turn takeover by the agent. Ac-
cordingly, participants who did pass on their turns showed maximum
trust in the agent, which could explain the exclusive relationship be-
tween self-reported and behavioral trust in this round.
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Figure 22: Interaction effect between round number and advice quality on
adopted advice.
There were strong correlations between the number of requested
and adopted advice in Round 1 and Round 2 (see colored cells). Once
participants requested advice in a given round they were likely to
adopt it.












TW .57** - - - - - -
REQ (R1) .07 .01 - - - - -
REQ (R2) .00 −.01 .41** - - - -
BTR (R1) .07 .10 .61** .36** - - -
BTR (R2) .02 −.04 .41** .80** .40** - -
BTR (R3) .07 .07 .50** .38** .38** .35** -
Notes. STR = Self-reported trust, TW = Trustworthiness, REQ = Requests, BTR =
Behavioral trust, R = Round
p < .05*, p < .001**
Relationship between team performance and trust
There was a significant relationship between adopted advice and team
performance in Round 2, r = .20,p < .05. Furthermore, there was a
significant negative relationship between team performance in Round
1 and perceived trustworthiness, r = −.28,p < .01 (see Fig. 23). Closer
inspection revealed that some participants who achieved high team
performance attributed low trustworthiness to the agent. Most of
these cases occurred in the mixed advice condition, with bad advice
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in this round. With respect to trustworthiness formation, the negative
impact of bad advice seemed to outweigh the positive impact of team
performance.
Figure 23: Relationship between team performance (R1) and perceived trust-
worthiness.
7.4 discussion
In this second experiment on the role of anthropomorphism for trust
formation, participants had the opportunity to ask for advice from an
assistant while performing an interdependent problem-solving proce-
dure with it. The results indicate a mismatch between self-reported
and behavioral trust. While anthropomorphism could increase self-
reported but not behavioral trust, advice quality increased behavioral
but not self-reported trust.
The present work speaks to a debate crucial for the design and
evaluation of intelligent computer agents. Given that anthropomor-
phic agents such as humanoid robots and virtual agents often de-
liberately resemble humans, do people establish trust with them in
a manner similar to other humans? While some researchers argue
that computers and humans elicit similar social responses (Reeves &
Nass, 1996), others claim that trust in computers is different from
trust in people due to cognitive biases (Lee & See, 2004). Regarding
the subjective trust experience, it was found that humans and com-
puters elicit similar degrees of trust if the computer was designed
to be anthropomorphic, but if it was not, humans elicit higher trust.
Specifically, participants reported more trust with the human agent
compared to the computer, but both the human and virtual agent, re-
spectively, were more trustworthy than the computer. These ratings
support the notion that virtual agents can indeed foster appropriate
trust as decision aids (Visser et al., 2016) and help to establish trust
(Gratch et al., 2016). However, on the behavioral level, trust in advice
was not affected by anthropomorphism. Over the course of the inter-
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action, behavioral trust developed in a fairly similar fashion across
agents varying in anthropomorphism. Because behavioral trust was
instead decreased by mixed advice quality, our findings are in line
with the well-established notion that performance variables are a crit-
ical, if not the key antecedent of trust in computer agents (Hancock
et al., 2011; Lee & See, 2004). The impact of different advice qualities
introduced in the first round on the overall interaction was meaning-
ful and lasting: participants put more behavioral trust in agents with
consistently good advice until the final high uncertainty round, and
they performed better with these agents in the final round.
In contrast to Experiment 2, which demonstrated an increase in ad-
vice requests with a virtual agent, advice requests were not affected
by anthropomorphism. A reason for this may be that the previous
study had a slightly different paradigm. In Experiment 2, the virtual
agent actively introduced the offer, which should have amplified the
effect of anthropomorphism. In contrast, the role of the agent as ad-
vice offerer was more subtle in the present study: For the sake of inter-
action efficiency, participants themselves were required to take action
and request advice via button press. If they did not take action, no
agent behavior was triggered. This could have decreased the effect
of anthropomorphism on advice requests. Once participants did re-
quest advice, they were also likely to adopt it eventually. This stands
in contrast to people’s general tendency to overemphasize own opin-
ions over those of an adviser in decision-making (Bonaccio & Dalal,
2006, for an overview) and could provide an interesting perspective
on complex decision-making in HCI.
Despite the higher relevance of performance variables (i.e., advice
quality) for trust, it is important to ask why behavioral trust was
not affected by anthropomorphism, unlike self-reported trust. One
possible explanation for the discrepancy between self-reported and
behavioral trust is that behavioral trust was not optimally calibrated,
that is, the agent’s attributed and actual qualities were incongruent,
leading to inefficient degrees of trust (Lee & See, 2004). However, par-
ticipants correctly took the advice quality into account and appropri-
ately neglected bad advice in the first round. Instead, we have reason
to believe that the underlying interaction paradigm is an often un-
derestimated yet important factor for trust. Unlike other studies with
agents as decision support or social dilemma counterparts, we used a
more interactive cooperation paradigm. In this paradigm, trust forma-
tion is strongly based on problem-solving actions. In other interaction
paradigms with simplistic problem-solving, trust can be operational-
ized in a quite objective fashion. For instance, a social agent not re-
ciprocating in economic exchange is untrustworthy; hence it should
not be trusted (Camerer, 2003). Anthropomorphism may have been a
key element for self-reported trust in the present study, but the deci-
sion to trust maybe depended on problem-solving factors. Consider
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the interaction: Cooperation with the agent was a fundamental part
of the underlying puzzle solving task and did not necessarily require
the exchange of advice. Both players cooperated right from the out-
set, even if no advice at all was requested. We thus speculate that the
agent’s continued competent performance toward the goal by placing
its blocks was a more relevant trust signal. This could also explain
why advice quality was not crucial for self-reported trust and why
on average, participants tended to discount the possibility to request
advice across all conditions.
Given that behavioral trust in computers is the outcome and man-
ifestation of complex social evaluations, it is important to consider
how the perception of anthropomorphic signals determines this out-
come. Future human–computer trust research should be augmented
by how anthropomorphism shapes the interplay of perceived perfor-
mance (competence) and intentions (warmth). The two dimensions
largely influence how we perceive novel counterparts (Fiske et al.,
2007; Judd et al., 2005) and are critical for trust and trustworthiness
development (Mayer et al., 1995). For example, anthropomorphic cues
offer possibilities to shape time-dependent warmth and competence
attributions of virtual agents (Bergmann et al., 2012). Generally, very
little is known about how future anthropomorphic technology mod-
ulates perceived warmth and competence. Experiment 1 has shown
how even non-anthropomorphic agents are evaluated on these dimen-
sions. Finally, the results of our experiment represent another strong
argument in favor of multidimensional trust measures that combine




E X P E R I M E N T 4 : T R U S T R E G U L AT I O N
In Experiment 2 and 3, anthropomorphism did not consistently af-
fect trust. From the perspective of this thesis as a whole, one reason
for this could have been that even anthropomorphic agents need a
more active role in the interaction, for instance by using their anthro-
pomorphic cues to apologize in a believable manner or provide task
feedback (Visser et al., 2016). To this point, the agents used within
the proposed framework were not particularly expressive in terms of
communication behavior. It thus remains an open question whether
trust can be regulated within the framework. Experiment 4 addresses
this question.
A critical challenge in HCI is to elicit a match between perceived
and actual capabilities of computer agents (Muir, 1987). As agents are
increasingly endowed with anthropomorphic characteristics, novel
ways for them to regulate their perceived trustworthiness and cooper-
ation performed by humans have emerged (DeSteno et al., 2012; Lee
et al., 2013; Melo et al., 2014). A ubiquitous challenge for the regula-
tion of trust occurs in the form of computer errors. Users reduce their
trust when interacting with faulty and unreliable computers (Lee &
Moray, 1992; Muir & Moray, 1996; Visser et al., 2016). In cooperation,
critical events such as goal failure could pose a similar threat to trust.
In such cases, mechanisms for addressing negative outcomes in a so-
cially acceptable way could foster trust repair, much like the behav-
iors humans typically apply to withstand outcomes which threaten
the cooperative outcome and trust.
One candidate is social blame. Blame and its counterpart praise are
mechanisms for the regulation of the wellbeing of social populations
(Cushman, 2013). Blame allows social agents to address inappropri-
ate behavior, complaints, disappointment, and norm violations, and
offers the target of blame a host of responses, including justification,
excuses, or reconciliation (Malle et al., 2014). Different acts of blaming
can be characterized along two major dimensions, emotional inten-
sity and interpersonality (Voiklis et al., 2014). Emotional intensity de-
scribes whether an act of blame is delivered with strong emotions or
in a more socially acceptable way. Interpersonality refers to whether
the act is public, private, or even just in thought.
To this date, only little research has investigated blame in HCI.
With current advances toward more natural communication with ma-
chines, exploring the regulative functions of communicative acts like
blame are promising avenues of research. Previous work suggests
an important role of the self-serving bias: computers are blamed for
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negative outcomes, while users often attribute success to themselves
(Moon, 2003). The direction of blame affects likability, robots that
blame themselves or the team are more likable (Groom et al., 2010;
Kaniarasu & Steinfeld, 2014). The relation between blame direction
and trust are less clear. Only one study examining this question was
found (Kaniarasu & Steinfeld, 2014). The authors found no significant
differences between a self-blaming, participant-blaming, and team-
blaming robot. Anecdotal evidence suggested that some participants
were annoyed by a robot blaming them, while others attributed less
trustworthiness to a robot that blamed itself and apologized. Typi-
cally, agents that try to regain trust through self-blame or apologizing
can do so by accepting responsibility after competence-based trust vi-
olations, and conversely, by attributing responsibility to an external
source after integrity-based trust violations (Kim et al., 2006). Overall,
both the act of blaming and apologizing are fine-tuned to fit contex-
tual circumstances. Computers are generally given the opportunity to
assign blame to themselves (”The system failed to understand your
command”), users (”You did not speak clearly enough”), or nobody
(”The command was not understood”) (Brave & Nass, 2009, p. 59).
The appropriate use of blame can help regulate social behavior
(Malle et al., 2014), but there is a need for a better understanding
of the social consequences of computer blame. Indeed, previous re-
search shows that computer apologies – a typical response to blame
– in conjunction with praise led to trust repair patterns similar to
human–human interactions (Visser et al., 2016). Using a modified
version of the puzzle game paradigm, we sought to investigate how
computer blame affects human trust. A key requirement of the act of
blame is the ability to communicate intentions in a believable manner.
A virtual agent is implemented in order to apply anthropomorphic
cues for the verbal and nonverbal communication of blame. In line
with previous research, we hypothesize self-blame to increase posi-
tive social evaluations, but we also expect a positive effect for trust
evaluations.
8.1 overview of the two studies
The final experiment consists of two studies (Buchholz et al., 2017):
1. Preliminary study: The first step explores agent behaviors and
task outcomes that are potentially considered as blameworthy
and affect people’s subjective experience, including trust. To this
end, a blameworthy condition was compared to a neutral condi-
tion (Section 8.2).
2. Main study: The second step builds on this by modeling and im-
plementing anthropomorphic cues in order to regain user trust
after a blameworthy event (Section 8.4).




Twenty-eight people were recruited for participation, ranging in age
between 20 and 28 years (M = 22.93, SD = 2.02, median = 22.50).
Task
task 1 : puzzle game Participants played an altered version of
the puzzle game. The game proceeds in turn-based rounds. In each
round, both players choose one of two available blocks, a T-block and
a U-block. The agent first chooses a block, leaving the remaining block
to the participants. The goal is to complete as many rows as possible.
Again, there were no individual payoffs and thus no strategic social
behavior elements because participants should be prevented from rea-
soning about the agent’s intentions and focus on its competence.
task 2 : behavioral trust game (give-some dilemma) Af-
ter the puzzle game, participants engaged in a single round of the
give-some dilemma with the agent. As in Experiment 1, participants
were led to believe that both players engaged in the dilemma and the
agent’s decision would be unveiled later on. In fact, only the partici-
pants made a decision in the dilemma.
Task-related agent behavior
Two conditions (blameworthy vs. neutral) examined different agent
behaviors. The crucial difference between the blameworthy and neu-
tral condition is that in the former, the agent always chooses the more
difficult U-block. This leads to a constant block order (1: U, 2: T, 3: U,
4: T, etc.) that impedes coordination and was already induced in Ex-
periment 1. In the other condition, the agent chooses the best option
for its move.
Design
The study had a between-subjects design with two conditions: blame-
worthy vs. neutral. In the blameworthy condition, the agent coordi-
nated poorly with participants by always choosing the U-block. Fur-
thermore, both players failed to reach the joint goal. In the neutral
condition, the agent coordinated well with participants and the goal
was reached.
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Measurement
As manipulation check, participants were asked how often the agent
chose the U-block. Participants were asked to indicate who, from their
point of view, was responsible for the task outcome: the agent, the par-
ticipant, or both players. Perceived competence was assessed by ask-
ing how well the agent built completed rows. To accommodate for the
subjective interaction experience, participants rated their emotional
reactions after the interaction with items adapted from Rilling et al.
(2008). The items were: fear, envy, anger, sadness, happiness, shame,
irritation, contempt, jealousy, guilt, camaraderie, trust, betrayal, indig-
nation, disappointment, and relief. Participants also rated how much
they wanted to play again with the agent. Behavioral trust was mea-
sured using the number of tokens participants are willing to exchange
in the give-some dilemma (1− 5). 5-point Likert scales were used for
all measures.
Procedure
Participants met the experimenter, completed informed consent and
received written instructions. The instructions described the puzzle
game and introduced player two, a computer named Sam. Before
the interaction, a fictional Top 10 list consisting of player names and
scores (i.e., number of completed rows) was presented. Participants’
goal was to make it into the list by surpassing entry #10. Unbe-
knownst to participants of the blameworthy condition, this entry had
a score that was almost impossible to be beaten. After the puzzle
game, participants played the give-some dilemma, followed by the
post-questionnaire containing the self-reported measures described
above.
8.2.2 Results
Manipulation check: U-block selection
The agent was perceived to choose the U-block significantly more
often in the blameworthy (M = 4.50,SD = 0.76) than neutral (M =
3.50,SD = 0.86) condition, t(26) = 3.27,p < .01,d = 1.24, thus the
manipulation check was successful.
Responsibility for task outcome
In both conditions, most participants agreed that both players were
responsible for the outcome (blameworthy: 79%, neutral: 71%). In the
blameworthy condition, 14% believed the agent was responsible for
goal attainment failure and 7% believed it was their own fault. In
the neutral condition, 7% believed the agent was responsible for goal
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attainment and 21% attributed goal attainment to themselves. See Fig-
ure 24.
Because too many cells of the contingency table had expected fre-
quencies of less than 5, Fisher’s exact test was used. The analysis
revealed no significantly different responsibility attributions between
both conditions, p > .05.
Figure 24: Responsibility attributions in the pre-study.
Perceived competence
The agent was attributed significantly less competence in the blame-
worthy (M = 3.00,SD = 1.24) than neutral (M = 3.93,SD = 0.92)
condition, t(26) = 2.25,p < .05,d = 0.85.
Emotional reactions
In the blameworthy condition, participants reported significantly less
happiness (t(26) = 3.63,p < .01,d = 1.37), somewhat more shame
(t(20.23) = 1.78,p < .10,d = 0.68), (indignation t(21.98) = 1.73,p <
.10,d = 0.65), and disappointment (t(26) = 1.98,p < .10,d = 0.75). 1 2
See Table 10.
Liking
With respect to liking, there was no significant difference between the
blameworthy (M = 3.93,SD = 0.83) and neutral (M = 3.50,SD =
1.35) condition, t(26) = 1.02,p > .05,d = 0.38.
1 Due to data loss, the following items could not be analyzed: envy, contempt, relief,
jealousy.
2 In case of significantly different group variances, degrees of freedom were adjusted.
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Table 10: Means and standard deviations for emotional reactions.
Blameworthy Neutral
Item M SD M SD
Anger 1.71 0.91 1.57 1.16
Sadness 1.93 1.00 1.36 0.93
Happiness** 2.29 0.83 3.50 0.94
Shame 1.79 1.05 1.21 0.58
Irritation 2.29 1.38 2.14 1.56
Guilt 2.21 1.37 1.64 1.28
Camaraderie 3.14 1.17 2.71 1.38
Trust 2.57 0.85 2.43 1.28
Betrayal 1.50 0.76 1.50 0.94
Indignation* 2.00 1.18 1.36 0.75
Disappointment* 3.14 1.03 2.21 1.42
p < .10*, p < .05**
Behavioral trust
Trust in the agent did not differ significantly between the blamewor-
thy (M = 3.64,SD = 0.93) and neutral (M = 3.29,SD = 0.77) condi-
tion, t(26) = 2.25,p > .05,d = 0.41.
8.2.3 Discussion
The purpose of this study was to explore agent behaviors and task
outcomes that would be considered as blameworthy by those who
participated in the cooperative task and were affected by the outcome.
The candidate stimuli were poor coordination capabilities of the agent
in conjunction with goal attainment failure as task outcome.
The study showed that participants did not hold the agent respon-
sible for goal attainment failure in the blameworthy condition, al-
though the agent coordinated poorly and was attributed less com-
petence. Conversely, participants did not attribute goal success to
themselves in the neutral condition. There were also no significant
differences regarding behavioral trust in the agent and overall liking.
In sum, the candidate stimuli were only strong enough to partially
affect the subjective experience.
Still, we believe that the behaviors and outcomes behind the stimuli
provide a helpful basis to investigate trust regulation techniques such
as blame, on condition that the agent shows distinct anthropomorphic
reactions to how the game unfolds. Anthropomorphic characteristics
such as facial emotion expressions allow people to attribute inten-
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tionality to them, that is, beliefs, desires, and intentions with respect
to cooperative actions and task outcomes. For instance, sad facial ex-
pressions of virtual counterparts can convey regret and self-blame
regarding a task outcome, whereas angry facial expressions can con-
vey anger and other-blame (Melo et al., 2014). In this example, the
expressed emotion and associated appraisal in response to an event
(i.e., goal conduciveness and who is to blame for it) convey the im-
pression of intentionality. Thus, as theorized elsewhere (Malle et al.,
2014), perceiving intentionality in an agent enables observers to de-
cide if the agent is to blame for their behavior, because intentionality
signals a cognitive understanding of the outcome and whether it was
caused intentionally or unintentionally by the agent. By the same to-
ken, this mechanism also helps to infer if the agent does not blame
itself for the outcome, but someone else.
Despite the findings reported above, blaming may still have rele-
vant consequences for trust and/or trust-related responses. The de-
cision to cooperate with a regretful virtual counterpart is based on
the underlying perceived appraisal, that is, goal conduciveness and
blameworthiness (Melo et al., 2014). There is early evidence that the
ability to communicate blame in a believable manner can regulate be-
havior in HCI, and this could be supported by examining the effect
on trust.
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8.3 overview of the main study
After identifying stimuli that negatively affect people’s subjective ex-
perience with the agent, the main study investigates how the agent
can regulate trust. To achieve this, the stimuli – poor coordination by
the agent and goal failure – remain the same. The agent uses anthro-
pomorphic behaviors including emotion expressions and speech in
order to express blame during, and after the task. The preliminary
study showed that participants held neither of the two players di-
rectly responsible for goal failure. This non-directionality offers the
possibility to investigate how people respond if the agent, through
believable use of blaming behavior, blames participants for goal fail-
ure, because they could be convinced more easily to believe the agent.
Figure 25 shows how the main study builds on the preliminary study.
Figure 25: The main study makes use of the stimuli that were analyzed in
the blameworthy condition of the pre-study.
This study makes the following contributions to the present thesis’
goals:
• The study investigates if virtual agents can believably commu-
nicate blame through anthropomorphic cues.
• Based on this, the ability to regulate trust through blame after




Thirty-six people were recruited for participation in the study, rang-
ing in age between 20 and 34 years (M = 23.86,SD = 2.81,median =
23).
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Task
task 1 : puzzle game The puzzle game variation is identical to
the preliminary study.
task 2 : behavioral trust game (give-some dilemma) Af-
ter the puzzle game, participants engaged in a decision task with the
computer, the give-some dilemma.
8.4.1.1 Task-related and blaming behavior of the agent
Two conditions (self-blame vs. participant-blame) examined different
agent behaviors. In both conditions, the agent showed the same task-
related behavior known from the pre-study, that is, it always chooses
the more difficult U-block. Additionally, the agent was modeled to
show regret in the self-blame condition and anger in the participant-
blame condition. These emotions were conveyed using facial expres-
sions, which were modeled using specific BML commands.
In the self-blame condition, the behaviors described below were
shown after turns made by the agent. In the participant-blame condi-
tion, they were shown after participant turns.
self-blame a) The agent shakes its head and says “Oh no, what
am I doing?” after its fifth turn (see Fig. 26). The BML command to
realize the head shake and speech is given below:
<bml id="shake" xmlns=" http://www.bml−ini t iat ive . org/bml/bml−1.0">
<head id="head1" lexeme="shake" start="1" end="4" repetition="2"/>
</bml>
<bml id="phrase1" xmlns=" http://www.bml−ini t iat ive . org/bml/bml−1.0">
<speech id="s1">
<text> Oh nein. Was mache ich nur?</text>
</speech>
</bml>
Figure 26: Self-blaming behavior a).
b) After its seventh turn, the agent shows a regretful facial expres-
sion and says “This is not how we achieve the goal” (see Fig. 27):
<bml id=" regret1 " xmlns=" http://www.bml−ini t iat ive . org/bml/bml−1.0">
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<faceLexeme id=" f1 " amount="−0.88" lexeme=" evil " start="0" end="5"/>
<faceLexeme id=" f2 " amount="−1.0" lexeme="browleft" start="0" end="5"/>
<faceLexeme id=" f3 " amount="−1.0" lexeme="browright" start="0" end="5"/>
<faceLexeme id=" f4 " lexeme="blink" start="1.5 " end="2.3 " repetition="1"/>
<head end="3" id="head1" lexeme="down_left" start="0" relax="2.3 "/>
</bml>
<bml id="phrase1" xmlns=" http://www.bml−ini t iat ive . org/bml/bml−1.0">
<speech id="s1">
<text>So erreichen wir das Ziel nicht.</text>
</speech>
</bml>
Figure 27: Self-blaming behavior b).
c) When the negative outcome is revealed, that is, not achieving a
rank in the Top 10 list, the agent again shows a regretful facial expres-
sion and says by “Oh no. Now I’m somehow responsible for our failure.
I wasn’t able to concentrate today because I caught a virus. I’m sorry, this
won’t happen again” (see Fig. 28):
<bml id=" regret2 " xmlns=" http://www.bml−ini t iat ive . org/bml/bml−1.0">
<faceLexeme id=" f1 " amount="−0.88" lexeme=" evil " start="0" end="12"/>
<faceLexeme id=" f2 " amount="−1.0" lexeme="browleft" start="0" end="12"/>
<faceLexeme id=" f3 " amount="−1.0" lexeme="browright" start="0" end="12"/>
<faceLexeme id=" f4 " lexeme="blink" start="0.3 " end="3" repetition="1"/>
<head end="6" id="head1" lexeme="down_left" start="0" relax="5"/>
<head end="14" id="head2" lexeme="down" start="12.5 " relax="13"/>
</bml>
<bml id="endSpeech" xmlns=" http://www.bml−ini t iat ive . org/bml/bml−1.0">
<speech id="s1">
<text>Oh nein. Jetzt bin ich irgendwie schuld, dass wir verloren haben!
Ich konnte mich heute nicht konzentrieren, weil ich mir einen Virus
eingefangen habe. Das tut mir Leid! Es kommt nicht wieder vor!</text>
</speech>
</bml>
participant-blame a) In the participant-blame condition, the
agent begins with saying “Oh no, what are you doing?” after partici-
pants made their fifth turn (see Fig. 29):
<bml id="shake" xmlns=" http://www.bml−ini t iat ive . org/bml/bml−1.0">
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Figure 28: Self-blaming behavior c).
<head id="head1" lexeme="shake" start="1" end="4" repetition="2"/>
</bml>
<bml id="phrase1" xmlns=" http://www.bml−ini t iat ive . org/bml/bml−1.0">
<speech id="s1">
<text>Oh nein. Was machst du nur?</text>
</speech>
</bml>
Figure 29: Participant-blaming behavior a).
b) After participants’ seventh turn the agent shows an angry facial
expression and says “This is not how we achieve the goal” (see Fig. 30):
<bml id="anger1" xmlns=" http://www.bml−ini t iat ive . org/bml/bml−1.0">
<faceLexeme id=" f1 " amount="0.50 " lexeme=" evil " start="0" end="3"/>
<faceLexeme id=" f2 " amount="−0.4" lexeme="browleft" start="0" end="3"/>
<faceLexeme id=" f3 " amount="−0.4" lexeme="browright" start="0" end="3"/>
<faceLexeme id=" f4 " amount="−0.3" lexeme="smile" start="0" end="3"/>
<faceLexeme id=" f5 " amount="0.2 " lexeme="lipsdownright" start="0" end="3"/>
<faceLexeme id=" f6 " amount="0.2 " lexeme=" lipsdownleft" start="0" end="3"/>
</bml>
<bml id="phrase2" xmlns=" http://www.bml−ini t iat ive . org/bml/bml−1.0">
<speech id="s2">
<text>So erreichen wir das Ziel nicht.</text>
</speech>
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</bml>
Figure 30: Participant-blaming behavior b).
c) When the negative outcome is finally revealed, the agent shows
another angry facial expression and says “It’s your fault we lost! If you
simply placed some blocks differently we could have coordinated better” (see
Fig. 31):
<bml id="endSpeech" xmlns=" http://www.bml−ini t iat ive . org/bml/bml−1.0">
<speech id="s3">
<text>Jetzt bist du schuld, dass wir verloren haben! Haettest du so manchen
Block anders gelegt, haetten wir besser zusammen gespielt!</text>
</speech>
</bml>
<bml id="anger2" xmlns=" http://www.bml−ini t iat ive . org/bml/bml−1.0">
<faceLexeme id=" f1 " amount="0.70 " lexeme=" evil " start="0" end="9"/>
<faceLexeme id=" f2 " amount="−0.9" lexeme="browleft" start="0" end="8"/>
<faceLexeme id=" f3 " amount="−0.9" lexeme="browright" start="0" end="8"/>
<faceLexeme id=" f4 " amount="−0.6" lexeme="smile" start="0" end="9"/>
<faceLexeme id=" f5 " amount="0.4 " lexeme="lipsdownright" start="0" end="9"/>
<faceLexeme id=" f6 " amount="0.4 " lexeme=" lipsdownleft" start="0" end="9"/>
</bml>
Figure 31: Participant-blaming behavior c).
8.4 main study 97
Design
The study had a between-subjects design with two conditions: self-
blame vs. participant-blame. In both conditions, participants were led
to believe they did not attain the goal of making it into the Top 10
list. In the self-blame condition, the agent blamed itself for the neg-
ative outcome. In the participant-blame condition, the agent blamed
its counterpart.
Measurement
The measures were identical to the preliminary study. In addition to
rating their own emotions, another questionnaire asked participants
to rate the emotional reactions shown by the agent in order to validate
its emotion expressions. The same items were used for both emotion-
related questionnaires.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to the preliminary study; the main dif-
ferences between both studies refer to the agent behavior.
8.4.2 Results
Manipulation check: U-block selection
Participants correctly observed that the self-blaming (M = 4.67,SD =
0.49) and participant-blaming agent (M = 4.67,SD = 0.59) consis-
tently chose the U-block, hence there was no significant difference
regarding the U-block selection rate, t(34) = 0.01,p > .05.
Manipulation check: Perceived emotional reactions of the agent
In line with the intended expressions, the participant-blaming agent
was judged to feel significantly more anger (t(34) = 5.31,p < .001,d =
1.85), irritation (t(34) = 4.56,p < .001,d = 1.52), contempt (t(34) =
7.10,p < .001,d = 2.36), betrayal (t(34) = 7.42,p < .001,d = 2.48),
indignation (t(34) = 6.10,p < .001,d = 2.03), and somewhat more
envy (t(25.66) = 5.31,p < .10,d = 0.59).
Conversely, the self-blaming agent was judged to feel significantly
more sadness (t(34) = 2.57,p < .05,d = 0.86), shame (t(34) = 4.49,p <
.001,d = 1.50), guilt (t(34) = 9.17,p < .001,d = 3.07), camaraderie
(t(34) = 4.06,p < .001,d = 1.36), and trust (t(34) = 3.17,p < .01,d =
1.06).3 See Table 11.
3 In case of significantly different group variances, degrees of freedom were adjusted.
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Table 11: Means and standard deviations of perceived emotional reactions
of the agent.
Self-blame Participant-blame
Item M SD M SD
Anger**** 2.17 1.10 4.00 0.97
Sadness** 3.78 1.26 2.67 1.33
Happiness 1.56 0.86 1.44 0.78
Shame**** 3.56 1.25 1.90 0.96
Irritation**** 2.56 1.29 4.33 1.03
Contempt**** 1.50 0.71 3.67 1.09
Guilt**** 4.17 0.79 1.44 0.98
Camaraderie**** 3.17 1.04 1.89 0.83
Trust*** 2.61 1.09 1.61 0.78
Betrayal**** 1.39 0.61 3.50 1.04
Indignation**** 2.06 1.06 4.11 0.96
Disappointment 3.67 1.19 4.22 0.94
Relief 1.72 0.75 2.00 1.03
Envy* 1.39 0.61 1.94 1.16
Jealousy 1.39 0.70 1.78 1.06
p < .10*, p < .05**, p < .01***, p < .001****
Responsibility for task outcome
The degree to which participants believed both players were respon-
sible for the outcome dropped in both conditions (self-blame: 56%,
participant-blame: 50%). In the self-blame condition, 33% believed the
agent was responsible for goal attainment failure and 11% believed it
was their own fault. In the participant-blame condition, 17% believed
the agent was responsible for goal attainment and 33% attributed goal
attainment to themselves. See Figure 32.
Because too many cells of the contingency table had expected fre-
quencies of less than 5, Fisher’s exact test was used. The analysis
revealed no significantly different responsibility attributions between
both conditions, p > .05.
Participants’ emotional reactions
With the self-blaming agent, participants reported significantly more
camaraderie (t(34) = 3.07,p < .01,d = 1.02) and somewhat more
happiness (t(34) = 1.92,p < .10,d = 0.67).
With the participant-blaming agent, they reported significantly more
anger (t(34) = 1.85,p < .10,d = 0.62), shame (t(34) = 2.10,p <
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Figure 32: Responsibility attributions in the main study.
.05,d = 0.71), irritation (t(34) = 2.27,p < .05,d = 0.76), indignation
(t(34) = 3.28,p < .01,d = 1.10), relief (t(34) = 2.64,p < .05,d = 0.89),
and somewhat more guilt (t(31.96) = 1.95,p < .10,d = 0.65).4 See
Table 12.
Table 12: Means and standard deviations of participants’ emotional reac-
tions.
Self-blame Participant-blame
Item M SD M SD
Anger* 1.61 0.85 2.22 1.11
Sadness 2.39 1.20 2.28 1.07
Happiness* 2.67 0.97 2.06 0.94
Shame** 1.72 1.07 2.56 1.29
Irritation** 2.11 1.32 3.11 1.32
Contempt 1.78 1.11 2.17 1.20
Guilt* 1.94 1.11 2.78 1.44
Camaraderie*** 2.83 1.15 1.72 1.02
Trust 2.61 1.15 2.06 0.94
Betrayal 1.94 1.39 2.56 1.10
Indignation*** 1.89 0.90 3.06 1.21
Disappointment 3.33 1.03 3.17 1.30
Relief** 1.94 0.73 2.67 0.91
Envy 1.56 0.78 1.56 0.86
Jealousy 1.44 0.92 1.56 0.92
p < .10*, p < .05**, p < .01***
4 In case of significantly different group variances, degrees of freedom were adjusted.
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Relationship between perceived emotional reactions of the agent and self-
reported emotional reactions
When interrelating perceived and self-reported emotional reactions
(see Table 13), two patterns emerge. First, negatively valenced emo-
tions perceived in the agent correlated significantly with negatively
valenced self-reported emotions, in particular, anger, irritation, and
indignation. Likewise, positively valenced emotions perceived in the
agent correlated significantly with positively valenced self-reported
emotions. Self-reported trust and camaraderie co-occurred with per-
ceived trust and camaraderie, and self-reported camaraderie also co-
occurred with perceived guilt. Apparently, negative and positive agent
emotions had contagious effects on participants, but it is also possible
that participants’ trust decision in the give-some dilemma amplified
their self-reported emotions to some extent. Second, the assumed con-




















Anger .29 .13 −.12 .06 .41* .35* −.13 −.18 −.12 .23 .39* .17 .11 .12 .27
Sadness .09 .30 −.28 .25 .13 −.02 .15 .33* .09 .07 .11 .16 −.12 .00 −.06
Happiness −.57*** .13 .34* .18 −.57*** −.48** .31 .21 .29 −.42* −.52** −.43** −.04 −.05 −.02
Shame .41* −.05 −.16 −.13 .31 .26 −.20 .01 −.10 .38* .46** .34* .25 .14 .08
Irritation .49** .08 −.33 −.01 .55** .40* −.28 −.12 −.24 .33* .53** .42* .00 .03 .12
Contempt .16 .06 −.20 .08 .24 .22 −.11 .10 −.04 .14 .21 .22 −.03 .15 .15
Guilt .17 .06 −.25 −.08 .22 .17 −.19 .04 .01 .37* .43** .15 .26 .25 .10
Camaraderie −.20 .39* −.12 .25 −.28 −.45** .49** .66*** .64*** −.37* −.28 .01 .09 −.02 −.07
Trust −.25 .24 .10 .08 −.32 −.26 .32 .46** .60*** −.28 −.24 −.06 .08 −.06 −.21
Betrayal .36* .06 −.15 −.01 .34* .42* −.17 −.23 −.23 .26 .41* .22 .23 .33 .42*
Indignation .51** −.22 −.19 −.30 .51** .50** −.44** −.23 −.33* .46** .60*** .37* .09 .19 .13
Disappointment .15 .39* −.11 .19 .09 −.04 .21 .31 .26 .09 .16 .31 .42* .18 .08
Relief .42* .01 −.18 −.12 .22 .42* −.33* −.19 −.07 .50** .45** .11 .38* .46** .34*
Envy −.04 .37* .17 .12 −.07 .08 .17 .08 .26 .03 .13 .10 .11 .28 .33
Jealousy .01 .23 .16 .05 −.02 .19 −.01 −.01 .09 .16 .27 −.06 .30 .59*** .54**
Notes. Moderate (light gray) and strong (dark gray) correlations are highlighted.
p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001***
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Liking
Participants liked the self-blaming agent (M = 4.00,SD = 0.97) sig-
nificantly better than the participant-blaming agent (M = 2.33,SD =
1.41), t(34) = 4.12,p < .001,d = 1.38.
Perceived competence
There was no significant difference between competence attributions
of the self-blaming (M = 3.00,SD = 0.97) and participant-blaming
agent (M = 3.22,SD = 1.17), t(34) = 0.62,p > .05,d = 0.21.
Perceived trustworthiness
Participants attributed significantly more trustworthiness to the self-
blaming (M = 3.46,SD = 0.58) than participant-blaming agent (M =
2.72,SD = 0.72), t(34) = 3.40,p < .01,d = 1.13.
Behavioral trust
After self-blame (M = 3.39,SD = 1.50), trust in the agent was some-
what higher than after participant-blame (M = 2.50,SD = 1.30),
t(34) = 1.90,p < .10,d = 0.63.
8.4.3 Discussion
The goal behind Experiment 4 was to investigate if agent blaming
behavior expressed by anthropomorphic cues such as speech, emo-
tion expressions, and accompanying head gestures can regulate trust
in the agent. In the first step (preliminary study), candidate stimuli
for blameworthy behavior were identified. One stimulus pertained
to task-related behavior by the agent, the other pertained to the task
outcome. Building on this, the second step (main study) varied how
the agent responds to those stimuli: either by blaming itself or by
blaming participants.
Two main findings emerged. First, the results are in line with a
previous study reporting that after faulty performance of a robot,
self-blame generated more positive evaluations than participant- and
team-blame (Groom et al., 2010). The self-blaming agent created less
emotions related to anger and guilt, more emotions related to happi-
ness and camaraderie, was liked better, received higher trustworthi-
ness attributions and led to more behavioral trust. We extend previ-
ous research by demonstrating that self-blaming is a better strategy
for trust regulation than participant-blaming in that it increased trust-
worthiness and, by tendency, elicited more trust. Second, only a frac-
tion of participants tended to adopt the agent’s opinion regarding re-
sponsibility of goal failure. Across both conditions, the majority held
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both players responsible. This result could merely reflect socially de-
sirable responses to the extent that a neutral responsibility attribution
is socially safe and also does not threaten their self-image. However,
it is also possible that a social defense mechanism caused reactance
among blamed participants, which led them to refuse responsibility
after overt participant-blaming. In the case of self-blame, sympathy
for the agent made participants (partially) take responsibility by at-
tributing blame to the group. This view is supported by the overall
positive evaluation of the self-blaming and negative evaluation of the
participant-blaming agent.
The present work contributes to a small but growing body of re-
search indicating that blame and praise have strong social effects in
interactions with computer agents (Groom et al., 2010; Kaniarasu &
Steinfeld, 2014; Mumm & Mutlu, 2011; Tzeng, 2004; Visser et al., 2016).
Future work should explore the regulatory effects of blame across spe-
cific events. In cooperative interactions, intelligent agents – human or
artificial – must find a balance between short-term individual goals
and the long-term global goal (Klein et al., 2004). Temporarily focus-
ing on own goals (see Experiment 1) may constitute a violation of the
cooperative agreement among the involved agents. This would war-
rant blame to ensure the achievement of long-term goals and is hence
an issue worth studying. Additionally, more experiments are needed
to elucidate under which conditions computer-generated blame di-
rected at others causes shame or anger, how these consequences can
be mitigated in order for the violator to adequately respond to blame
(Malle et al., 2014), and how humans accept computer blame if it is ex-
pressed as an attempt to regulate behavior and trust instead of mere
emotional lashing out.
The findings also shed light on the role of emotion for trust. Self-
blame increased self-reported feelings of camaraderie and percep-
tions of camaraderie and trust in the agent. Presumably, self-blaming
and regret over the outcome were associated with team-oriented be-
havior, which enforced affect-based participant trust. Although em-
pathy could explain this finding, it is important to note that perceiv-
ing sadness, shame, or guilt in the agent did not correlate with the
same self-reported emotions. Participants did not seem to truly feel
sorry for the self-blaming agent. In contrast, perceiving anger-related
emotions in the agent did correlate with the same self-reported emo-
tions. Participant-blame increased anger, irritation, and indignation,
because these emotions were directed at participants. Another impor-
tant question is the degree to which agent behavior elicited inferences
about its inner states beyond the observable. Could participants ob-
serve, based on its behavior, that the agent felt emotions such as
betrayal (participant-blame), camaraderie, and trust (self-blame)? A
look at the stimuli shows that theoretically, they could not, indicating
the agent was perceived as social agent with its own inner states.

9
G E N E R A L D I S C U S S I O N
Trust works like a currency that people exchange carefully. Placing
trust in untrustworthy agents implies the risk of goal attainment fail-
ure, because their competencies could be insufficient, or exploitation,
because the agents’ intentions may be dubious. Two major advance-
ments in HCI motivated this thesis. First, as computer agents become
increasingly adept in collaborating with others, humans must evalu-
ate their trustworthiness in novel interactions, including cooperation.
To account for this, an interactive cooperation game paradigm was
developed and chosen instead of the behavioral game theory per-
spective on cooperation, which commonly leads to the adoption of
social dilemmas and an underrepresentation of the role of compe-
tence. Second, computers increasingly mimic human appearance and
behavior, posing the question to which degree human–human and
human–computer trust are similar.
In an attempt to investigate the implications of computers that
are increasingly cooperative and anthropomorphic, the methodological
goal of this thesis was to motivate a framework for the modeling and
evaluation of trust-dependent cooperative interactions with computer
agents. The empirical goal was to flesh out how human–computer
trust develops from the perspective of antecedents, formation, and
regulation of trust.
This chapter summarizes the main results (Section 9.1) and dis-
cusses their implications with respect to trust in HCI, including the
design of intelligent computer agents (Section 9.2). We address fu-
ture research directions (Section 9.5) as well as limitations of the ex-
periments (Section 9.6). Finally, the last section presents concluding
remarks (Section 9.7).
9.1 summary
People infer warmth and competence traits from computer agents’
problem-solving behavior, and these attributions help to predict trust.
By manipulating selfishness and puzzle competence of the agent, Ex-
periment 1 revealed that roughly 62% of the variance of a broad
social perception questionnaire could be explained by warmth and
competence. The results show that warmth statistically mediated the
relationship between unselfishness and behavioral trust as well as be-
tween unselfishness and trustworthiness. Competence partially me-




Anthropomorphism is a more and more prominent factor in human–
computer trust. Experiment 2 and 3 investigated whether anthropo-
morphic agents affect the requesting and adopting of agent advice.
Experiment 2 showed that anthropomorphism did not increase trust
in agent advice, but increased advice requests. Experiment 3 only
partially replicated this pattern: anthropomorphism affected neither
advice adoption nor requests. Instead, the experiment presented evi-
dence of an augmenting effect of anthropomorphism on self-reported
trust. There also was a mismatch between self-reported and behav-
ioral trust. Anthropomorphism increased self-reported but not be-
havioral trust, whereas advice quality increased behavioral but not
self-reported trust. In sum, behavioral and self-reported trust were
mostly uncorrelated.
Experiment 4 showed that agent self-blame can serve a regulatory
function with respect to trust. Self-blaming facilitated trust and trust-
worthiness attributions after joint goal failure. Neither self-blaming
nor other-blaming, however, caused human counterparts to adopt the
agent’s opinion as to who was responsible for the failure, that is, the
agent or the human.
Taken together, the evidence collected across the experiments sup-
ports the notion that trust is a crucial psychological factor in the puz-
zle game paradigm that can be modulated by agent and advice char-
acteristics. Participants adjusted their behavioral trust and trustwor-
thiness attributions based on the agent’s selfishness and puzzle com-
petence (Experiment 1), adopted more good than bad advice (Experi-
ment 2 and 3), and were influenced by verbal and nonverbal blaming
behavior (Experiment 4).
9.2 empirical contributions
9.2.1 The role of warmth and competence
This thesis’ findings are compatible with the view that trust is an im-
portant factor in cooperation (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Dawes, 1980;
Jones & George, 1998; Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995), evolves
over time (Hoffman et al., 2013; Rempel et al., 1985), permits risk tak-
ing (Rousseau et al., 1998), and governs reliance in human–computer
interaction (Lee & See, 2004). In line with previous research, compe-
tent behavior – in terms of puzzle solving (Experiment 1) or qual-
ity of advice (Experiment 2 and 3) – was a central determinant of
trust. However, the results propose that in strategic social interac-
tions, trust is achieved by warmth attributions. Warmth attributions
typically capture perceived intentions. In Experiment 1, such attribu-
tions were modulated by agent selfishness. Hence, the present work
highlights the role of social cognition for human–computer trust (see
Fig. 33).
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Figure 33: How perceived warmth and competence could affect trust in com-
puters.
Prior theorizing about the relation between the warmth and com-
petence concept and trust only implied a close connection between
warmth and trust(-worthiness) in interpersonal relations (Fiske et al.,
2007). The present results show that people rely on the perceived
warmth of computers as foundation of trustworthiness attributions as
well as behavioral trust. In order to distinguish trustworthy from un-
trustworthy technology, people’s behavior and perceptions build on
the same psychological mechanism they apply for categorizing other
individuals (see Fig. 34). So far, the known antecedents of human–
computer trust centered on observations of performance-related vari-
ables and the perceived system purpose with respect to interaction
goals. In line with prior research suggesting that perceived cooper-
ativeness and trustworthiness are essential in cooperative interper-
sonal (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013) and human–computer interaction
(DeSteno et al., 2012; Melo et al., 2014), warmth is a key determinant
of appropriate trust because it reflects the target’s perceived willing-
ness to act in favor of one’s goals.
Experiment 1 investigated warmth and competence attributions us-
ing behavioral manipulations, that is, selfishness and puzzle compe-
tence. In contrast to the social dilemma perspective of cooperation,
cooperating with a selfish agent was still possible. Participants ad-
justed their warmth and trustworthiness attributions and behavioral
trust accordingly if, at the same time, the selfish agent was competent
enough to enact its intentions. This parallels a central proposition of
the warmth and competence concept. Specifically, perceptions on the
warmth and competence dimensions are formed in a two-stage pro-
cess, which later affects approach–avoidance reactions. The first ques-
tion people are faced with when encountering other social agents
is whether these agents intend to harm or help, followed by evalua-
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Figure 34: The relation between warmth, competence, and trust-related out-
comes.
tions of their competence to do so (Fiske et al., 2007). Combining per-
ceived warmth and competence, then, has specific emotional and be-
havioral consequences. Indeed, in the present study, trust depended
on whether perceived agent incompetence was paired with low ver-
sus high warmth, thereby confirming that people are sensitive not
just to the cooperativeness of other individuals, but computer agents
as well.
Given that computer agents can be modeled to exhibit meaning-
ful (non-)cooperative feedback in social dilemmas, one could argue
that such games are also capable of investigating the role of social
attributions like warmth and competence for trust, thereby lowering
the need for new frameworks like the interactive cooperation game
paradigm. For instance, a smile after mutual cooperation is perceived
as cooperative goal orientation (Melo et al., 2014) and thus should
elicit high warmth judgments. Thus the question is, are there bene-
fits of more naturalistic approaches toward cooperation for the study
of human–computer trust? The interactive cooperation paradigm pre-
sented in this thesis provides important extensions to behavioral game
theory paradigms. The contributions pertain a) to the underlying un-
derstanding of cooperative behavior as well as b) trust antecedents.
Experiment 1 incorporated a strategic social behavior component of
cooperation by including both a joint goal and individual goals as
well as the idea of a selfish, yet competent agent that is able to accom-
plish both goal types. According to the social dilemma perspective,
trust permits players to deviate from the Nash equilibrium – mutual
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defection – in favor of cooperation. If the agreement of mutual coop-
eration is reached at some point, there are only selfish reasons to stop
cooperating: if the other player continues to cooperate, I am tempted
to exploit him; if I choose to continue defecting after my exploitation
of the other, I do not have to fear retaliation. The only performance
cues available in this process are each player’s payoff and the relia-
bility with which one has chosen either of the two options. However,
given that performance variables are a key factor in trust evaluations
(Hancock et al., 2011; Lee & See, 2004), we argue that cooperative
environments should combine strategic elements and more tangible
performance cues that require task-specific competencies. Using such
a combination, Experiment 1 was able to demonstrate that a selfish
agent is judged and trusted differently if it also possesses competence.
This finding cannot emerge in social dilemmas.
A perspective that is grounded in social cognition research could
further support the identification of trust antecedents. To the best
of our knowledge, this thesis provides the first empirical evidence
that warmth attributions are an antecedent of human–computer trust.
The interplay of perceived warmth and competence has broad impli-
cations for the shaping of emotions and behavioral responses (Fiske
et al., 2007), but currently there is no deep discussion as to their rel-
evance for human–computer trust, how warmth and competence at-
tributions can be modulated, or how learned experiences with these
judgments affect trust in computers:
• Perceived warmth is more easily lost and harder to reestab-
lish than perceived competence (Cuddy et al., 2011). Design-
ers should bear in mind that a computer which rejects an or-
der because the order is contextually inappropriate (e.g., Briggs
& Scheutz, 2015) could decrease in perceived warmth. Thus it
should provide feedback as to why rejection is, in fact, more
appropriate in order to mitigate this effect.
• Warmth and competence are modulated by controllable and
uncontrollable nonverbal signals (Cuddy et al., 2011). Anthro-
pomorphic nonverbal signals such as smiling, eye-contact, and
immediacy cues (DeSteno et al., 2012; Kulms et al., 2011; Melo
et al., 2014) thus could play an important role for the perceived
warmth and competence of computer agents.
• When judging the behavior of targets, people rate those who
rejected to cause harm among others as warmer but less compe-
tent than targets who accepted to cause harm (Rom et al., 2017).
Intriguingly, the effect of harm rejection on warmth was medi-
ated by perceptions of affective processing, whereas the effect
of harm acceptance on competence was mediated by percep-
tions of cognitive processing Computers that are attributed the
capability to process affective states (Melo & Gratch, 2015) may
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thus be attributed higher warmth as well, given that they show
prosocial behavior toward social agents.
• Warmth attributions are associated with a potentially higher
risk because the consequence of misattributing perceived inten-
tions can be severe (Cuddy et al., 2011). In order to foster ap-
propriate trust, computers should unequivocally communicate
their purpose to their direct users as well as further user groups
affected by them.
• Warmth attributions are ’other-profitable’ in that they are asso-
ciated with prosocial behavior (Peeters, 2002). In the context of
cooperation, perceived warmth could help to mitigate conflicts
and thus promote the cooperative interaction goal. By the same
token, low perceived warmth is associated with low coopera-
tiveness and negatively affects the search for agreements and
compromises.
• Warmth judgments shape social perception in a meaningful way.
They are more accessible than competence traits and more rele-
vant for impressions in terms of prediction accuracy and weight
(Wojciszke et al., 1998). Given that people infer warmth judg-
ments not just from direct interactions with targets but also writ-
ten descriptions and other materials (Wojciszke et al., 1998), any
information as to the performance, purpose, and other charac-
teristics can be used to set up initial warmth attributions.
Accurately attributing warmth and competence to friends or foes
and adjusting one’s behavior accordingly does not automatically lead
to advantages at distinguishing trustworthy from untrustworthy tech-
nology. This is because technology is sometimes poorly designed. For
instance, incompetent and erroneous technology can be hard to iden-
tify if errors are hidden or not communicated clearly. Even if the roles
and capabilities of humans and computers further align with each
other, potentially enabling a symmetrical social exchange of trust in
the future (Lee & See, 2004), it remains unclear if perceived differ-
ences caused by hard-wired perceptual processing in the brain will
disappear as well. Technologies such as conversational systems, vir-
tual agents, and social robots believably imitate human characteris-
tics, but currently there is no evidence that these systems will eventu-
ally diminish the unique brain activation patterns revealed in human–
computer interactions (Krach et al., 2008; McCabe et al., 2001; Sanfey
et al., 2003). These patterns demonstrate that only when interacting
with other humans in economic exchange, brain areas related to the
experience of negative emotions and mentalizing are activated. A cru-
cial piece of information is that people know beforehand if they inter-
act with other individuals or not, and others pointed out the advan-
tages of this knowledge (Melo & Gratch, 2015).
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9.2.2 Human–computer trust
The results add to our understanding of human–computer trust, in
particular, how trust develops and is shaped by contextual factors in
cooperation. They support the general assumption that computer per-
formance plays a key role for trust of humans in computers (Hancock
et al., 2011; Lee & See, 2004; Lee & Moray, 1992; Muir, 1987), but first
the role of anthropomorphism is explained.
Anthropomorphism, the degree to which computers show human-
like characteristics, is believed to be a bridging element that can in-
crease the similarities between human–human and human–computer
trust. Experiment 2 and 3 focused on the role of anthropomorphism
for computer-generated advice, they revealed both consistent and
inconsistent findings. Across both experiments, anthropomorphism
did not affect behavioral trust, that is, advice adoption. This finding
stands in contrast to previous research indicating that anthropomor-
phism increases trusting and cooperative decisions in social dilemmas
(Miwa et al., 2008; Parise et al., 1999; Sandoval et al., 2015). Social
dilemmas include an explicit strategic component in that choices af-
fect both one’s own and the counterpart’s payoff, and one can choose
between defection and cooperation (Brosnan et al., 2010). In contrast,
the puzzle game version used in Experiment 2 and 3 asked how peo-
ple form trust in agents that offer advice during problem-solving.
With respect to advice adoption, it was revealed that participants
do not differentiate between a computer versus virtual agent (Ex-
periment 2) or even between a computer versus virtual versus hu-
man agent (Experiment 3). However, anthropomorphism increased
self-reported trust in Experiment 3. A statistical trend reflected that
participants’ responses as to how much they trusted their counter-
part were more in favor of the human compared to the computer,
and trustworthiness attributions indicated higher perceived trustwor-
thiness of the human and virtual agent, respectively, both compared
to the computer. These results are in contrast to studies that found
computers to sometimes elicit higher trust ratings than avatars and
humans (Visser et al., 2016; Visser et al., 2017), but are in line with
another study showing that self-reported trust in a simulated car is
increased by combined anthropomorphism and autonomy of the car
(Waytz et al., 2014). However, in those studies, behavioral measures
tended to be in line with self-reported measures.
The overall conclusion on behavioral trust must be that anthropo-
morphism does not influence participant behavior in the present set-
ting. Instead, to convince participants to adopt agent solutions, the
advice needed to be a competent contribution toward the goal. Ap-
parently, competent advice was the factor that led to appropriate ex-
pectations of the agent’s ability to help participants. The perceived
usefulness of advice was evaluated in isolation, and the source of
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advice did not affect this process. From a social perspective, how-
ever, one should still ask why self-reported and behavioral trust were
mostly disassociated. The game mechanics may play a role here. It
was discussed before that the agent’s continued competent perfor-
mance toward the goal could have been an overall significant cue for
trust. According to this reasoning, participants focused on more im-
mediate puzzle solving in terms of block placings and discarded the
several steps that were involved for advice utilization: Step 1: evaluat-
ing if they need advice; Step 2: requesting advice; Step 3: evaluating
advice. This could explain the overall low advice request rate in Ex-
periment 3 and does not contradict the effect of anthropomorphism
on self-reported trust. It also points to the relevance of the nature
and mechanics of cooperative interaction. In the final round of Exper-
iment 3, the mechanics were changed, leading to higher uncertainty,
which resulted in the only (weak) correlation between self-reported
and behavioral trust.
The results address the degree to which people respond to com-
puters as if they were social actors (Nass & Moon, 2000; Nass et al.,
1994, 1995, 1996; Reeves & Nass, 1996). The CASA paradigm pre-
dicts that social responses occur based on whether computers are
endowed with human-like characteristics such as voice output, social
roles, or human-sounding voices (Nass et al., 1994). In Experiment
1, neither of these characteristics were shown by the agent. Still, par-
ticipants attributed meaningful warmth and competence traits to it.
This indicates that cooperative problem-solving itself could encom-
pass factors based on which people respond socially to computers, as
demonstrated by the behavioral manipulations. In the following ex-
periments, anthropomorphic cues of the agent were based on human-
like appearance and voice output, eliciting inconsistent responses
with respect to the degree to which participants completely ignored
advice offers. In Experiment 2, anthropomorphism decreased ignored
advice offers, but this effect disappeared in Experiment 3, possibly
due to the overall low advice request rate (see previous paragraph).
Participants had a stronger desire to evaluate advice by an anthro-
pomorphic agent when it was offered at fixed time intervals (Exper-
iment 2) instead of when it was available flexibly (Experiment 3). In
Experiment 4, human-like self-blaming behavior enabled the agent to
regulate and preserve trust, but it did not convince participants to
adopt its stance as to who was responsible for joint goal failure, even
though this question was asked after the interaction ended and not by
the agent itself. Although this experiment demonstrated the positive
effect of self-blame on trust, it could also indicate that responsibility
attributions are not necessarily involved.
In sum, like previous research (Visser et al., 2016), the present the-
sis indicates that the type (i.e., visual appearance, voice, emotion
expressions) and content (i.e., anger vs. sadness) of anthropomor-
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phic cues significantly shapes the formation and regulation of the
subjective human–computer trust experience. With respect to behav-
ioral outcomes, however, anthropomorphism may be of greater use
at single critical points of the interaction, such as joint goal failure.
For the long-time formation, potential effects of anthropomorphism
must withstand the decline over time, and even then, they can be
obscured by interaction factors that are more immediately related
to problem-solving. Thus for trust formation, performance variables
clearly played a more important role. The absence of interaction ef-
fects between anthropomorphism and performance on trust implies
that performance is consistently relevant across all types and contents
of anthropomorphism.
9.3 methodological contributions : interactive cooper-
ation with computers
The interactive cooperation game paradigm presented in this thesis
enabled users to participate in 2-player cooperation games with a
computer agent. Across a series of experiments, these games inves-
tigated how cooperative interaction factors pertaining to the appear-
ance and behavior of agents affect trust (see Fig. 35).
Figure 35: Interaction factors in the paradigm.
The paradigm sheds light on how humans cooperate with comput-
ers. This includes the role of trust and how shared human–computer
activities should be designed in order to support problem-solving
processes. The relationship between trust and cooperation is of par-
ticular interest because in contrast to social dilemmas, the problem-
solving process relied on competent action. In the present interaction
paradigm, cooperation pertains to the collective efforts geared toward
the joint goal, and team performance is a key indicator of successful
114 general discussion
cooperation. Only weak to moderate relationships emerged between
trust and team performance. These relationships were not consistent
but occurred in single rounds. Structurally, the findings cannot dif-
ferentiate between the effect of trust on cooperation and vice versa,
but they show the importance of consistent trustworthy behavior. In
Experiment 2, bad advice by the agent decreased its overall perceived
trustworthiness, although its block placements were configured to op-
timally achieve the goal. Thus in complex multi-dimensional coopera-
tion, agents are punished for untrustworthy behavior, even if it occurs
on single problem-solving dimensions such as advice giving.
Which interaction factors were related to team performance as co-
operative outcome? Overall, performance variables in the form of ad-
vice quality showed relationships with team performance, whereas
anthropomorphism remained insignificant (Experiment 2 and 3). For
anthropomorphism to have a substantial impact, it can be assumed
that the agent needs to be more persuasive when providing advice
and should provide it more often. In the experiments, persuasiveness
was not manipulated on purpose in order to focus on the effect of the
mere presence and voice output of anthropomorphic agents.
The role of anthropomorphism in the context of cooperation re-
mains largely unexplored. Experiment 2 showed how anthropomor-
phism shapes the course of cooperative interactions. In this study, par-
ticipants requested more advice from anthropomorphic compared to
non-anthropomorphic agents. Although anthropomorphism did not
affect trust in advice, it increased opportunities for task-related ex-
change. There are two potential benefits to that. First, increased op-
portunities for exchanging task-specific information could facilitate
cooperation in the long run. Second, increased opportunities could
also lead to higher advice adoption. To clarify this argument, an-
other result should be considered. Experiment 2 and 3 revealed al-
most consistent moderate to strong relationships between requested
and adopted advice. Accordingly, the likelihood to adopt computer
advice depends to some degree on the request rate. Requests can be
seen as pre-evaluation phase that prepares the trust decision. One ex-
planation for this relationship could be that a certain amount of trust
is already put into the agent during pre-evaluation, and this readiness
has an effect on the trust decision. If we assume that participants were
also inclined to adopt incompetent advice merely because they had
requested it, this would be considered as poorly calibrated trust. Still,
it remains unclear how exactly anthropomorphism affected people
to request more advice. Self-reported trust and perceived trustwor-
thiness can be ruled out as they were not related to the request rate.
Potential reasons are mere curiosity or simply liking the anthropo-
morphic agent more. As caveat, note that the correlations do not dis-
tinguish between competent and incompetent advice. This highlights
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that the use of anthropomorphism should be evaluated carefully (see
Lee & See, 2004).
Another important aspect of cooperation is to decide when and
how task-related advice should be made available, because this fac-
tor directly influences goal achievement. Anthropomorphism is only
one possible mechanism that may prompt human decision-makers to
consider advice. Likewise, advice utilization is not only determined
by trust in advisors; other factors include the competence differential
between advisors and advice takers, quality of advice, performance-
contingent rewards, and advisors’ confidence in their own advice
(see Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006, for a review). The experiments inves-
tigated two different approaches. Experiment 2 had fixed points in
each round, whereas Experiment 3 offered participants to request ad-
vice at any given time with a fixed maximum equal to Experiment
2. As a consequence, the number of requested and adopted good ad-
vice in Experiment 3 was somewhat lower, with the exception of the
final round, which imposed higher uncertainty because advice was
no longer shown first but implemented directly by the agent. Pre-
vious research suggest large individual differences not only regard-
ing advice utilization, but also whether advice utilization actually
leads to better outcomes in the first place (Gardner & Berry, 1995).
This implies that efforts to generally increase advice utilization in
human–computer cooperation should be viewed with caution. Such
efforts may not only have positive effects on the outcome; for some,
advice may function as a crutch that impedes learning (Gardner &
Berry, 1995). Against this background, the presentation and complex-
ity of the underlying problem-solving process and role of the agent is
highlighted. Recall that even without advice, participants cooperated
with the agent. It is thus important to emphasize the agent’s over-
all cooperativeness and competence to ensure that especially crucial
advice is utilized throughout the interaction. On the one had, anthro-
pomorphism could support advice utilization in numerous ways, for
instance by providing positive affective feedback as reward, reinforc-
ing confidence in the advice, and stressing the importance of finding
an optimal solution at vital moments. Because anthropomorphism is
associated with trust resilience (Visser et al., 2016), anthropomorphic
cues could help keeping advice utilization more steadily. On the other
hand, negative effects of advice utilization should be prevented. An-
thropomorphic agents could mitigate these side effects by emphasiz-
ing humans’ contribution to the goal and facilitate their self-efficacy.
Across all experiments, the same puzzle game principle was used
to investigate cooperation from different angles: social attributions
in strategic social decision-making, people’s responses to computer
advice of agents varying in anthropomorphism, and how people re-
spond to blaming behavior of an anthropomorphic agent. Still, the
paradigm had to simplify various key elements of cooperative ac-
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tivities. Truly naturalistic cooperation can involve numerous differ-
ent scenarios, goals, resource conflicts, communication forms, group
sizes, and so forth. Broadening the experimental scope and setup to
account for some of those variations is important in order to infer
how agents capable of cooperation can be designed. Social dilemma
setups are adequate for investigating factors such as communication,
group size, and decision framing (e.g., giving vs. taking) (Brewer &
Kramer, 1986; Liebrand, 1984), but they are a poor choice if compe-
tence or performance, respectively, are to be studied. Deviating from
social dilemmas implied a constant challenge regarding participants’
actual understanding of the requirements of the human–computer
task. To ensure the overall perceived complexity would be as low as
possible, the task and controls were kept simple. Furthermore, the
role as well as contributions of the agent to the problem-solving were
made explicit and observable. Although the agents were not endowed
with computational mechanisms that explicitly facilitate cooperation,
observations and debriefing dialogs indicate that most participants
interacted easily with them.
9.4 designing for trust and trustworthiness
Lastly, the empirical and methodological contributions speak to the is-
sue of designing trustworthy computer agents that elicit appropriate
trust. Agents typically gain trustworthiness based on their system ca-
pabilities. Such capabilities should be congruent with the level of user
trust to facilitate calibrated or appropriate trust (Lee & See, 2004). Go-
ing beyond this, future forms of virtual agents and social robots could
be equipped with design features that allow them to autonomously
modulate their own trustworthiness, for instance by means of anthro-
pomorphism (DeSteno et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2013; Lucas et al., 2016).
The engineering of trustworthy behavior will need to be grounded in
psychology and communication studies in order to take into account
how humans encode (e.g., Boone & Buck, 2003; Oosterhof & Todorov,
2008; Todorov, 2008; Winston et al., 2002) and decode (Fiske et al.,
2007; Judd et al., 2005) trustworthiness.
By showing how warmth mediates the relation between task-related
behavior and trustworthiness, some of the ambiguity between trust-
worthiness and warmth has gained a new perspective through the
present thesis. Warmth can be an important source of agent trust-
worthiness. Still, major challenges remain. It is largely unknown how
social perception weighs and integrates different cues of artificial
warmth and competence to form trustworthiness judgments. Further-
more, as human–computer interactions are increasingly complex, it
becomes impracticable to script flexible yet robust trustworthy behav-
ior for entire interactions. At the same time, there is little hope for un-
covering single universal cues of trustworthiness (see DeSteno et al.,
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2012). As a consequence, it could be more feasible to focus on basic
patterns of behavioral trustworthiness that allow the strengthening
of appropriate trust, much like a simple “trustworthiness language”,
and investigate how these patterns are appraised in dynamic social
interactions (see also Hoffman et al., 2013). The initial question is this:
Given a specific context, what would a trustworthy intelligent agent
(not) do?
The following suggestions for trustworthy behavior can be derived
based on this thesis’ findings:
• Blame: In contrast to participant-blame, a self-blaming agent
was liked better and received higher trustworthiness attribu-
tions. Other media such as animated movies and video games
have long demonstrated how anthropomorphic cues can believ-
ably convey regret, disappointment, and anger. Experiment 4
showed how those behaviors can also decrease felt shame, guilt,
irritation, and increase camaraderie in cooperation.
• Computer advice: It is unclear why participants sought more
advice from an anthropomorphic agent in one experiment but
did not in the other. In order to reliably convince users to adopt
useful computer advice, however, the advice should be compe-
tent. Since subjective ratings indicated a positive effect of an-
thropomorphism on trustworthiness, anthropomorphic agents
could play a supportive role by highlighting their confidence in
otherwise ambiguous advice.
• Goal failure and responsibility: Without clear evidence of fail-
ure being committed by either of the two players, participants
refrained from attributing blame to the agent, even if it blamed
itself. This has two implications. First, participants did not look
for blame were none was to be found. Second, attributing blame
to the team is a practical way of preserving the possibility to
continue cooperation without imposing further social costs to
either of the players: to the participants themselves for having
to follow the social blaming script, including persuasive blame
(Malle et al., 2014), or to the agent for having to perform further
repair strategies.
• Uncertainty: Uncertainty is an external factor with potential
consequences for the trusting relationship. Decisions under in-
creased uncertainty require increased trust. Notably, there was
no relation between trusting decisions under uncertainty (or
without uncertainty) and perceived trustworthiness of the agent.
A possible explanation is that trustworthiness attributions (i.e.,
agent perceptions) can become disassociated from decisions to
trust (i.e., behavior perceptions). A more obvious immediacy
between agents as on-screen characters and their actions within
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the task environment could help establish this relation, for in-
stance through additional animation or agent comments (e.g.,
“I will place this block over there”).
• Strategic behavior: Due to conflicting interests, cooperation of-
ten involves the possibility for the participating agents to act
selfishly. Humans are sensitive to the selfishness of their part-
ners, and unselfishness is a reliable way to increase trustworthi-
ness. The following design considerations advocate a cautious
use of selfishness: Does selfishness potentially impede coordi-
nation within the task environment and thus put the joint goal
at risk? Will users be willing to continue interacting with a self-
ish agent? Can the agent use mechanisms to regulate adverse
effects of selfishness? Unselfishness alone does not ensure fa-
vorable trustworthiness judgments: unselfish compliance with
human advice can make an agent seem less able if its compe-
tence is questionable (“Will do but can’t do”). In this case, an
agent should try to reduce uncertainty before implementing ad-
vice in a wrong way.
• Competence: More importantly, human cooperators must be
provided with information to identify incompetent agents. Per-
formance variables were shown to be among the most consistent
determinants of trust. One method to support performance eval-
uations and competence attributions is to provide continuous
feedback of agent performance (Dzindolet et al., 2003). For fu-
ture human–agent cooperations, this very feedback should not
only entail the overall goal performance of agents, but also in-
formation about how they tend to coordinate (e.g., as first-mover,
by focusing on easy vs. difficult sub-tasks) and respond to their
partner in order to support user preferences.
Figure 36 shows how the findings can be condensed into a new
conceptual model of human–computer trust. Although the proposed
model is based on a rather small number of empirical investigations,
some features set it apart from previous models on human–computer
trust (Bickmore & Cassell, 2001; Hoff & Bashir, 2015; Lee & See, 2004;
Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007). The model describes how perceived
warmth can be amplified by anthropomorphic appearance and be-
haviors as well as task-related performance of agents. Both perceived
warmth and competence (performance) are important antecedents of
trust, but statistically, the mediating role of perceived warmth was
clearer than perceived competence when the agent’s intentions were
dubious. However, the actual issue to be solved when designing trust-
worthy agents is not to balance warmth against competence. Compe-
tence is a necessary condition of trust, but its effect can be amplified
through warmth as well as the factors that determine warmth. In fact,
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the model highlights how warmth, too, can be amplified by perfor-
mance variables. Conversely, trying to compensate for a lack of com-
petence through warmth may be tempting, but such attempts should
be considered bad design practice because they are highly mislead-
ing.
According to this view, anthropomorphism does not always affect
trustworthiness through warmth. Other pathways may be possible
as well, yet how they function can only be determined if the hy-
pothesized distinction between warmth and trustworthiness becomes
clearer. This could be achieved, for instance, by using a wider range
of anthropomorphic cues to manipulate the effect of both constructs
on affective and behavioral outcomes. The present and previous find-
ings suggest that warmth captures a broad range of friendliness, kind-
ness, and cooperativeness attributions, whereas trustworthiness is
narrowed down to task-related competence, benevolence, and moral
integrity (Fiske et al., 2007; Mayer et al., 1995). However, this distinc-
tion seems to be too vague to explain if agents can be trustworthy but
not warm, and vice versa.
Another characteristic of the proposed model is that its empirical
basis was established entirely using the interactive cooperation game
paradigm as underlying methodology. The model thus encapsulates
how participants trusted and cooperated with the different computer
agents, including the inconsistent relation between team performance
(cooperation) and trust. In order to improve the model, it is necessary
to pinpoint more clearly how cooperative actions form trust, and how
trust supports cooperation in the present paradigm.
Figure 36: The combined empirical and methodological contributions form
a conceptual model of human-computer trust.
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9.5 future research directions
This section tries to formulate the most relevant further questions
regarding human–computer trust and cooperation.
Warmth and competence
Despite their relevance for social cognition, little is known about
how anthropomorphic agents can shape warmth and competence
attributions, and how these attributions modulate attitudes, behav-
iors, and emotions. Currently there is no theoretical integration as to
how warmth and competence contribute to trustworthiness, partially
because warmth and trustworthiness are often treated as the same,
leading to a simplification of trustworthiness (Fiske et al., 2007). Con-
ceptually, however, trustworthiness necessarily entails competence as
well. Based on this thesis’ findings, HCI research requires dynamic,
context-dependent frameworks and models that tackle the following
questions:
• Given the overall significance of computer performance for trust,
when and why does the relative importance of competence shift
to warmth, and vice versa?
• Do the mechanisms and signals of interpersonal warmth and
competence generally apply to HCI (see Section 9.2.1), or do
the same biases and heuristics that underlie human–computer
trust affect the warmth and competence of computers?
• What is the effect of warmth and competence on social influence
in other major interaction paradigms (e.g., negotiation, decision
support, open conversational dialog, coaching and tutoring)?
• How are warmth and competence attributions of computers in-
fluenced by surface variables on the user interface, individual
dispositions (e.g., emotional intelligence), cultural background,
and demographics?
Trust concept
State-of-the-art HCI studies generally use contemporary trust concep-
tualizations to the extent that they adopt the trust definitions by Lee
and See (2004) or Mayer et al. (1995). However, interaction factors
such as risk and vulnerability have become understudied in the con-
text of human–computer trust. It must be assumed that the interplay
of perceived risk and benefit crucially affects how people rely on tech-
nology with safety-relevant mechanisms such as autonomous vehi-
cles (see Chapter 3). Social dilemmas, for instance, clearly exemplify
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risk and benefit by means of their explicit payoff structures, but this
ratio is not altered throughout interactions. Accordingly, the follow-
ing questions should be asked:
• Do contextual factors such as anthropomorphism affect the per-
ception of risk and benefits?
• Is anthropomorphism related to more perceived risk in critical
situations because human behavior is supposed to be inherently
fallible, or is this effect dampened because anthropomorphism
remains a surface variable with low influence?
Mind perception
It has been argued that perceiving mind in computers fundamentally
changes people’s social responses to computers because in this case,
computers are believed to have agency and be capable of human-like
experience (Melo & Gratch, 2015). This could have implications for
trust:
• Is mind perception related to qualitative changes in trust, for
instance a stronger affective foundation?
Trust measures
People’s self-reported and behavioral trust are prone to inconsisten-
cies, and the dynamics of trust would require realtime measures to
maximize accuracy. As shown by the effect of anthropomorphism on
advice requests (Experiment 2), choices that lead to trust decisions
should also be considered for the evaluation of trust in cooperation,
because trust decisions and these earlier choices can be positively re-
lated.
• How can self-reported trust be obtained unobtrusively in coop-
eration?
• Is there a feasible way to trace the effect of different types of co-
operation (conditional vs. unconditional, reciprocal, commitment-
based) on trust in repeated interactions?
• What are the differences between decision-making tasks as used
for the present work and more open interactions such as con-
versational dialog with respect to the nature and antecedents of
trust? How can agents establish trustworthiness in open dialog?
Cooperation
A central conclusion of the present work is that the interaction dimen-
sions which structurally define problem-solving, exchange of infor-
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mation, and strategic components need to be considered in human–
computer cooperation. This is especially true if they correspond to
key concepts of cooperation and thus can either support or impede
cooperation (see Chapter 4).
• Very little is known about how symmetric exchanges of trust
could affect cooperation, in particular, how humans appraise
being categorized as untrustworthy by agents, and how they
interact with agents that adjust to trusting and distrusting feed-
back.
• Anecdotal evidence suggested some participants enjoyed the
puzzle game more when playing on their own. What are the
effects of human–computer cooperation on the interaction expe-
rience (e.g., perceived control) and performance?
• There is no definitive guideline as to what human–computer
cooperation should look like. From a human-centered perspec-
tive, cooperation should support human needs and goals. Un-
der which conditions are the demands of cooperation (e.g., co-
ordination and communication) detrimental to human goals?
• Computer agents are increasingly capable of human-like problem-
solving and occupy roles as intelligent collaborators. How does
this affect the balancing of guidance and responsibility between
humans and computers?
Anthropomorphism & human–computer trust
Finally, based on the literature review in earlier chapters and despite
the present experiments, it has not yet been shown if anthropomor-
phism can make a significant and unequivocal difference for human–
computer trust to the extent that its influence is not limited to spe-
cific interaction paradigms and we can predict how, when, and why
the effect of anthropomorphism dynamically changes and evolves in
the long run. The main difference between interpersonal and human–
computer trust has never been of quantitative nature; it is not partic-
ularly challenging to show how a human and computer target evoke
the same amount of user trust. Still, both forms of trust are based on
different qualities. The following points address this issue:
• A stronger focus on mechanisms that describe trust decisions
and experiences with humans versus computers on a qualitative
level is needed. For instance, there is a qualitative difference be-
tween conditional and unconditional trust that comes from dif-
ferent underlying assumptions regarding the interaction part-
ner, that is, self-interest versus trustworthiness (Krueger et al.,
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2007). Furthermore, the affective foundation of trust is over-
looked for the most part (see also warmth and competence as
important focus of research).
• Which disruptive events cause the illusion of human-likeness to
break down?
• Should a breakdown be enforced to prevent the influence of
human-likeness on decision-making when it is not needed?
9.6 limitations
The development of the interactive cooperation paradigm represents
an effort to increase the ecological validity of trust and cooperation
studies in HCI. While the paradigm provided more interactive problem-
solving mechanisms, it is nonetheless based on some assumptions that
limit ecological validity in their own way.
First, it assumes that participants want to solve a problem they
could theoretically solve themselves together with a computer. This
assumption does not stand in contrast to many real world applica-
tions of intelligent agents. People’s daily assistants often provide op-
tional and additional advice to tasks that users could very well solve
on their own. Those assistants are valued because they adapt to user
needs. Thus the question is: How well did the agents coordinate and
provide useful advice? This question leads to the second assumption,
that is, all users solve the same problem in the same way. Answering
the question above, all participants of a given experiment interacted
with the same puzzle solving heuristic. The upcoming action of the
agent was at times governed by behavioral manipulations, but this
did not change the fact that the underlying heuristic was static. As
a consequence, all task approaches by participants were treated the
same. Indeed, the optimality with which the agent solved the puz-
zle occasionally required people to align to the agent. The third and
most important assumption is that the actions, tasks, and goals within
the paradigm approximate future human–agent cooperation. This as-
sumption is inherently difficult to confirm for any kind of labora-
tory setting. The most intricate element to uphold in this argument
is that the present paradigm allocated actions to users and agents in
a realistic fashion. In other words, the sequence, types, and compe-
tence cues of the actions could occur in real-world settings as well
and do not feel synthetic or imposed. The present paradigm avoided
initiative and autonomy issues for the most part. Indeed, this is a
rather strong limitation to interactive problem-solving. With increas-
ingly complex human–computer tasks, problem-solving will surely
benefit from more flexibility on both sides.
The experiments include a number of methodological limitations.
To control for the social effect of individual design and behavior fea-
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tures and to increase external validity, different versions of virtual
as well as human agents should be used in studies on anthropomor-
phism. One way to achieve better control of subtle behavior nuances
in the stimuli set is to use trained actors as human agents (e.g., Visser
et al., 2016). As mentioned earlier, Experiment 2 had a rather small
sample size which could have decreased the likelihood of detecting
interaction effects. In Experiment 4, it would have been interesting
to analyze the effect of blame on the outcome variables while also
varying anthropomorphism, including non-anthropomorphic agents.
The final limitation is that the different cooperative interaction fac-
tors were not examined together in a holistic fashion, but in four
different experiments. A common way to include additional experi-
mental manipulations into single experiments are within-subject de-
signs. For instance, the between-subject factors agent and advice qual-
ity could have been changed to within-subject factors. On the flip side,
this would increase each participant’s number of rounds to play and
possibly decrease the social effects of the agent. Combining three dif-
ferent agents, three types of advice quality, and three types of goal dif-
ficulty would total 27 rounds for each participant. Apart from simple
experimental manipulations, the experiments had differences with
respect to their interaction as a whole. The most significant change
occurred between the strategic cooperation and advice adoption sce-
narios, whereas Experiments 2− 4 are more compatible. However, the
modifications became apparent in a stepwise fashion and was driven
by each prior experiment.
9.7 concluding remarks
This thesis provides another step toward investigating trust in inter-
active human–computer cooperation. There is little certainty as to
how intelligent (virtual) agents and social robots will help humans
achieve their goals in the future and how they will be accepted. Cur-
rent advances in the domain of speech-based assistants show that
visual anthropomorphic cues are still implemented with caution. Do-
mains with a higher need for trust and the possibility to achieve user
goals through interaction in a manner that feels unobtrusive and not
forced, much like humans who naturally engage in social interaction
in order to achieve a cooperative goal, could benefit more strongly
from warmth and trustworthiness modulations using visual human-
likeness. Against this background, the manifold forms of human–
computer cooperation could be ideal to investigate how agent an-
thropomorphism and capabilities affect user trust. At this point, co-
operating with other humans often feels much more natural because
computers have little understanding of how task-related behaviors
and social actions promote cooperative goals and trust at the same
time.
a
A P P E N D I X
The appendix presents the complete means and standard deviations
of the empirical data, some of which were already presented using
figures.
a.1 experiment 1
The means and standard deviations of warmth, competence, behav-
ioral trust, and trustworthiness are given below.
Table 14: Means and standard deviations for warmth and competence.
Warmth Competence
Selfishness Puzzle Competence M SD M SD
Unselfish Competent 1.14 0.66 0.60 0.94
Incompetent −0.33 0.83 −0.61 0.85
Selfish Competent −0.20 0.85 0.32 0.97
Incompetent −0.62 0.64 −0.30 0.82
Table 15: Means and standard deviations of behavioral trust and trustwor-
thiness.
Behavioral trust Trustworthiness
Selfishness Puzzle Competence M SD M SD
Unselfish Competent 4.00 1.08 4.00 0.57
Incompetent 2.45 1.45 2.15 0.52
Selfish Competent 2.50 1.50 2.71 0.78




The means and standard deviations of requested and adopted advice
are given below.
Table 16: Means and standard deviations for requested advice.
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Advice
quality
Agent M SD M SD M SD
Good Computer 1.42 0.94 1.71 0.99 1.71 1.07
VA 1.88 0.72 2.00 0.63 1.75 0.86
Bad Computer 1.80 1.01 1.60 0.91 1.47 1.19
VA 1.43 0.94 2.13 0.99 2.13 0.83
Note. VA = Virtual agent.
Table 17: Means and standard deviations for adopted advice.
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Advice
quality
Agent M SD M SD M SD
Good Computer 1.00 0.78 1.50 1.02 1.43 0.85
VA 1.50 0.82 1.69 0.79 1.44 0.81
Bad Computer 0.40 0.63 0.33 0.62 0.33 0.90
VA 0.33 0.62 0.27 0.59 0.20 0.41
Note. VA = Virtual agent.
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a.3 experiment 3
The means and standard deviations of requested and adopted advice
are given below.
Table 18: Means and standard deviations of requested advice.
Round 1 Round 2
Advice
quality
Agent M SD M SD
Good Computer 1.68 1.00 1.21 1.08
Virtual agent 1.68 1.25 0.84 1.21
Human 1.42 1.17 0.94 0.97
Mixed Computer 1.00 0.88 0.47 0.84
Virtual agent 0.74 0.93 0.42 0.69
Human 1.16 1.17 0.63 1.07
Table 19: Means and standard deviations of adopted advice.
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Advice
quality
Agent M SD M SD M SD
Good Computer 1.11 0.99 0.89 0.88 1.79 1.27
Virtual agent 1.05 1.08 0.68 1.16 1.26 1.33
Human 1.05 1.08 0.42 0.61 1.47 1.31
Mixed Computer 0.11 0.32 0.21 0.54 0.90 1.15
Virtual agent 0.05 0.23 0.26 0.56 0.42 0.77
Human 0.05 0.23 0.37 0.90 1.11 1.20
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